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Abstract 
This thesis examines the social, cultural and emotional welfare of Scottish 
women and children who were included in the mass evacuation of civilians 
which took place at the beginning of the Second World War.  The first half 
of the twentieth century was marked by the momentous events of two very 
bloody and all-encompassing world wars.  From the 1920s the British 
government, through the Committees of Imperial Defence and Air Raid 
Precautions, speculated on how best to protect the civilian population in the 
event of any future major conflict.  As a result plans were put in place for the 
mass evacuation of vulnerable people through the appointment of an 
Evacuation sub-committee.  The process of evacuation of millions of 
civilians has been documented by historians writing mainly from an English 
perspective.  The same level of detailed academic analysis has not been 
extended to Scotland.  The following thesis adds to the breadth of analysis of 
the evacuation process in Britain.    
 
The work explores the well-established theory that warfare ultimately led to 
welfare most often associated with Richard Titmuss.  This theory has been 
challenged by a number of revisionist historians, specifically Macnicol and 
Harris.  This thesis upholds the Titmuss theory and provides evidence in 
support of the claim within the framework of health, education and religion.  
The research methodology adopted was a qualitative study of oral testimony 
by Scottish evacuees through a series of interviews.  These interviews reflect 
on the broader evacuation experience from a hitherto somewhat neglected 
Scottish perspective.  The information has been analysed in conjunction with 
an extensive and contrasting collection of sources.  This data, while adding 
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value to the broad British experience of evacuation, identified a specific 
Scottish dimension, in particular within the sphere of maternity and child 
care, child guidance and the extension to educational service.  The thesis 
also examines the way in which the Scottish process brought the Church and 
state into closer contact. 
 
In conclusion this thesis identified how far the evacuation process 
contributed to the social welfare developments which took place during and 
immediately after the Second World War.  The oral history interviews 
contained within the research made it possible to establish that the social 
well-being of post-war generations was enhanced as a result of the 
evacuation process.             
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Introduction 
 
As regards the evacuation scheme, I am almost afraid to refer to it as 
a social experiment, although I have heard those words used about it 
time and again.  It certainly has been a social upheaval…I have seen 
both sides of the problem and I want to be fair in dealing with it.  
 Joseph Westwood MP, 21 November 1939. 1 
   
The evacuation process that Joseph Westwood, Labour MP for Falkirk and 
Stirling, referred to above began on Friday, 1 September 1939, two days 
before the declaration of the Second World War.  It is the story of the 
evacuation process, which was the mandatory transfer of thousands of 
vulnerable people to places of perceived safety, referred to above as a ‘social 
experiment’, that lies at the heart of this study.  Evacuation was an attempt 
by the British government to protect the most vulnerable members of the 
public, including schoolchildren, mothers with children, the blind and 
disabled, who were sent away from perceived danger areas of major cities at 
the outbreak of war.  Much of the academic history of the evacuation 
process, including oral testimonies, has been written from an English 
perspective.  In Scotland the actual experience of evacuation has not been 
told comprehensively from those who were evacuated.  More importantly, as 
a social history, working from a base of materials derived from first hand 
                                                 
1 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1088-1089. 
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interviews allows us to see that evacuees were more than just recipients of 
some kind of government policy, they themselves helped shape it.  
 
Using oral testimony in conjunction with a variety of primary source 
material and historiography, this thesis investigates the development of 
social welfare and the role of memory within the framework of the 
evacuation process.  It is a thematic exploration and explanation of social 
and cultural change resulting from this evacuation in three particular fields: 
education, health and religion.  Together, these strands combine to form the 
overarching theme of the thesis to relate the social history of the Scottish 
evacuation in which the evacuees were themselves such a fundamental part.    
 
This chapter introduces the motivation for the thesis, its aims and objectives, 
and the methods used in connection with the collecting of oral testimony.  It 
includes a review of the literary sources which have been used to help create 
a structured argument that warfare led to welfare within Scotland in the 
years 1939-1945 and the immediate aftermath.  It concludes with a 
description of oral history as a method of research, a note of the original 
sources which have been used in the body of the thesis to stimulate and 
justify the arguments, and a brief résumé of the contents chapter by chapter.   
 
The motivation for the thesis grew from initial research for a Masters 
dissertation which concerned Scottish children involved in the evacuation 
process.  Scottish children, mothers with pre-school children and helpers 
numbered 175,000 of the 1.5 million people residing in Britain who were 
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evacuated at the beginning of the Second World War.  Research showed that 
the Scottish evacuation process along with the children involved in it were 
substantially overlooked in published works on this episode of wartime 
history.   
 
The evacuation of vulnerable people from major British cities was put in 
train at the beginning of the Second World War as a means of protecting the 
most vulnerable; young children, mothers with children, the blind and 
disabled.  In England, after the initial mass movement of people in 
September 1939, there were two subsequent evacuation schemes put in 
place, after the London Blitz, then again in 1944 when London was hit by V 
1 and V 2 bombing raids.  Scotland’s situation was quite different in that 
after the first evacuation scheme there was just one further mass evacuation 
which took place after the blitz on the town of Clydebank, near Glasgow, 
during March 1941.  Evacuation has been described as ‘a remarkable event 
in the history of modern Britain’.2  This process effectively helped create 
new welfare measures and improved welfare arrangements for the benefit of 
mothers and children at the time and for future generations.   
 
Much of the work on the relationship between the Second World War and 
the development of welfare has been written around the English wartime 
experience, leaving the Scottish experience of war and its social 
repercussions largely untouched in the historical literature of the period.  
                                                 
2 Susan J. Hess, Civilian Evacuation to Devon in the Second World War (University of 
Exeter, 2006), p.2. 
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This is due to a number of fundamental differences in the Scottish and 
English systems of education, health and housing.  Academic consideration 
of what happened in Scotland has, thus far, largely been approached in 
general terms without regard to the social and economic problems which 
existed within Scotland at the time.  William Boyd’s extensive statistical 
work concerning the Scottish evacuation, collated and written in 1944, was, 
and remains, the most in depth academic work carried out regarding the 
evacuation process, and will be used throughout this thesis.3  In 2006 
Stewart and Welshman drew on Boyd’s work, and further contributed to the 
knowledge of the experience and outcomes of evacuation unique to 
Scotland.  They concluded that evacuation drew attention to the difficulties 
endured by the Scottish urban working class and argued that as a result of 
the relative autonomy of Scotland, welfare and education took on a different 
trajectory in the post-war era.  They further argued that differences between 
Scotland and England were rooted in approaches to poverty and social 
deprivation which were more structural than behavioural, and that as an 
example of these differences, child guidance in Scotland was strengthened 
by its role in the evacuation process.4   Sociologists and psychologists have 
shown a keen interest in child welfare and the emotional effects of war and 
evacuation over the past thirty to forty years.  These issues will be discussed 
in the body of the thesis in relation to how they are pursued in oral 
testimony, and in measuring the lasting impact of the evacuation process on 
the health and welfare of children.  Alongside the academic work of Stewart 
                                                 
3 William Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland: A Record of Events and Experiments (Berkley, 
1944). 
4 John Stewart and John Welshman, ‘The Evacuation of Children in Wartime Scotland: 
Culture, Behaviour and Poverty’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, 26:1/2 (2006), 
pp.100-120. 
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and Welshman, a few interest groups have produced books and pamphlets 
particular to local areas around Scotland.  These include anecdotal accounts 
from former evacuees and have been useful reference guides for locating 
respondents.5    
 
Aims and Objectives 
The aims of this thesis are fourfold.  The thesis will assess how far the 
theory that warfare ultimately led to welfare may be applied to Scottish 
evacuees.  It will test the hypothesis that oral history is necessary in order to 
observe the wider picture of evacuation from a Scottish perspective.  It will 
help further our knowledge of what happened to Scottish evacuees utilising 
the help of oral testimony from those who took part in the process.  The final 
objective is to highlight the experiences of former Scottish evacuees and 
ensure that their participation in the process is appropriately recorded in the 
history of British evacuation.  
 
The Scottish evacuees suffered equally to their English counterparts in 
having to adapt to the problems associated with the emotional trauma of 
family separation.  Their experiences have been particularly under explored 
and deserve equal recognition within the history of the evacuation process.  
The thesis also challenges the historical stigma associated with those who 
                                                 
5 Two most notable local histories referred to in the thesis are from: Lorne Wallace, Here 
Come the Glasgow Keelies (Perthshire, 1999), and Clydebank Life Story Group, Untold 
Stories: Remembering Clydebank in War Time (Clydebank, 1999). 
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took part in the evacuation process. Such stigma, which stemmed from 
media coverage of the first few days of the war and early wartime social 
surveys, was the result of unquestioned assumptions about the unhygienic, 
impoverished, and the generally undesirable conditions in which evacuees 
had lived.  Many of these stories were tenuous in nature and have to be 
examined within the broader context of the social situation which was 
prevalent in inner cities at the time.  Although the majority of evacuees came 
from the cities, which was home to predominantly working-class families, 
the assertions that the majority suffered from head lice and scabies, were bad 
mannered with dirty habits, were assumptions that required qualification.  
Challenge will be made to these contemporary attitudes in the body of the 
thesis.  In other words, this thesis questions the discourse of social 
degeneracy that has historically been associated with evacuees.  
 
The cohort group involved in one-to-one interviews or as focus groups 
amounted to thirty respondents.  This representative sample of respondents 
have had their experiences recorded in face to face interviews.  The sample 
involved a number of individuals who were involved in the Clydebank blitz 
and subsequently evacuated.  One of the cohort groups involved four 
respondents similarly evacuated from Clydebank.  Other interviewees 
include one lady who was privately evacuated to Auchterarder from Dundee, 
and two people from a private school in Glasgow, evacuated with their 
school group.  The remainder of the respondents were evacuated from either 
Glasgow or Edinburgh, all under the official government evacuation scheme.  
The testimony of the sample cohort will be used in conjunction with 
documentary evidence and historiography to demonstrate how evacuation 
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helped to enhance the development of social welfare during the war and in 
the early post-war period.   
 
Method 
During the planning stages of this project the main objective was to base as 
much information as possible on the oral histories of former evacuees.  The 
oral testimony has therefore played a significant part in the overall 
framework of the thesis.  From necessity, and to lay the foundations on 
which to build a case for evacuation as an integral part of social welfare 
development during the war and in the post-war era, it was important to 
outline the reasons for the process. The complex nature of the evacuation 
arrangements meant this had to be done over two chapters, with the 
inclusion of evacuation both home and abroad.       
 
Once the ground work on the evacuation process had been completed it was 
necessary to consider individual issues chapter by chapter.  The main themes 
related to health, religion and education.  Taking each of these fundamental 
factors as a separate entity will help prove that evacuation was important in 
achieving the fairly rapid levels of change in social welfare which developed 
throughout wartime.  Positive improvements in this area will support the 
argument expounded by Richard Titmuss, whose work embodied the belief 
that warfare ultimately led to welfare.  Titmuss’s conviction that warfare led 
to welfare underpins the argument throughout the thesis.6 
                                                 
6 The Key work in which Titmuss set out his theory of warfare leading to enhanced 
welfare is: Richard M, Titmuss, History of the Second World War: Problems of Social 
Policy (London, 1950). 
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The Scottish topic, once established as a social history project, with an oral 
history base, meant the search for participants had to be undertaken at some 
speed, as time was of the essence.  It has been over seventy years since the 
start of the Second World War and finding former evacuees from among the 
Scottish population was a relatively difficult task.  This search involved 
adverts in local newspapers, and a network of fellow students and friends 
who, through talking to friends and family found people willing to talk about 
their experience and have their stories recorded.  This part of the project 
involved extensive travel throughout the central belt of Scotland, taking in 
places such as Clydebank, East Kilbride, Bishopbriggs and Clarkston in 
Glasgow.  Other interviews were conducted in Stirling and the surrounding 
areas of Perthshire, down through Edinburgh and the south east.   
 
Sensitivity to age meant the interviews were of a qualitative nature and a 
relatively casual approach to the interviews had to be adopted.  This 
inevitably meant that on occasion there was a tendency for respondents to 
stray off topic.  As a result not all the conducted interviews have been 
utilised in the thesis as there were occasions when some of the details were 
not relevant to the thematic interests of the issues under discussion.  The 
element of trust between the interviewees and interviewer was fundamental 
from the beginning as the interviews were conducted in the homes of 
respondents.  Once this trust was established the respondent was made aware 
of the central themes of the thesis which provided a starting point for their 
narrative.  The interview began with a request that the respondent simply tell 
the story of their evacuation experience as far as possible as he/she 
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remembered it.  It was felt that the presence of a formal questionnaire would 
be off putting and lead to distraction in the train of thought.  This type of 
interview meant that transcriptions were required to be carried out before 
any real structured analysis could be undertaken. 
 
Initially respondents were generally slightly restrained, believing that their 
experience was of very little importance.  However, within a short time 
stories flowed freely and it soon became apparent that by its very nature 
evacuation lay close to the surface of their memories, and some of them 
were definitive of their adult lives.  In most cases recall was clear and well 
narrated.  This valuable narrative is important for the research project as 
most respondents remembered distinctive events personal to them.  All 
remembered the people they had been billeted with even when billets were 
changed two, and sometimes three times.  Food and school were common 
features of the narrative, and occasionally there was a passing reference to 
their educational attainment and religion.  It was from these threads of 
commonality that the topics for the chapters on education and religion 
developed.    
 
Parsons pointed out from his experience of interviewing evacuees there was 
a certain reticence on their part to complain about their circumstance.  He 
believed this to be so much so that material for public consumption made 
propaganda inevitable.7   With passage of time and the desire to have their 
                                                 
7 Martin Parsons, “I’ll Take That One”: Dispelling the Myths of Civilian Evacuation 
1939-45 (Peterborough, 1998), p.245. 
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stories recorded, that reticence has dissipated to a certain extent.  Nowadays 
evacuee testimony and oral history generally has become more acceptable in 
historiographical terms as an evidence base upon which to build a fairly 
graphic research structure.   
 
Advocates of the benefits of oral history testimony include Portelli,8 
Abrams,9 Thomson10 and Tosh,11 who, while they believe that by its nature 
oral testimony is a valuable resource, acknowledge the inherent problems of 
this type of evidence.  Oral history evidence differs significantly from that of 
biographical and autobiographical accounts.  Expressions, gestures, 
intonation, depth of feelings and enthusiasm in the spoken word is missing 
from written sources.  Yet oral testimony requires to be substantiated by 
documentary evidence and historiography, although it has to be remembered 
these too are subjective and require a degree of scrutiny. 
 
Literature Review and Historiography  
The discussion of the literature which follows comments on a selection of 
publications central to the argument that war in general, and evacuation in 
particular, led to significant changes in social welfare.  Much of the 
literature is taken from social and cultural histories ranging from the post-
                                                 
8Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue 
(Wisconsin, 1997).  
9 Abrams Lynn, Oral History Theory (Oxford, 2010). 
10 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History 3rd Edition (Oxford, 2000). 
11 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, methods and new directions in the study of 
modern history, 5th Edition (Harlow, 2010). 
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war era to more recent accounts.  The literature is discussed mainly from a 
social and cultural point of view with social welfare developments the 
predominant theme in each chapter.  For the Scottish evacuation process the 
major influence has been William Boyd’s research, which was carried out 
during the war and covers the main aspects of the scheme.  As such this 
material falls into the primary source category and has been evaluated under 
that heading later in this chapter.  A review of the general literature involved 
begins with the work of Richard Titmuss as this has proved to be central to 
most historians working on evacuation.   
 
Almost forty years after his death, Richard Titmuss’s definitive work on 
social policy provision and Second World War social welfare still provides a 
basis for academic, comparative and critical research surrounding the 
foundations of the British welfare state.  Central to his work on Problems of 
Social Policy was the handling of the evacuation plans adopted by the 
government from the early1930s until the end of the Second World War.  
His work was, and continues to be, widely quoted by historians and those 
involved in political and social studies with an interest in social welfare.  
Critical reviews include work from academics in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States, which gives some indication of how important his 
writing has been in helping to form scholarly opinion on social policy, social 
welfare and social justice.  
 
In 1941 Titmuss was appointed as part of a team of experts charged with 
writing the official history of Britain in the Second World War.  This 
appointment came from the chief economic historian Keith Hancock, who 
had been appointed by the Cabinet Office to write a series of twenty-seven 
 21 
of the twenty-eight official volumes documenting the war on behalf of the 
government.  The Australian Dictionary of Biography, of which Hancock 
was chairman from 1959-1965, highlights his achievements in academia 
during the course of his life.  He held the chair of modern history at the 
University of Adelaide in 1924 and at the age of twenty-six became the 
youngest Professor in the British Commonwealth.  In 1934 he was chair of 
modern history at the University of Birmingham.  After the war he and three 
others were put in charge of shaping the new entirely postgraduate 
Australian National University of Canberra.  His achievements led to the 
award of honorary doctorate from nine universities.12  It was from 
Hancock’s appointment of Titmuss that the History of the Second World 
War: Problems of Social Policy was written.  This book was one of many 
published works on social welfare and social policy by Titmuss.  Other titles 
include; Essays on ‘The Welfare State’,13 Income Distribution and Social 
Change14, and Commitment to Welfare. 15  He held the founding chair in 
social administration at the London School of Economics (LSE) for twenty 
years and obtained honorary degrees from the universities of Wales, 
Edinburgh, Toronto, Chicago and Brunel and was appointed CBE in 1966.16       
 
Titmuss’s ultimate aim was to assess the growth of social services, with the 
aid of central and local government officials and voluntary agencies both 
                                                 
12 Australian Dictionary of Biography.   
www.adb.anu.ed.au  [Accessed 20 September 2012].     
13 Titmuss, Essays on ‘The Welfare State, 2nd Edition with a chapter on ‘the Irresponsible 
Society’ (London, 1963).  
14 Titmuss, Income Distribution and Social Change: A Study in Criticism (London, 
1962). 
15 Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare (London, 1968). 
16 www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31763  [Accessed 30 April 2016].  
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prior to and throughout the war.  As an historian working for the government 
he had free access to official documents that he used to present three main 
themes in the book.  These included evacuation, the hospital services and the 
care of the homeless.17  It is evacuation and the resultant social welfare 
changes which will be the focus of discussion here.  
 
The structure, statistics, chronology and much of the narrative of the book 
are in a format useful to the historian.  However, the Scottish evacuation 
process was misrepresented on two separate occasions in the book.  Titmuss 
stated that Scottish schoolchildren were evacuated with their mothers.18  The 
official Scottish line was that family members should be sent together but 
this was not always possible.  On several occasions within the oral testimony 
it was confirmed that school groups were sent to reception areas as a class 
and not with their family.  This was the case for the three Dennistoun 
schools in Glasgow when the children were all sent to the village of 
Dunning.  According to Boyd the number of unaccompanied Scottish 
schoolchildren evacuated in September 1939 was calculated to be 62,059.19  
These examples suggest flaws in Titmuss’s information gathering.  
 
Titmuss was commissioned by representatives of the wartime coalition 
government, and was committed to producing a report on the way in which 
the war was being conducted.  His narrative of events levelled very little 
criticism on the way the government handled the situation.  There were some 
exceptions, for example when Titmuss referred to ‘the backwardness of 
                                                 
17 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (London, 1950), p.ix. 
18 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.551. 
19 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.31. 
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evacuation plans at the beginning of 1939’, or the problems the Health 
Department faced as a result of  ‘the short-range, and admittedly defective 
measures to be put into operation’ should the situation arise.20  He was also 
critical of the fact that the problems highlighted by the first evacuation 
scheme were repeated during the second movement and later in the war.21  
 
Titmuss fostered an almost idealistic belief in people’s changing attitudes 
towards each other as a result of war.  He held an altruistic view of society, 
and hoped that social changes, brought about as a result of war, would lead 
to the creation of a more egalitarian society.  He wrote that total war fused 
all classes of society together and that death, injury and homelessness caused 
by bombs were just as likely to affect the rich as the poor.  War and welfare, 
he claimed, went hand in hand, and he emphasised the progress made in 
areas of welfare during the Second World War.  In his summing up of the 
role of the British government during the war he praised the flexibility of the 
newly established social services extended to all classes in society.22  He 
credited the evacuation process with advancement in social welfare in 
Britain in areas of child poverty and neglect, education, health, increased 
numbers of social workers and enhanced intervention in the problems 
relating to juvenile delinquency.  
 
Since the 1960s Titmuss’s theory concerning the wartime development of 
social welfare has been widely challenged by social and political historians.  
                                                 
20 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.33. 
21 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.357. 
22 Titmuss, Problems of Social policy (1950), p.506. 
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These include such historians as Angus Calder,23 John Macnicol24 and Pat 
Thane.25  The principle criticism levelled against Titmuss has been that 
social welfare development was a gradual process instigated long before the 
outbreak of war.  Where rapid change did occur as a direct result of war, 
these changes, Macnicol argued, did not go far enough to permanently 
improve the existing conditions of poverty.  Titmuss himself acknowledged 
that changes and improvements in social welfare had taken place long before 
the outbreak of the Second World War, although he believed that war 
contributed substantially to the speed with which change took place.  
Historians opposed to Titmuss’s view attributed many of the developments 
in wartime social welfare to the rise in employment levels during the war.  
The rise in employment, it was claimed, partially alleviated poverty 
concerns and allowed government to focus attention elsewhere, for example 
on education, health and housing.26 
 
Following the outbreak of war employment figures rose as more women 
were employed to do the jobs men had vacated when called up for military 
service.  As there were more working mothers the number of day nurseries 
increased, health care and nutritional requirements improved generally for 
women and children.  Milk and vitamin supplements were given to pregnant 
and nursing mothers and young children, and the existing milk in schools 
scheme was extended to all children during the war.  Titmuss believed the 
extension of the milk in schools scheme resulted from evacuation when 
                                                 
23 Angus Calder, The People’s War, Britain 1939-1945 (London, 1992), p.543.  
24 John Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of schoolchildren’, in H.L. Smith (ed.) War and Social 
Change: British Society During the Second World War (Manchester, 1986), p.3. 
25 Pat Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State, 2nd Edition (London, 1996), p.211. 
26 Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State (1996), p.246. 
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social investigators began writing about the neglect prevalent in child 
evacuees. Macnicol challenged this and suggested that the extension of milk 
in schools scheme was simply a natural continuation of services planned in 
the 1930s. 27  It was, he argued, included as part of rationing and wartime 
food policy, and a way of reducing surplus stocks held by producers, rather 
than a benevolent gesture on the part of the government.28  Others writing on 
the subject of evacuation have challenged Macnicol’s view of the wartime 
situation. Bernard Harris suggested Macnicol had ignored the fact that 
‘evacuation acted as a catalyst for social change’,29 and Derek Fraser 
claimed that evacuation ‘epitomised the impact of the war upon social 
policy’.30   However both these historians have warned against the idea of 
wartime solidarity that was part of the Titmuss principle.  
 
Two articles by Welshman relating to the evacuation scheme suggest a more 
positive approach to the Titmuss theory.  In Evacuation and Social Policy 
During the Second World War: Myth and Reality, he wrote Titmuss was 
‘undoubtedly correct in arguing that the evacuation altered attitudes to state 
welfare’ and that on balance evacuation was ‘a forward movement in 
thinking that was consolidated in important policy changes’.  He further 
claimed that ‘evidence for change seems more powerful than that of 
continuity’.31   This article focused on four issues which were highlighted as 
                                                 
27 Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of schoolchildren’ (1986), p.21. 
28 Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of Schoolchildren’ (1986), p.27. 
29 Bernard Harris, The Origins of the British Welfare State, Social Welfare in England 
and Wales, 1800-1945 (Hampshire and New York, 2004), p.286. 
30 Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (London, 2003), p.230. 
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defective in many city children when they arrived in reception areas, 
including head lice, lack of clothing and footwear, nutrition and 
delinquency.  Welshman justified his argument by providing examples of the 
way in which Civil Servants and School Medical Officers changed their 
approach to poverty, and of the way in which a more critical approach to 
health services developed in dealing with child hygiene, footwear and 
clothing, nutrition and child guidance.  
 
On the issue of delinquency, which Welshman discussed only in relation to 
England, he presented a convincing argument for the growth and 
development of child guidance as a result of the evacuation process.  He 
acknowledged that the effect of the separation of children from parents 
during evacuation had ‘a profound impact on theories about child care in the 
post-war period’.  This, he claimed led to improvements in social policy 
affecting families in the 1950s.  He believed that Titmuss had been a key 
player in the early stages of the evolution of the problem family, and that 
evacuation had been principally responsible for the move away from social 
problem groups in the 1930s to the problem families of the 1950s.32     
 
When dealing with juvenile delinquency exacerbated by evacuation it 
appeared that Titmuss view, it could be argued, was consistent with the rest 
of his positive theories on childhood behaviour.  While he recognised faulty 
parenting was a contributory factor, Titmuss attempted to rationalise the 
problem of delinquency taking account of many of the psychological aspects 
of childcare and separation.  In dealing with delinquency he was influenced 
                                                 
32Welshman, Evacuation and Social Policy During the Second World War: Myth and 
Reality, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1998, pp.28-53.  
 27 
by psychologist John Bowlby’s attachment theory, and considered emotional 
and environmental conditions fundamental in the first five years of a child’s 
life.  He wrote that if a child is deprived of affection or is separated from 
parents in his/her early years it could lead to problems in later life.33  
Titmuss viewed delinquency from an intergenerational perspective where he 
perceived that the fundamental problem often resulted from those parents or 
carers who had suffered separation in the early stages of their own life.  
From this alternative view of delinquency, it is possible to assume that he 
was as consistent in his views of the causes of delinquency as he had been 
about the causes of neglected clothing, bedwetting and head lice.        
 
Titmuss’s belief in universalism also remained consistent not only in his 
work on the wartime social history but throughout his later life.  He was 
aware that there would be issues arising from his work that would be 
challenged by those coming after him and that the ‘broad generalisations’ he 
made would be subject to revision by historians.34  Welshman’s article is an 
example of counter-revisionism as it presented a controversial argument 
surrounding both Titmuss’s personality and opinions.  
 
Whether in agreement with or opposed to his ideas and opinions, much of 
Titmuss’s early work provides the framework on which to build a picture of 
the progress made in social welfare from 1940s Britain until the twenty-first 
century.  Writing in 2011 both Julie Summers’ research concerning the  
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return of the evacuees, and Juliet Gardiner’s descriptive interpretation of the 
London Blitz, have taken examples from Titmuss. 35  At the time of writing, 
the most recent journal article concerning his ideals and opinions was 
written from a sociology perspective, published in 2008.36  Mann’s article 
deals with Titmuss’s essays on social welfare division, and implies that the 
work which originated in the Second World War is still a valid starting point 
for the critical analysis of social welfare development.   
 
The evacuation process was given scant attention as a significant aspect in 
the social history of the Second World War during the 1960s.  The general 
histories of the war incorporated a brief mention of evacuation within the 
wider context of events from the time.  Writing in 1968 Marwick was 
somewhat dismissive of evacuation as important to social welfare 
developments.   He conceded however that while he thought evacuation had 
been exaggerated, it was an example of war exposing existing institutions.37  
Addison’s opinion of evacuation written in the early 1980s was similar to 
that of Marwick, and upheld the received and uncontested opinion of 
historians writing in the 1960s, that evacuees were generally victims of slum 
conditions and ignorant of normal domestic conveniences.38  Addison’s 
work largely reproduces the prejudices and the stigma associated with earlier 
work on the evacuation.  
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Adopting a political perspective, Addison focused predominantly on the 
victory of the Labour Party in 1945 as the vehicle for improvements in 
welfare.  Arguing for permanent change, he wrote that the rise of the Labour 
Party, and in turn welfare reforms, was a response to evacuation, the 
Dunkirk spirit, and total war.    He thought that when the working classes 
were mobilised for total war, they would insist on making change 
permanent.39  The victory of the Labour Party at the end of the war was 
therefore considered to have been the means by which extended provision of 
health and welfare was introduced.  
 
On a political level Crosby, whose work focused predominantly on the 
English evacuation process, believed the collapse of the evacuation scheme 
in the early months of the war, and the general uncertainty surrounding 
Conservative intentions, presented the Labour Party in England with an 
opportunity for action.40  Labourites, he said, established themselves as early 
and severe critics of the Board of Education’s actions during the evacuation.  
Crosby claimed the Labour Party kept up an attack on wartime educational 
policy, and suggested that the cynical attitude Conservatives had shown to 
educational reform gave Labour a political advantage.41   Yet Crosby 
perceived it less likely than Addison that the working classes were mobilised 
for change as a result of the evacuation process.  Instead he speculated on 
the victory of the Labour Party in 1945 as more of a verdict against the 
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Conservative Party’s ability to lead the wives and children of working class 
men to safety.42       
  
As a consequence of the renewed attention to the evacuation process since 
the 1980s by historians, the remainder of this introduction will focus on the 
historiography from this era and beyond.  Historiography surrounding 
evacuation has focused generally on two main arguments: how far the 
evacuation process was responsible for social welfare improvements, and to 
what extent there was a unification of social classes as a result of evacuation.  
These arguments are pertinent to the overall theme of the thesis and 
therefore necessitate discussion at this point.  
 
McLachlan held the generally accepted view of historians that diseases such 
as head lice and scabies among evacuees shocked public health and 
voluntary workers.  He argued that instead of welfare developments 
continuing along the lines of the 1930s, war had ‘produced the resolution to 
do what should have been done earlier’.43  He commented that the first 
evacuation scheme, and the raids on Clydebank in March 1941, had shaken 
up the social complacency of the local administration of the Department of 
Health for Scotland.44   He further argued that evacuation resulted in lasting 
improvements in welfare provision.  It brought the need for health care 
provision for children to the fore, he said, and was directly related to 
improvements in the hygiene of school premises, and the extension in child 
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guidance clinics by education authorities.45   McLachlan’s positive argument 
towards improved health care as a result of evacuation has been of value to 
the warfare to welfare argument of the thesis.  However, it should be noted 
that McLachlan was a civil servant and it is possible he modelled his 
arguments on those of Titmuss.  
 
The belief in a more egalitarian society, and a brighter and better future for 
all was championed by Titmuss.  In 2006 Susan Hess wrote that it was little 
wonder Titmuss espoused the wartime spirit of universalism in so far as he 
was writing in what she referred to as the heady post-war early years when 
belief in Britain’s New Jerusalem was at its zenith and Labour’s post war 
government in its infancy.46   From a Roman Catholic perspective, 
Fitzpatrick also believed that the shared experience of war helped bring the 
Catholic body closer than before to the national community.47   Fitzpatrick’s 
work has been particularly useful in the context of Chapter IV on the subject 
of religion and education.  In terms of class levelling it was his opinion that 
the ghetto mentality changed as war weakened the barriers that had existed 
between the Roman Catholic minority and the community as a whole, and 
gave the Catholic population a new sense of belonging.48  Politically this 
sense of belonging may be associated with the rise and sweeping victory of 
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the Labour Party, which was, according to Fitzpatrick, the political if not the 
spiritual home of the majority of the Catholic community.49   
 
Revisionist historians such as Macnicol argued against the possibility of 
social levelling of classes and any long-term welfare developments resulting 
from evacuation.50  Conflicting opinions exist between Fitzpatrick and 
Macnicol over the question of class and education.  Macnicol argued that 
welfare reforms did not go far enough and perpetuated the division of class 
through the continuation of a three tier system of education.51   Macnicol’s 
opinion was shared by Thane, although her argument against evacuation as 
an instrument for social change went significantly further than Macnicol. 52   
She believed improved living standards were a result of full employment, 
and commented that there was little evidence of ‘a heightened government 
awareness’, if it existed, that drove the war government to enthusiasm for 
extensive social reconstruction.53  She questioned many of the government 
intentions regarding improvements in social welfare.  In her opinion change 
was necessary to maintain civilian support for the war.54  She argued against 
the influence of war on educational improvements, believing that Butler’s 
success with education in 1944 was achieved through his own determination 
and the uncontroversial nature of his proposals.55  However, she did agree 
with Murphy on the subject of child care developments instigated as a result 
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of evacuation and separation, although she stressed that such developments 
were extended along the lines advocated before the war.56  She further 
acknowledged, as Murphy did, that the neglect and ill-treatment of some 
children while in foster care ultimately led to the Curtis and Clyde 
Committee enquiry, and eventually the Children Act of 1948.  The death of 
12 year old Dennis O’Neill as a result of starvation and beating while in 
foster care served to highlight the flaws in the existing system of child care 
and protection.57  Dennis O’Neill’s death was indirectly linked to the 
evacuation process as it was on account of the pressure for places for 
children due to wartime conditions that led to the boy being placed on a 
remote Shropshire farm.  Murphy explained that he had been placed by an 
untrained school attendance official and there had been no follow up checks 
made on his progress between July 1944 and January 1945.58   Holman, a 
former evacuee, also stressed that the genesis of legislation for the Children 
Act of 1948 was shaped by the general experience of war, and in particular 
of the experience of evacuation.59   
 
Calder also accredited much of the legislation for social change to the work 
which had been done before the war. 60   He recognised nevertheless that 
after the bombing raids began there was a ‘change of heart in the 
authorities’, as the need for evacuation success grew more important.61  
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While he agreed there were signs of improvement in the physical condition 
of children during the war, he questioned the degree of improvement in their 
psychological and intellectual development.62     
 
Contrary to both Thane and Calder, Virginia Berridge, suggested evacuation 
may have led to more change than they had thought possible.  Taking a 
longer term perspective it was her opinion that the reassessment of health 
services for schoolchildren, the growth in attendance at antenatal centres by 
pregnant women, and the greater emphasis on child guidance and 
psychology were examples of improved welfare during the war.63    
 
The emotional aspect of child welfare was of particular interest to Lucy 
Faithfull, later Baroness Faithfull, who became a social worker as a result of 
her work with evacuees.  Devoted to the cause of child welfare throughout 
her life, she realised from the time of the first mass evacuation that 
evacuated children generally had a greater degree of emotional disturbance 
than those who stayed at home.64  Throughout her long career first as a 
social worker, then as Inspector for the Children’s Branch of the Home 
Office, followed by her time as Director of Social Services, she worked to 
keep children with their families.  Her biographer wrote that this 
undoubtedly resulted from her experience of evacuation.65  The long-term 
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psychological and sociological problems inherent in evacuation were 
manifest by the separation of families during evacuation.  These problems 
caused by separation provided professionals in the field with a valuable 
source of research into the psychological and sociological health of former 
evacuees.  This aspect of evacuation forms part of the discussion in Chapter 
VI concerning the long-term emotional health of evacuees.    
 
Rusby’s quantitative study of long-term attachment issues as a result of 
evacuation, adds considerably to our understanding of the psychological 
aspects of the ‘social experiment’ which was the evacuation process.  Rusby 
has systematically explored the possible association between a variety of 
aspects relating to the evacuation experience and the subsequent mental 
health, marital history and attachment of participants in their adult life.  The 
evacuation experience was believed to be defined by five experience 
variables, consisting of total period away, frequency of parental visits, care 
received, number of billets and age at evacuation.  As may have been 
predicted, he found the dominant variables to be age at evacuation and care 
received, which led to two extremes of positive gain or emotional legacy.  A 
young child with poor care during evacuation led to a negative experience 
and alternatively an adolescent with good care led to a positive experience.  
He found that the frequency of visits by parents during a child’s evacuation 
led to the more self-confident and sociable they were in life and in the 
quality of relationships.  Horizons and interests in adulthood were broader 
when there were frequent changes of billets.66   
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Since the 1980s a number of books have been published by former evacuees 
with recollections and reminiscences of their own and others who were part 
of the evacuation scheme, and which deal with a variety of issues.67  Of 
these text and oral histories Rusby wrote that 50 years had to pass before 
either those involved, or the general public were able to look honestly at 
these recollections.68  Some of these histories, such as Holman’s, offer more 
than others to historical debate.  Holman’s argument in favour of evacuation 
as a means of accelerating reform, although informative in a number of areas 
of evacuation, falls short on some important details to back up his assertions.  
This is especially the case in his discussion on child care and in the 
escalation in employment of social workers.  Ruth Inglis meanwhile 
maintains the preconceived opinion of the condition of the majority of 
evacuees as dirty and unkempt.  Her approach, which reproduces the stigma 
associated with the participants of evacuation, does not question the 
hierarchies embedded in prior historical accounts.  
 
According to Parsons it was difficult to find a typical evacuee.  Often 
geographical location influenced individual experiences.69  However, from 
the recollections in the publications by those mentioned above, and in oral 
history interviews conducted for this thesis, there is commonality of 
experiences concerning a number of the issues.  Education, for example, was 
cause for concern in a significant number of cases, and for many a source of 
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disappointment at the way in which educational attainment was affected by 
war and evacuation.  In the 1960s Marwick and Calder recognised how 
influential war had been on the British education system.  Of the legislation 
included in the Education Act of 1944 Calder wrote that it was ‘potentially 
the most important gesture towards democracy in the twentieth century’.70  
For Lindsay Paterson the origins of post-war thinking about secondary 
education lay earlier in the 1930s.71   He stressed however, that as in so 
much of Scottish social life in the 1940s, educational reform became a 
firmly established route to progress.72 
 
Government officials at the time were aware of the importance of education 
during evacuation and openly voiced concern in this area.  For example, 
Joseph Westwood, MP for Stirling and Falkirk, who went on to become 
Secretary of State for Scotland in July 1945, spoke out over the 
postponement of the introduction of the 1936 Education Act.  He said that:  
 
The new day school regulations would have brought us nearer to the 
time when our educational system would be adapted to the capabilities 
of the child, instead of compelling the children to fit into one or two 
cast-iron moulds.  Now, almost at its beginning, the war numbers 
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among its casualties education which is one of the most important of 
our social services.73  
 
For education historians, evacuation severely disrupted the education system 
during the war and effectively threw children from different social and 
cultural backgrounds together in a way they had never been before.  This 
cultural shift for urban children to rural parts of the countryside left long 
lasting impressions on such children that were themselves formative and 
influential on their subsequent education.  Paterson saw this as symbolising 
a unity that perpetuated after the war.  Progressive comprehensive reforms, 
he believed, emerged after the 1960s and appeared to narrow the differences 
in educational progress in relation to class, gender and religion.74  Fitzpatrick 
held with this opinion in terms of Scottish Catholic secondary education, 
which expanded significantly from the 1950s onwards.  He commented that 
the provision of new schools had kept pace with the massive programme of 
re-housing for more than twenty years after the war.75   
  
In educational terms evacuation affected religious as well as academic 
education, and the continuous religious welfare of evacuees is discussed in 
Chapter IV.  The continuation of religious education of evacuees was 
especially important among the hierarchy of various churches.  However, a 
search through the General Assembly papers for the period and various 
documents from local Parishes in St Andrews and Glasgow uncovered very 
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little information relating to evacuation within the Church of Scotland.  
Perhaps because of the lack of primary evidence in this area, much of the 
historiography relating to evacuation covers religion in very general terms.  
Holman offers some insight in so far as, in his opinion, there was an almost 
universal opening up of church services and Sunday schools to evacuees, 
and, he claimed, in many cases all youth organisations were thrown open to 
them.  His information is inconclusive however as he omitted figures and 
locations to enable a comparison to be made with pre-war attendance.  He 
was nevertheless one of the few historians of evacuation who made 
reference to the Commission of the Churches, a religious body who provided 
guidance to Churches on the problems to be faced by evacuation.76  The 
report by the Commission of Churches is a useful wartime source of 
information concerning the working of various churches and church bodies 
during the Second World War.   
   
Few social historians have dealt with the religious aspect of evacuation in 
any depth.  Calder believed that there was a degree of religious tolerance 
during the evacuation.  Although his evidence is of a general nature there 
were instances where a greater understanding and tolerance existed between 
religious groups during the evacuation process.  He claimed that Jews who 
were received into gentile homes during evacuation helped mix people 
together providing, what he regarded as, a new degree of mutual respect and 
tolerance.77  Evidence from the Glasgow Synagogue in Garnethill does not 
point to the type of tolerance to which Calder alluded.  Chaim Bermant’s 
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account of his life during the war leans towards an agreement with Calder 
only in so far as he found it reassuring to be resented for being an evacuee 
rather than for being a Jew.78  Autobiographical accounts by former 
evacuees reinforce the importance that was placed on religion in certain 
quarters during the evacuation, including those by Bermant and Milbourn.79  
Publications pertinent to religion include those which offer informative 
testimony of the life and work of Quakers during the war.80  The personal 
testimony in these autobiographical accounts provide important evidence 
relating to religion within the evacuation process.   
 
Sources 
Boyd’s 1944 statistical survey of the Scottish evacuation process ranged 
from the planning stages, through the first mass evacuation, private 
evacuation, overseas evacuation and the Clydebank blitz.  His research 
considered the attitude of parents in deciding whether or not to include their 
children in the evacuation scheme.  This included family size, age, gender, 
class, and religion from a Roman Catholic and Protestant perspective.  He 
took account of billeting problems, teachers, the provision of education, 
home study groups, residential hostels and homes and camp schools.  His 
work has been widely used throughout the thesis when referring to statistical 
and documentary evidence relating to the Scottish scheme.   
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As Boyd’s work was carried out during the war he could not have predicted 
the long-term effect of evacuation.  He did however comment on the lack of 
provision for any psychological problems which may have resulted from 
separation caused by evacuation.  He offered some insight into his personal 
thoughts on the evacuation process when he wrote that this lack of provision 
was ‘another indication of the scrappy nature of the arrangements’.81  Boyd’s 
opinion was shared by the members of the Commission of Churches.82   
 
Ferguson and Fitzgerald’s account of wartime dealt specifically with 
evacuation in terms of hospital and maternity care.83  During the war there 
were a number of social surveys produced on evacuation and the pamphlet 
by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns: 
Evacuation and the Social Future, has been of particular value to this 
study.84  Following these works there was a gap of approximately thirty 
years before any extensive research on evacuation was undertaken.  This 
later work has already been addressed in the introduction.   
 
A wide range of original sources have been used to add to the evidence from 
the oral testimony and the existing historiography, in order to assess how far 
evacuation was helpful in establishing new and improved welfare 
developments in Scotland.  Newspapers including the Glasgow Herald, 
Daily Record and Mail, Scotsman, Jewish Chronicle and Jewish Echo have 
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been used.  Records of Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, 
accessed through online Hansard, have been thoroughly explored.  Minutes 
of meetings, letters, health records and school log books held at both 
Glasgow and Edinburgh City Archives have also been used.  Sourcing the 
original school magazines for Whitehill School in Dennistoun, Glasgow, 
from a private collection, helped provided an insight into the everyday 
wartime life of an educational establishment.  Other important original 
source material was accessed through archival documentation held at the 
National Archives, National Archives of Scotland, Jewish Archives, and the 
Archives of Stirling and Falkirk, Glasgow University, Dundee City, and St. 
Andrews University and St. Andrews Museum.  The individual Parish 
Church records from St. Andrews and Glasgow provided little of value to 
the themes in question.  They did help to establish that evacuation was of no 
great importance to the everyday life of some rural parishes.  Scrutiny of the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland papers for the period of the war 
uncovered little of any substance concerning the evacuation in Scotland.  
Library sources included The British Library, the National Library of 
Scotland, Edinburgh City Library and the Mitchell Library in Glasgow and 
local libraries in Clydebank, Linlithgow, Stirling and Perth.   
 
This thesis offers a contribution to the field of study explicitly through 
collection of personal testimonies carried out by the author.  The interviews 
have uncovered aspects of the Scottish experience which have been touched 
upon only tentatively by past historians of evacuation.  An example of this is 
the setting up and implementing of the home study groups undertaken by 
teachers in the early years of the war.  These interviews constitute the most 
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systematic consideration of the Scottish evacuation experience since Boyd’s 
1944 investigation.   
 
Although the revival of interest in evacuation during the Second World War 
has been wide ranging there is still scope for further research.  This would 
allow a broader understanding of the subject in local areas.  There are still 
people throughout Scotland whose experience has been left untold.  These 
people may well help historians to uncover areas of evacuation which have 
as yet been unaccounted for in the general history of the subject.  In many of 
the more recent publications not all of the interviews have been carried out 
on a face-to-face basis.  There is in fact a significant amount of oral histories 
which have been included in historical works where the recorded experience 
has been analysed from existing testimony.  An example of this can be seen 
Lyn Smith’s ‘Young Voices’ where most of the work has been taken from a 
broad range of sources held at The Imperial War Museum.85   
 
The collection of evacuee experiences held at the Imperial War Museum is 
fairly extensive and relates mainly to English evacuees.  Hess noted that 
there is also a research centre for Evacuees and War Child Studies within the 
University of Reading.  An Evacuee Reunion Association (ERA) was 
established in 1996 which, according to Hess is the largest organisation 
serving the Second World War British evacuees and has helped ex-evacuees 
to finally find a united voice in the face of the revival of interest in the 
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subject.86  There is no equivalent body in Scotland.  It is notable that in at 
least one of the small country reception areas of Perthshire, evacuees 
celebrated a reunion in 1994.  This received national and local television and 
radio coverage.87  To show their appreciation for the care they received 
during their stay in Dunning, the evacuees arranged for a plaque to be placed 
on the wall of the local church which reads:  
 
This plaque is dedicated to the villagers of Dunning from the 
evacuees, mostly from Glasgow, of the Second World War, 1939-
1945. ‘A Welcome Was Made and Not Forgotten’. 
 
The memories of the Dunning people and the evacuees who stayed there is 
still very much alive and the research interviews carried out for this thesis 
indicates that there is a strong and hitherto untapped living memory of 
evacuation experience in Scotland.   
 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapters I and II 
Chapters I and II have been set out in a descriptive tone in order to fully 
explore the workings of the evacuation process.  These two chapters 
describe how the official evacuation process grew from a suggestion of the 
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best way to safeguard vulnerable civilians, through to its implementation at 
the beginning of September 1939.  Much of the content of these opening 
chapters has focused on existing historiography and primary documentary 
evidence.     
 
Chapter III 
Chapter III considers the various aspects of health and welfare issues raised 
by evacuation and takes account of the changes introduced directly and 
indirectly as a result.  It deals with the generally received attitude to 
evacuation which existed early in the war by social surveyors and media.  
This was principally that evacuees had arrived in reception areas in a dirty 
and verminous condition, rife with scabies and head lice.  These reports, 
exaggerated as they may have been, effectively influenced changes to the 
way future evacuation schemes were carried out.  School medical 
inspections, missing from the first scheme, were to be carried out before 
children could be included in any future evacuation scheme and those 
children deemed unfit were to be given curative treatment.  The chapter also 
deals with nutritional concerns including school-meals and the milk-in-
schools scheme as well as the provision of vitamins and orange juice for 
children and pregnant women.  It also deals with the expansion of maternity 
care as a result of evacuation.      
 
Chapter IV 
This chapter considers the subject of religion with regard to evacuees.  It 
draws on the views of several interviewees.  It deals with the problems 
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which emerged once the first evacuees were settled in reception areas.    
Discussion focuses on the attitude and reaction to evacuation from within 
various faiths to the official scheme, and the action taken by the hierarchy of 
these churches during the war.   By its nature evacuation included a mix of 
social and cultural identities and a range of faiths are considered in this 
chapter.  The chapter utilises material obtained at the Scottish Jewish 
Archives, contained within the Synagogue building at Garnethill in 
Glasgow, relating to the evacuation of Jewish children and the work of the 
Jewish hierarchy in helping to stem the threat of Jewish children being sent 
to Christian homes.  This material suggested that there were basic 
similarities between Jewish and Catholic responses to evacuation.  The 
chapter also considers how Protestant groups reacted to evacuation.    
 
Chapter V 
The chapter focuses on the children who stayed at home during the war and 
those children who returned to evacuation areas within weeks and months of 
the instigation of the initial scheme.  Here the research focuses on what 
happened to city children when schools were closed in the early months of 
the war and how the lack of ancillary services affected their health and 
wellbeing.  Documentary evidence fits comfortably here with the 
historiography and the testimony from respondents in highlighting the way 
in which social and cultural change was manifest as a result of war and 
evacuation.    
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Chapter VI 
The final research chapter focuses significant attention on the testimony of 
the respondents.  It attempts to equate their narrative with the received 
perception of evacuation.  While some additional oral history is used 
throughout the thesis, the final chapter heavily features the pertinent 
information from former evacuees contained in the original interviews. This 
helps correlate their experience with the original source material and the 
documented historiography on evacuation.  The six chapters of the thesis are 
followed by an extended conclusion. 
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Chapter I 
The Evacuation Process:  Theory and Practice 
 
The process and planning for the movement of millions of people before and 
during the Second World War was a major undertaking, on a scale never 
before exercised by the British government.  Evacuation was not a new 
phenomenon.  According to Parsons, preparation for the evacuation of 
people and livestock had been planned in Dorset in 1803, as a result of a 
threatened invasion by the French.88  More than a century later, during the 
Spanish Civil War, the first evacuation of unaccompanied children took 
place following the bombing of civilians in Guernica in 1937.  This 
movement of children, separated from family and friends, aroused a degree 
of public sympathy which was not felt for adult refugees.89  The difference 
between these events and the mass evacuation planned in Britain in the 
1930s, predominantly for school age children, was in the interpretation of 
the term.  The Evacuation Committee in charge of planning and operating 
the evacuation scheme used the term to mean the ‘transference beyond the 
limits of the urban area concerned’.90  In real terms this meant moving those 
considered most vulnerable to areas of the countryside where it was 
perceived to be safe from the threat of aerial bombardment.   
 
Scottish matters, although forming the central component of this thesis, will 
only be discussed briefly in this chapter.  It provides an overview of the 
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central administration and implementation of evacuation arrangements, from 
the inception of the idea until the first wave of evacuees were installed in 
areas of perceived safety.  The Scottish evacuation process followed the 
guidelines laid down by the British government, but was organised and 
executed autonomously by the Scottish Departments of Health and 
Education.  These departments were ultimately responsible for setting out an 
acceptable solution to the problems which evacuation was likely to incur, 
including the question of selection of those civilians considered most 
vulnerable.  This was a crucial aspect of the evacuation process as a whole 
throughout the British Isles.  For the purpose of evacuation preparations, the 
safety of vulnerable people from densely populated areas, especially in 
major cities, industrial areas and docklands, and their dispersal in rural, 
sparsely populated areas was a priority.  The removal of vulnerable people 
from areas of potential danger, in times of war, stemmed from the changes in 
warfare adopted towards the end of the First World War when air attack 
became more widespread.   
 
Titmuss, was the leading authority on the methods, implementation and 
implications of the evacuation process.  His work on ‘Problems of Social 
Policy’, which covers the whole period of the Second World War and has 
taken account of all aspects involved in the evacuation scheme, will provide 
the foundation for historic debate.  His theory that warfare ultimately led to 
welfare will form part of the argument for the social welfare changes which 
were instigated as a result of evacuation.  This theory was formed from an 
observation of the developments in welfare following on from previous 
wars. This was compounded by the fact that government officials were 
sensitive to the importance of establishing a method of protection for 
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civilians in the event of future enemy attack.  A brief look at the 1920s will 
explain how evacuation developed as a means of protection.  In addition, 
this chapter will look briefly at the civilian bombardment which took place 
in Europe during the 1930s, which was influential to the British government 
plans for health, transport, accommodation and settlement beyond areas of 
potential danger.  This will involve consideration of financial aspects of the 
operation and how evacuation worked in practice.  Discussion in this chapter 
will also include the way in which dependence on the voluntary sector grew 
and developed through evacuation planning and implementation.  Various 
opinions about the nature of the evacuation arrangements, in particular 
hostile local authority attitudes in receiving areas, and ineffectual 
parliamentary pressure for compulsory evacuation, will be discussed. 
 
In essence planning for war and evacuation became more realistic as the 
1930s progressed and conflict with Germany rapidly became inevitable.  In 
spite of assurances from Germany that no further claims would be made on 
European territory after the invasion of the Sudetenland in March 1938, in 
September of that year the German army annexed the rest of 
Czechoslovakia, and Britain was forced to step up preparations for war. 
 
Through observations of, and reaction to, the conflict in China in 1931 and 
the Civil War in Spain between 1936 and 1939, the British authorities 
believed that evacuation of civilians was necessary before conflict began, in 
order to avoid widespread panic.  The Air Raid Precautions Department 
judged that bombing raids on London would reach levels of seventy-two 
casualties per ton of bombs dropped.  This figure was based on reports of 
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raids on Barcelona in March 1938.91  Government ministers anticipated that 
evacuation prior to the outbreak of war would therefore avoid widespread 
panic.     
 
The Official Report by the Committee on Evacuation in September 1938 
concluded that: 
 
It [was] impossible fully to envisage the horrors of intensive air attack 
by the forces of a major European power on a densely populated city; 
but events in Spain and China have at least given some indication of 
what might befall.92 
 
The lack of preparedness in the earlier continental European evacuation 
procedures undoubtedly encouraged the British government to implement an 
early evacuation programme.  Reports from Spain during the Civil War 
described how thousands of people were having to flee from their homes 
with nothing but the clothes they stood in, and trek miles across the country 
to find safety and shelter.  Reports also emphasised the chaos in Guernica 
after the bombing there in April 1937, when the first evacuation of 
unaccompanied children took place.93   
 
Meanwhile, in Germany during the 1930s thousands of Jews were seeking 
safe passage out of the country to avoid Nazi persecution.  However, with 
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the re-introduction of a visa system for Austrian and German citizens in the 
spring of 1938, which had been abolished in 1927, this proved extremely 
difficult.  Louise London claimed that the British government’s contribution 
to helping Jewish adults escape persecution in Germany was exaggerated, 
orchestrated as a way of encouraging other countries towards greater 
benevolence of refugees.94   In spite of this, Mann and London both agreed 
that the British did more than other European countries in extending a 
degree of kindness towards the children of Jewish families fleeing Germany.  
Voluntary organisations were given permission to help bring up to 10,000 
Jewish children into Britain without visas.  This, London suggested, was an 
unequivocally humanitarian act.95  It is not possible to tell how many 
refugees from the kindertransport came to Scotland.  Five residential homes 
were opened for Jewish refugees and evacuees but only two of these kept 
records.  In addition two hostels were opened in Glasgow, one in Hill Street 
which accommodated 30 boys and the other in Renfrew Street for women 
and girls which took only 15 people at a time.  Between 1939 and 1948 a 
total of 175 boys had stayed at the Hill Street hostel.96   
 
In order to avoid, as far as possible, the development of a situation in Britain 
similar to the chaotic evacuation experienced in Spain, or the panic retreat of 
Jews from Germany, advanced planning was necessary for the safe passage 
of vulnerable British citizens from city areas considered to be most volatile.  
The first evacuation took place during the first weekend of September 1939, 
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when over one and a half million people were evacuated from major British 
cities to areas of perceived safety from attack by the German military. This 
mass evacuation was undertaken based on the assumption that aerial attack 
by German bombers would follow the instant that war was declared.97  This 
anticipatory action was the result of the work and effort of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, together with a substantial number of sub-committees.  
These Committees had been in planning and discussion during the 1920s and 
1930s on the way in which any future wars might be conducted.98  The 
Committee of Imperial Defence agreed that once any hope of a peaceful 
settlement with Germany had gone ‘there might well be little or no margin 
of time between that stage and the outbreak of hostilities’.99   
 
Evacuation planning from the mid-1930s, shrouded in secrecy in Whitehall, 
culminated in the appointment in May 1938 of an evacuation planning 
committee under the Chairmanship of Sir John Anderson.  The Committee 
reported on the basic principles of evacuation and was completed by July 
1938.  Once approved by the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, it was 
published in October 1938.  The publication of the ‘Anderson Report’, 
named after the Committee Chairman, was delayed as a result of the Munich 
Crisis in September 1938.   Following discussion of the report in the House 
of Commons, the administration for evacuation was placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, as it involved areas of health, 
education and housing. 100 
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‘The Anderson Report’ on evacuation formed part of the Civil Emergency 
Defence Scheme.  Evacuation arrangements in the Report focused on 
London and surrounding areas, although the Committee presumed that the 
details would apply to all other areas of the country.  Section nine of the 
Home Secretary’s memorandum concerned the recommendation that 
evacuation should be approved, and included a clause which proposed that: 
‘the organisation best suited for London should be applicable elsewhere 
without substantial modification’.101  
   
The Anderson Committee was made up of four (male) Cabinet Ministers.  
These Ministers were given the task of arranging for the safe passage of 
those who would ultimately be evacuated from perceived danger areas, 
particularly around major cities, that were thought would be most at risk in 
the first instance.  The Committee consulted with Ministries of Health, 
Transport and Education in England, and the Department of Health for 
Scotland (DHS) and the Scottish Education Department (SED).  A network 
of local authorities worked in conjunction with these departments in 
designated target areas and safe areas, referred to thereafter as the ‘sending’ 
areas and the ‘reception’ areas.   
 
Planning involved reaching agreement on where these safe areas and 
vulnerable areas were likely to be.  The country was divided into three areas, 
sending (the evacuation area), reception and neutral areas. The Anderson 
Committee concluded that safe areas should be up to 50 miles outside 
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London.102  Danger areas, it was agreed, were mainly densely populated 
urban areas, where, as Calder pointed out, ‘the poorest strata of official 
evacuees [came] from’.103    
  
In Scotland danger areas were calculated to be places with an average 
density of 100 people per square mile,104 including Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
Dundee.  Scotland’s safe areas came under scrutiny during a House of 
Commons debate in November 1939 when Neil Maclean, MP for Glasgow 
Govan, questioned the validity of some of the designated reception areas.  
He claimed that: 
 
One school was sent down to another school which [was] only half a 
mile away from the largest explosives factory in Britain…I am 
naming neither the place nor the name of the firm whose explosives 
factory is there.  [Further]…Gargunnock, a steel factory, 
manufacturing steel for armaments, plates for shipping, metal for 
guns, that is supposed to be a safe area and the children of Glasgow 
are evacuated to that region whose factory gives all the directions that 
need to be given to enemy aircraft that come over.105   
 
These potentially safe areas and the people most likely to be included in the 
evacuation process had been established at an early stage by the evacuation 
planners.  It was thought that those who would be more of a liability if they 
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remained in danger areas should be evacuated in the first instance. School 
age children formed the largest single group, with the remainder comprising 
mothers with younger children, expectant mothers, the blind and the 
disabled.  The aged and chronically sick who were being looked after at 
home proved problematic to accommodate under the government scheme 
and were not included in the initial plan.   
 
Acting on the advice of several women’s organisations, the Anderson 
Committee felt that parents would be more receptive to sending their 
children in school units if they had a guarantee that their children would be 
given a friendly welcome into good homes, that medical services would be 
available, and that they would be accompanied by teachers, books and 
equipment.106  It was also believed that the evacuation of schools in school 
units would give ‘a precise basis for plans which [were] lacking in the case 
of adults’.107 
 
In September 1939 there were 62,059 unaccompanied children evacuated in 
Scotland.108  A pamphlet by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare 
mentioned that in Scotland: ‘Families large or small were to be kept together 
with no classification of children into primary or secondary school 
groups.’109  This meant that siblings were to be evacuated and billeted 
together as far as possible.  Titmuss interpreted this to mean that all Scottish 
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schoolchildren were evacuated with their mothers and not in school groups 
which was not in fact the case.110  Other historians, writing from a purely 
English perspective, were also under the impression that, in Scotland, all 
children were evacuated with their families.  Ruth Inglis111 and Heather 
Nicolson112  have both commented on this point.  However, there were 
children in Scotland evacuated in school units although, where possible, 
siblings were kept together.  Evidence from a number of interviews with 
former evacuees from Dennistoun and Clydebank, in Glasgow,113 verify that 
they had been sent with their school groups rather than with their families.  
In the case of pre-school children, this group were evacuated with mothers.  
The ‘super’ units comprised of primary schoolchildren, pre-school and post-
primary school children, mothers, helpers and teachers, who were all 
assembled and grouped together in their own particular school units on the 
day of evacuation.114 
 
An operation of such magnitude would inevitably incur substantial costs.  
The initial transfer costs included travel, predominantly by rail, together 
with a standard food package which was supplied to each evacuee for the 
journey.  The operation presented the possibility of setting up centres to 
provide meals at the point of destination.  These communal centres were 
gradually organised in a number of reception areas where evacuees could 
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have a main meal once a day in the area where they resided.  The cost of the 
meal was deducted from the amount received in payment to householders for 
keeping evacuees.  There was a reluctance, in some cases, to allow evacuees 
to take part in the communal meal services, as the payment of the two 
shillings a week required for the provision of five meals was felt to be too 
expensive, especially as the provision of overall care received for evacuees 
amounted to only eight or ten shillings a week.  By March 1940 only 3 per 
cent, which equated to approximately 14,000, of the evacuees in England 
and Wales were receiving communal meals.115      
 
The organisation and provision of meal services was one of a number of 
funding issues which evacuation organisers had to consider.  Further to this, 
consideration had to be given to the cost involved in providing for the 
ongoing health and welfare of evacuees in reception areas for an 
indeterminable length of time.   
 
The financial arrangements for the operation of the evacuation scheme as 
laid down in the Report of the Committee on Evacuation stated under 
section 108 that: 
 
…the Government should bear the entire cost of the evacuation and 
maintenance in safer districts of school children removed from 
vulnerable areas.  
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For all other members of the public who might require to be included in any 
large-scale evacuation section 109 stated that: 
 
…evacuation covering other members of the community, the cost of 
transport and free rations at the outset of the transference and the first 
charge for accommodation, feeding and general welfare arrangements 
should fall upon the Government. 
 
Recovery was to be arranged when: 
 
…conditions [were] stabilised…the authorities should take steps to 
ascertain the persons who can afford to contribute wholly or partly to 
their maintenance, and that they should require from such persons a 
contribution towards the general expenses which the Government are 
incurring.116 
 
The financial implications of evacuation were to prove especially difficult in 
time of war in terms of the strain on fiscal resources on all government 
departments involved in defence planning.  The Anderson Committee’s 
recommendation was that the government should meet the costs incurred in 
the evacuation process, with basic medical care for evacuees being met 
under existing funding for normal welfare schemes.  No extra cost was to be 
incurred by those hosting evacuees.  In the case of accompanied children the 
cost of medical care was to be met by the parents.117  
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The first principle of the evacuation process was that any costs incurred by 
reception authorities would be recovered from the evacuating authorities. 
While in theory this process may have seemed straightforward, in practice it 
was highly complex.  The process of working out which local authority was 
responsible for meeting payments incurred in the care and maintenance of 
evacuees involved a great deal of accounting administration between 
sending and reception areas.  This proved to be even more complex where 
evacuees moved billets, which, in some cases, could have been at least two 
or three times.  
 
In October 1939 a scheme was introduced to allow the government to claw 
back some of the money paid out to householders who looked after 
evacuees.  Effectively this imposed a recovery scheme of means tested 
payments of up to six shillings a week to be paid by the parents of evacuated 
children. The problems encountered in the process of recovering the amount 
due by parents proved as time consuming, and geographically complex, as 
the administration involved in recovering payments for welfare care between 
sending and receiving local authorities.  As Calder pointed out, voluntary 
evacuees under the government scheme came predominantly from the 
poorest urban areas where payment of such sums would have been difficult 
to meet, although he conceded that the government was ‘far from harsh in its 
exaction of contributions from parents’.118   
 
One of the basic problems in the payment of allowances and recovery of 
costs involved, was due to the lack of uniformity in the system of 
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administration between local authorities.119  Keeping track of evacuees in 
reception areas was difficult as substantial numbers of children and mothers 
returned home in the early weeks and months of the war.  Further 
complications arose in ensuring the correct local authority was charged, or 
paid, for costs incurred when evacuees changed billets between different 
local authority areas.  Additional complexities included working out how 
much was due to householders who cared for evacuees.  For those prepared 
to take two or more evacuees eight shillings and six pence per week was 
paid for each child. Ten shillings and six pence was paid for those of 16 
years and over.  Payment of five shillings a week was paid to householders 
where lodging only was being provided to mothers and children over 14 
years and three shillings for each younger child.  Local authorities had been 
given an assurance at the outset that any additional costs incurred in 
receiving areas, as a result of the influx of evacuees, would be met from the 
Civil Defence budget which would be reimbursed from the Exchequer.120  
 
Cost recovery and medical care were important issues of evacuation.  
However, initially it was more important to secure enough suitable 
accommodation for evacuees before the process could take place.  This, the 
Anderson Committee recommended, would be both quicker and more 
economically viable, if large numbers of people, especially children, could 
be accommodated in private houses as long as the rural inhabitants were 
being treated with care and sensitivity.121  The use of large houses was 
considered, if and when some reconditioning could be carried out, in order 
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to make suitable accommodation for evacuees and, where possible, hutted 
camps would be made available.  Boyd mentioned that the raw materials 
required for building suitable camp accommodation were needed for other 
‘essential purposes’ during the war.122  The unsuitability of camp 
accommodation was evident from what happened to evacuees from the Civil 
War in Spain who had been encamped in holiday accommodation.   
 
Assessing the exact figures for those who would require accommodation 
was hampered by the fact that evacuation was to be conducted on a 
voluntary basis.  In theory it appeared that there would be sufficient 
accommodation for 3.7 million people based on one person per habitable 
room in most of England and Wales.  Planners estimated that at least eighty 
per cent, or 3.2 million of those eligible would be likely to take up the 
scheme.123  These figures were over-estimated as, in reality, when the 
evacuation scheme got underway, less than half the expected numbers 
arrived on evacuation days.   
 
A reduction in the estimated number of people included in the official 
evacuation scheme alleviated some of the problems associated with 
accommodation, as early in the process it was evident that for businesses, 
and government departments, to continue to run efficiently some would have 
to relocate to safer areas away from the cities.  These office workers 
required space in the countryside to work and live and their presence 
reduced available space.  Also, private evacuees had earmarked 
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accommodation in private homes effectively reducing the space available for 
government evacuees in some of the designated rural areas.124   
 
Specific areas where accommodation problems were considered to be 
particularly acute were in the North of England, and in Scotland, due to the 
fact that overcrowding already existed in both places.125  The shortage of 
space in these areas was exacerbated by the fact that almost twenty-one per 
cent of available accommodation was earmarked for private evacuees.126  
Account was also taken of the unsuitability of households where there was 
no adult presence during the day or where the residents were elderly or 
infirm.  Regulations under the 1935 Housing Act stipulated that there should 
be no more than five people to four rooms.  Due to overcrowding in 
Scotland this regulation was removed, and when billeting officers were 
reviewing the total number of rooms available in private homes which could 
be used for evacuees, even the kitchen had to be included as a potential 
bedroom.127   
 
In order to ensure that accommodation would be available for those who 
registered to take part in the voluntary evacuation scheme, the Anderson 
Committee agreed in principle that billeting would have to be made 
compulsory and enforced ‘without regard to class or other distinctions’.128   
Compulsory billeting was a contentious issue as the effects of the first wave 
of evacuation were gradually being realised.  As numerous reports were 
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brought to light of unhealthy, unkempt and badly behaved children in 
reception areas, householders were less willing to volunteer to take further 
evacuees.  The issue of compulsory billeting became particularly significant 
when a second wave of evacuation was discussed.  As the war went on a 
number of businesses, factories and offices were compelled to move from 
potentially high risk areas in order to continue to trade.  Those business 
which were required to remain in the cities, and whose employees could be 
billeted outside the centre at the end of the working day, also required 
accommodation in rural or semi-rural parts of the country.   
 
The assumption was that individuals involved in the essential work of 
keeping the country functioning as normally as possible would respect their 
civil duties and continue working in the cities.  Rose wrote that the slogan 
‘equality of sacrifice’ was widely used through the war to help boost morale 
and promote a good work ethic.129  Workers would be ensured:    
 
…proper shelter accommodation and other measures of air raid 
precautions to protect and succour those who [would] be expected to 
continue to live and work in vulnerable areas.130 
 
Compulsory evacuation would have to be implemented in the event of air 
attack, and if it involved essential workers, they were to be ‘accommodated 
at a reasonable distance from their place of work’.131  Titmuss reported that 
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in December 1940 the Ministry of Health had extended a scheme for 
requisitioning unoccupied houses for certain classes of war casualties to 
include war-workers.  The result of these new measures meant, in real terms, 
by 1942 a total of 15,742 war workers were billeted under the compulsory 
billeting powers extended to eighty-six local authorities in England and 
Wales.  Other essential workers in bombed out areas either made use of 
shelters or trekked to and from work each day from temporary 
accommodation, which was a time consuming arrangement.  A study carried 
out in the Bootle area of Liverpool, after the raids began, revealed that the 
loss of working time for the 24,000 people who worked there amounted to a 
total of eight working days for each worker in May 1941.132   Testimony 
from Scottish workers, such as Violet, evacuated from Clydebank after the 
bombing in 1941 confirmed that they faced a similar situation.133    
 
Accommodation was also needed for teachers and helpers, and school 
closures meant that teachers were often required to move with their classes, 
whether or not they had family commitments. If there were sufficient 
numbers of teachers in the receiving areas they could be sent home or moved 
to other districts.  
 
It was agreed that teachers on evacuation duty be paid an allowance of 
fourteen shillings per week, calculated on a sliding scale depending on their 
commitments. They were allowed a flat rate of five shillings per week 
billeting allowance. Teaching continued in the receiving areas for children, 
either on a double-shift system or full days, which meant that both local 
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children and evacuees were able to maintain some form of education.  Boyd 
emphasised the invaluable role teachers played in the overall evacuation 
process both professionally and voluntarily.  His research included 
information on the way in which a number of large houses were converted 
and used as residential schools under the evacuation scheme.  He discussed 
the demand placed upon the lives of teachers who were called upon to work 
in such situations. Recognition was given to the fact that teachers gave up 
much of their leisure time to organise recreational activities for pupils, and 
were often expected to teach subjects unfamiliar to them by corresponding 
with colleagues teaching in city schools.  He cited an example where a 
modern languages teacher with only a slight knowledge of Spanish was 
given the task of teaching pupils in that subject, and where maths teachers 
were called upon to teach book-keeping and shorthand.  In spite of these 
shortcomings 39 out of 42 pupils successfully completed leaving certificates 
in the residential schools surveyed by Boyd.134   
 
The whole operation of evacuation planning and preparations from 1938 
onwards came to fruition on Friday, 1 September 1939.  The organisation of 
such a major undertaking was relatively well organised in view of the 
substantial numbers involved.  The arrangements and costs involved in 
securing accommodation at the point of destination, and the organisation and 
implementation of transport facilities to remove people from the cities, went 
relatively smoothly.  During the three days from 1 September 1939 a total of 
1,473,391 people in Britain were evacuated.135  Of that number, children 
made up the largest single group, and anxious parents had to wait to be 
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informed of the final destination of their child or children.136  The Scotsman 
reported on 1 September that: 
 
While the evacuees are setting out for “unknown” centres in the 
country, it has been arranged that within about 24 hours parents and 
guardians would be informed of the exact location of their children.137    
 
On arrival in the various reception areas the evacuees were taken to billeting 
stations and chosen at random by their future carers, a process which 
Titmuss described as ‘a hit-or-miss chance of a child being placed in a good 
official billet’.138  John Welshman cited a number of examples of random 
selection recalled by former evacuees:  these include the memories of a 
woman who was nine years old when she was evacuated from Salford to 
Lancaster.  She remembered being taken to Greaves School: 
 
…from there [we] were walked around to find homes.  I was the last 
one – with another girl, and the lady shouted “Doesn’t anybody want 
them?”  Mrs Crosby said “I’ll take them” and she took us straight off 
to Morecambe on the bus to see if the illuminations were still on.139 
 
Calder likened this undignified selection process to a Roman slave 
market.140  Parsons refereed to it as ‘dehumanising’.141   
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These problems had not been anticipated during the planning stages of the 
evacuation scheme.  The Anderson Committee had taken advice from a wide 
range of different organisations, including the relevant government 
ministries: the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, the Board of Trade 
Food (Defence Plans) Department and the Transport Services.  The teaching 
unions, including the National Union of Teachers and Association of Head 
Masters, were also consulted, as well as a significant number of voluntary 
services.142  Various representatives from some of these groups were 
appointed to the Advisory Committee on the Evacuation of Schoolchildren 
and the Scottish Advisory Committee on Evacuation (SACE).  SACE was 
made up of representatives from reception areas and sending areas, the 
Women’s Voluntary Service and the Institute of Education.143   
 
The success of the operation depended heavily on the involvement of a 
substantial number of voluntary organisations, the police, and the 
cooperation of householders and individuals willing to offer their services.  
The reliance on volunteers before, during and after the evacuation scheme 
got underway, was evident from the Anderson Committee report which 
stated that: 
 
Voluntary bodies could probably play a large part in arranging for the 
communal feeding of refugees, so far as this proves to be necessary, 
and for general welfare arrangements.144 
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Just as they had assumed that essential workers would make every effort to 
carry on under war conditions, the reporting committee expected, rightly as 
it turned out, that people, especially middle class women, would be willing 
to provide some level of service in time of stress.  On this principle the 
Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) was established and organised by Lady 
Stella Reading as an extension of the Air Raid Precautions (ARP).145  The 
WVS together with other women’s groups came to play a crucial role in the 
organisation of evacuees.  An illustration of how essential volunteers were 
for such an undertaking was evident from the Scotsman newspaper for 
Friday, 14 July 1939, when it was reported that 300 voluntary staff had been 
enrolled for the work of billeting evacuees in areas of Stirlingshire, in 
Scotland.146  Boyd also paid tribute to the many people involved such as 
those with ‘good will with leisure and without, householders of all 
classes’.147  All involved in helping to make the transition from home to 
reception areas as painless as possible were invaluable to the organisational 
success of the evacuation scheme. 
 
Volunteers were also enlisted from domestic and teaching staff to help 
organise and look after evacuees from the beginning of the journey to the 
point of destination and possibly beyond that time.  Titmuss’s use of the 
phrase ‘an army’ to describe the number of teachers and volunteers enlisted 
to help in the initial movement of evacuees, signifies to some extent the 
numbers of volunteers involved who formed a fundamental part of the 
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evacuation scheme and of the war effort generally.148  During the war 
volunteers helped run youth clubs, and sewing, knitting and cookery classes 
for evacuees.  They also ran mobile canteens, rest centres and clothing 
depots for the homeless.  They provided a wealth of services as fire fighters 
and ambulance drivers and helped in rescue efforts on the ground after bomb 
attacks.  The work of the Women’s Institute (WI) and the Women’s 
Voluntary Service helped to stimulate an interest in the development of 
committees in social welfare progression and identified much of the social 
deprivation and neglect that existed in British society.   
 
Historiography relating to evacuation has generally perceived its physical 
process with success.  For example, Calder referred to the organisation and 
transfer of the first wave of evacuees as ‘a triumph of calm and order’149 and 
Brown remarked on the scale of the initial movement as a ‘remarkable 
event’ in terms of the number of people involved.150   All those who were 
involved, teachers, parents, volunteers, transport officials, billeting officers 
and members of the police force, played an important part in the 
organisation and mobilisation process.  There is little doubt that the 
voluntary transfer of a million and a half people over one weekend, without 
a single reported accident, was a great credit to everyone engaged in the 
operation.  This figure excludes a further two million who left privately. 
Welshman said that in logistical terms evacuation was an ‘unqualified 
success’151 and as Calder pointed out, if the bombs had dropped immediately 
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on the declaration of war, the complaints that followed the first wave of 
evacuation would have seemed relatively unimportant.152 
  
Counter discourse on the success of the evacuation scheme points to the lack 
of consideration afforded to human emotion.  Parents were being asked to 
send their children away to unknown destinations for an indeterminate 
length of time.  In addition, while children who remained in reception areas 
were kept relatively safe from direct enemy action, there was, for a 
considerable number, the dramatic impact of family separation that remained 
with them throughout their lives.  Boyd observed that ‘failure was 
inevitable’, as it asked too much of parents.153  Titmuss presented a 
particularly positive opinion of the evacuation process and attributed it to the 
rapid development of social welfare which will be dealt with in a later 
chapter.  Nevertheless, he understood the pitfalls and imperfections of the 
scheme and recognised that evacuation caused ‘a multitude of problems in 
human relationships’.154   The positive opinions advocated by Titmuss had 
been challenged by a number of leading historians in the years following the 
Second World War, and from some former evacuees who chose to write 
about their experience.  Former evacuee Heather Nicolson wrote in negative 
terms of her experience.  For Nicolson and her sister, being evacuated during 
the war was a time in their lives which adversely affected their emotional, 
physical and psychological health.  She tells the story of the ways in which 
they were subjected to abuse during their evacuation in the first chapter of a 
book, which developed as a type of therapy when she realised that there was 
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a part of her life which she could not confront.  She was advised to advertise 
for people to come forward if they had been subjected to abuse during their 
evacuation.  In doing so she found that she and her sister were not alone in 
what they had suffered during their evacuation, and that the long-term 
emotional effects of abuse were still present in the minds of a significant 
amount of former evacuees whose stories are recorded in the book.155     
 
Stories of abuse were not recorded until many years after Titmuss’s work 
was published.  His positive attitude towards evacuation is evident in his 
belief that while he understood the deep seated prejudice which was inherent 
in the British social class structure, he felt that evacuation and war had 
helped to create a ‘more generous society’.156   His opinion was formed from 
the belief that as the poor condition of many evacuees became apparent, the 
‘conscience of the nation’ was aroused.157  However, while making this 
point he acknowledged that historians coming after him would undoubtedly 
question his views, a fact that has become apparent in accounts of 
evacuation by contemporary historians.  Rose is one of many historians who 
questioned the validity of Titmuss’s egalitarian opinion. She argued that 
rather than war helping to break down class barriers, the issue of class 
inequality was ‘central to the wartime nation.158  She believed that the idea 
of unity of class was a ‘powerful fantasy’.159  The harsh reality of the poor 
condition of evacuees and the subsequent public responses will be examined 
here and placed in the context of overall evacuation arrangements. 
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The creation of a more egalitarian society from the merging of social classes, 
thrown together as a result of war, was hoped for rather than achieved, as 
modern day historians have been quick to point out.  Boyd’s opinion, stated 
in 1944, reinforced the fact that far from creating an egalitarian society, 
whereby a more caring and inclusive consciousness would dominate public 
opinion as social classes came together under the evacuation scheme, he 
believed that once the first evacuees had been billeted their future welfare 
was given very little thought.160  Recognition and praise was proffered for 
the efficient way in which the initial movement was carried out.  This praise 
was however conditional in view of the speed with which evacuees returned, 
and the substantial problems which were brought to light as a result of the 
operation.  
 
Cracks in the evacuation scheme began to appear almost immediately as the  
extent of urban deprivation was brought home to rural communities, due to 
the wide distribution of city children over a vast area of countryside.  The 
first wave of evacuation had drawn attention to the poor condition of a 
significant number of children.  As the first evacuation had taken place 
during school holidays it had not been practical for the children to have 
medical inspections before they left the cities.  There were reports from 
householders of head lice, scabies, dirt and disease being spread by 
evacuees.  The problems of hygiene among evacuees was a major cause for 
concern, especially the scabies and head lice.  Both were spread as a result 
of simply coming into contact with a person who had the condition.  Causes 
of scabies included overcrowding, poor hygiene and population movement 
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to which all evacuees were subjected.  One former evacuee remembered that 
in return for the kindness shown to her by her host family she ‘gave them all 
scabies’.161  
 
For those evacuees who were settled in reception areas and were enrolled in 
local schools, hygiene problems became an issue for teachers.  During an 
informal meeting of West Lothian Head Teachers, the head of Broxburn 
High School announced that evacuation had brought to light the fact that in 
too many cases children were ‘dirty, ill-fed, ill-slept and ill-clad’.162  Scabies 
was such a cause for concern that in 1941 the DHS introduced the Scabies 
Order (Scotland).  This required that, in the case of verminous children, any 
instructions given by the Medical Officer of Health to parents, guardians or 
others in charge of children be complied with. 163  The order effectively 
made it a notifiable disease in Scotland, according to Manfred Green in his 
work on Epidemiology of Scabies. Green reported that as many as one per 
cent of the population of Glasgow was infected with scabies in 1939.164  
 
Other personal issues that caused concern included the lack of fundamental 
table manners and hygiene among evacuees and the more serious problem of 
enuresis (or bedwetting).  Evacuation also highlighted problems such as 
behaviour, moral and religious issues and class differences.  Behavioural 
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problems were such a cause for concern that it prompted the Advisory 
Council on Education in Scotland to seek advice from County Council 
authorities of the possibility of citizenship being introduced into the 
curriculum.165  
 
There were also reports of behavioural problems among some adult 
evacuees, especially mothers who had been evacuated with pre-school 
children.  The potential to create a tense situation was manifest when 
mothers and children were billeted in private homes.  Less than three weeks 
after the initial evacuation, the Scotsman reported cases where mothers made 
‘extravagant demands upon their hostesses [and] threatened them with “the 
law” if their unreasonable requirements [were] not accorded at once’.  These 
demands, it was suggested, could involve the householder being left all day 
to look after evacuee children, some as young as three months old.166  These 
claims were reinforced by Boyd’s survey of 89 families hosting evacuee 
mothers with children.  It showed 23 cases where personality clashes 
between mother and host were apparent.  Reported problems included ‘lazy’ 
or ‘truculent’ mothers, or mothers who had ‘expected breakfast in bed’ or 
‘lay in bed all forenoon’.167      
 
The poor condition of some evacuees led to the publication of pamphlets by 
women’s groups with substantial recommendations for change.  These 
pamphlets claimed that: ‘…through the depth of evacuation…social failures 
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[could] be appreciated’,168 and that evacuation had brought the nation’s 
social problems to the ‘doorstep of the public’, and in order to make better 
human beings, social conditions needed to be improved.169  The pamphlets 
included suggestions for tackling issues of neglect in health and education, 
and highlighted the problem of child neglect and cleanliness.  It called for an 
extension of educational facilities to include the teaching of cookery and 
dietary requirements, and proposed the launch of a public campaign for the 
promotion of healthy eating.   
 
As billeting officers, members of the WVS, and householders became more 
aware of the existence of different forms of neglect among evacuees, and, as 
complaints abounded concerning problems of head lice, lack of proper 
clothing and bad manners, a review of child welfare policy became a matter 
of urgency.  The extent of this led to some important issues for improvement 
in education and health being discussed at government level.  The issue of 
vouchers for clothes and shoes to necessitous children, extended free school 
milk, vitamin supplements and school meals all stemmed from the need to 
alleviate problems relating to the poor state of some evacuees.  The milk and 
meals in schools programme began in the inter-war period and continued to 
play an important part in maintaining the health of schoolchildren during 
wartime.  Research has shown that there was a significant improvement in 
the height and weight of children during the war.  Medical inspections of 
Glasgow children in July 1943 showed an overall height and weight gain for 
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both boys and girls when compared with the figures for 1935-1939.170  This 
was, in part, attributed to the extended arrangements for milk and meals in 
schools.  Also, the appointment of a Minister of Food and introduction of 
rationing helped promote the nutritional value of food, effectively improving 
the nation’s diet overall.  The introduction of any welfare change however 
was restricted by cost, and budget control for welfare services including 
education and health lay with each local authority.  The quality of service 
provided by these departments therefore depended heavily on locally-
controlled expenditure. 
 
In spite of attempts to encourage people to remain in reception areas the drift 
back was rapid, especially in the case of mothers with young children.  Of 
the 24,269 mothers evacuated in Scotland during September 1939 only 
3,043 were still in the receiving area by January 1940.   Of the 175,812 
people evacuated in Scotland in September 1939 a total of 129,046 had 
returned home by January 1940.171   Figures taken from an official count 
carried out by local authorities on 8 January 1940 showed a slight increase in 
the number of Scottish children remaining in reception areas over those in 
England.  The figures from January, recorded in Titmuss, took account of 
unaccompanied children where 55 per cent or 420,000 remained in receiving 
areas in England.  The comparative percentage of Scottish unaccompanied 
children was 61 per cent.  The figure for mothers with children in reception 
areas at the same time amounted to 13 per cent in England with only 9 per 
cent in Scotland.  For groups such as teachers, helpers, disabled, blind and 
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others, the number remaining in the reception areas in England was much 
higher, apart from that of expectant mothers, where the percentage figure for 
both countries was almost equal.172  The rapid drift back to the cities meant 
that the majority of the evacuated population were back in the danger areas 
long before the bombing began.  In effect, this meant that the operation had 
largely been in vain.  This situation was a source of worry for the authorities 
as the threat of attack from Germany loomed over Britain. 
 
The fact that large numbers of the priority classes were back in the danger 
areas before the bombing began was a source of concern among Cabinet 
members, who believed the evacuation planning and implementation to have 
been a failure.  In a debate in the House of Commons in November 1939 
mention was made on several occasions of the lack of planning and 
consideration given to evacuees.  For example, the opinion of Neil Maclean, 
MP for Glasgow Govan, was that: 
 
All that was considered was dumping children from one town into 
another, which was asked to receive more children than there was 
either accommodation for in the houses or in the schools.  
Consequently, it was bound to break down at some time.173 
 
There were a number of reasons why the drift back to evacuation areas was 
so rapid.  One school of thought among revisionist historians is the 
undercurrent of class division within British society became much more 
apparent as a result of evacuation.  From the first evacuation scheme there 
                                                 
172 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.172. 
173 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353. cc. 1140-1141. 
 79 
was a growing awareness of the problems caused by the merging of different 
social classes.  These social problems were so acute that they became cause 
for concern at government level and formed an integral part of parliamentary 
debate as early as November 1939.  William Gallacher, Communist MP for 
West Fife, was particularly critical of the government’s handling of 
evacuation policy.  He claimed that:  
 
…the whole character of evacuation [had] been affected, simply 
because the Government never gave serious consideration to the 
question beforehand.  That was due to the fact… that it was only the 
working-class who were to be evacuated and that anything is good 
enough at any time for the working class. 
 …nothing was done to prepare and no attempt made to get an 
understanding of the problem of how these thousands of working-
class children and mothers were to be protected.  But who on the 
Government benches is interested in them?  The Government’s idea 
is… that anything is good enough for working-class women and 
children.174 
 
Boyd’s survey supported these accusations.  He conducted an in depth study 
of Clydebank, after the first evacuation scheme was carried out, in order to 
establish why so many came back within the first few weeks, why others 
came back after months and why a few stayed long-term .  Part of this study 
included looking at issues of class structure, the experiences of evacuees 
sent privately, the presence or absence of family members, and whether 
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siblings and/or mothers were evacuated together.  His research took account 
of the age and sex of the children, the length of time between parental visits 
and the house size of the family home in the sending and receiving areas.  
 
Significant emphasis was placed on the class difference as a contributory 
factor in the early return of children from receiving areas.  Research showed 
that Clydebank evacuees were made up almost entirely of working class 
children.  When these children were billeted with families of a similar social 
class their stay was marginally more successful, as Boyd’s figures have 
shown.  His calculations showed that forty-two per cent of Clydebank 
children billeted in working-class households had returned after two months, 
as opposed to a fifty per cent return over the same period of those children 
billeted with families which Boyd considered to be households of a better-
class.   
 
There were other important issues which drove people back to evacuation 
areas, as Boyd’s survey has shown.  He claimed that in four out of every five 
cases it was in fact the parents who were responsible for the rapid return of 
evacuees, especially, as evidenced above, where mothers were evacuated 
with children.  By the end of 1939, according to the survey, only 300 of the 
original 4000 children evacuated from Clydebank were still in the receiving 
areas.  Evidence of religious differences between guest and host was a 
symptom of the early return of evacuees.  Boyd recorded that Catholic 
children in large families were less likely to be evacuated than Protestant 
children and, on average, Protestant children tended to stay away slightly 
longer than Catholic children.  Of the 838 Catholic children evacuated, only 
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one tenth remained in the receiving areas long-term.175   It is evident 
therefore that class division, the influence of parents and religion were all 
significant incentives to encourage the early return of evacuees.  There were 
however a number of other important reasons which helped influence their 
early return.  These included such issues as personality clashes, 
unwillingness of householders to carry on caring for strangers, and the 
emotional trauma of family separation.   
 
This chapter has outlined why the evacuation process was initiated and its 
implementation.  It included the problems involved in the mass movement of 
people throughout the country during the first weekend in September 1939.  
Attention has been given to the dependence placed on the invaluable work of 
the voluntary services during the war and on the substantial problems 
encountered in the first evacuation scheme.  These included compulsory 
billeting, the related problems of accommodation and transport, plus various 
aspects of health and hygiene in the homes where evacuees were billeted.  It 
also highlighted educationalists’ involvement, behavioural problems among 
evacuees, and class and religious division.  A few of these issues were 
discussed as being contributory factors in the early return of substantial 
numbers of evacuees.   
 
After the first wave of evacuation the government staged two further 
evacuation schemes within Britain during the Second World War which 
were implemented only after aerial bombardment had taken place.  For a 
short time, the government also took advantage of offers from the 
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Dominions and the United States, to send children to safety overseas.  The 
effect of these events will form the basis of the discussion in the following 
chapter which will continue with the theme of evacuation planning and 
implementation.   
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Chapter II  
Evacuation Schemes after 1939 
 
Following the mixed results of the first wave of evacuation, which took 
place over the three days from 1st to 3rd September 1939, alongside a 
continuous ‘trickle evacuation’ throughout the early months of 1940, the 
British government embarked on a second major evacuation scheme in the 
summer of 1940.  The threat of invasion seemed inevitable as the Germans 
continued to gain control over much of Western Europe.  The second 
evacuation scheme was therefore instigated in September and lasted for 
twelve months.  In September 1941 the government considered entirely 
ending the scheme, although there is no evidence from parliamentary papers 
to suggest this was discussed at Commons level.176  In July and September 
1944, when the V1 and V2 rockets threatened British cities, a third major 
evacuation was quickly undertaken. 
 
In May 1940 the German army had successfully invaded the Netherlands 
and Belgium and began their offensive through northern France.  The 
following month France capitulated.  As events were unfolding in 
continental Europe the British Government engaged in serious discussion 
concerning a second evacuation scheme.  Over the spring and summer of 
1940 approximately 300,000 people moved from London and coastal towns 
around the southeast to areas of perceived safety.177  As the need for a 
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second concentrated evacuation became clear, it was evident that before 
anything further could be put in place many of the problems highlighted by 
the first evacuation scheme would have to be rectified, in particular the need 
for greater sensitivity in both sending and reception areas.  
 
This chapter will continue the theme of the argument presented in the 
previous chapter by exploring how far government efforts helped ensure the 
safety of vulnerable people.  The wider context of change in social welfare 
resulting from the first and subsequent evacuations will also be considered.  
As the focus of the thesis is on Scotland, these later evacuation schemes will 
be discussed with a view to establishing how Scotland was affected by social 
welfare changes brought about by the evacuation process. 
 
The second and third official evacuation schemes within Britain applied 
mainly to London and coastal areas around the southeast where much of the 
heavy bombing took place.  In Scotland a second official full scale 
evacuation was launched during March and May 1941, when bombing raids 
hit Glasgow and Clydebank.  Additionally, in the summer of 1940, while the 
second evacuation scheme was underway at home the government launched 
a scheme to send children overseas.  The overseas evacuation scheme, which 
took place between July and September 1940, will be discussed here since it 
formed part of the overall evacuation process and involved Scottish children 
broadly on a pro rata basis, according to population size between England, 
Wales and Scotland. 
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Parsons complained of the lack of historiography relating to the second and 
third evacuation schemes, and stressed that most text books have tended to 
concentrate attention on the first official scheme.  He also commented on the 
lack of available information on the ‘trickle’ evacuation in the 1940s.178  
Historiographical argument relating to the second and subsequent evacuation 
schemes therefore begins here with the work and opinions of Titmuss, as his  
official version of the social history of the Second World War remains the 
most in-depth coverage of the subject to date.  Titmuss believed in the value 
of war as a vessel for the promotion and expansion of welfare provision.  He 
acknowledged the existence of poverty and inequality within British society 
and thought that war and evacuation would lead eventually to a more 
egalitarian society.  He described the evacuation process as the most 
important subject in the social history of the war, and believed the provision 
of milk for children on a national level, the provision of school meals and 
the immunisation of children against potentially deadly diseases such as 
diphtheria, were all evidence that inequalities highlighted by evacuation 
made change inevitable.179  These areas of health and welfare provision will 
be assessed in order to support or challenge this view.  In particular, this will 
be done with respect to Scotland’s health statistics.  
 
Boyd, writing in 1944 on the Scottish evacuation, claimed that once 
evacuees had been billeted their future welfare was given very little 
thought.180   There is some truth in Boyd’s comment in so far as the 
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guidelines for the initial evacuation process were laid out.  Evacuation was 
an experiment never before undertaken in Britain and it was a case of ‘trial 
and error’.181  The Anderson Committee did not, nor could not, have 
anticipated some of the problems which the first evacuation scheme brought 
to light.  From the inception of the idea of evacuation the planners took no 
account of the emotional family ties which led to parents being unable to 
part with their children when the theory of evacuation became reality.  They 
did not foresee the problems householders would face when children who 
were billeted with them were in a poor and dirty condition.  Nor could they 
have anticipated the problems caused by the speed with which evacuees 
returned to the danger areas.   
 
As the purpose of this chapter is to provide an outline of the issues involved 
in the evacuation process, it should be noted that the educational services in 
Scotland were alerted to the risks, and some of the possible consequences, of 
the evacuation scheme prior to the outbreak of war.  The SED gave 
significant attention to educational and moral disruption and provided 
guidelines to be carried out in the event of the scheme being put into 
operation.  Consideration was given to the implications of evacuation on 
accommodation, transport, finance, meals, materials, teaching staff and 
extra-curricular activities.  A circular issued in June 1939 pointed to the fact 
that in the absence of previous experience, the situation called for ‘initiative, 
resource and adaptability on the part of teachers’.  The circular stressed that 
health and moral welfare would require particular attention under stressful 
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conditions as extensive demands would be placed on the medical and social 
services of the community.  The mention of moral welfare and the social 
services point to the fact that the SED were aware of the possibility of the 
emotional strain, as well as a physical strain, which would be placed on 
evacuees.182   
 
Early in the evacuation process it was apparent that greater emphasis would 
have to be placed on behavioural problems which were being highlighted in 
reception areas as the result of the double-shift system in schools, and in 
sending areas where schools were closed indefinitely.  Economically the first 
priority for funding was given over to war production and fighting services, 
manpower and materials.  This effectively limited the finance available for 
other services including welfare.183  Nevertheless additional wartime 
services were established and family centres set up where people could 
spend time outside the home.  Centres for the aged and expectant mothers, 
more social workers, hostels and nurseries were also put in place.  Examples 
of these additional services include a total of 660 hostels, accommodating 
10,000 children, 30 special hostels and 30 camp schools, all set up in 
England and Wales by July 1941.  In Scotland 106 hostels and 5 school 
camps were established.184  By the summer of 1942, the 106 Scottish hostels 
were providing accommodation for 3,500 evacuees.185   
     
                                                 
182 SCAS. SC5/7/25. Circular No. 121, from the Scottish Education Department, 19 June 
1939. 
183 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.402. 
184 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.373. 
185 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), pp.34 and 35. 
 88 
In subsequent evacuation schemes those children who were found to be unfit 
to be billeted in private households were placed in hostel accommodation, 
either on a permanent basis, or until they could be given the care and support 
they needed and were deemed acceptable to be moved into foster homes. 
Hostels could also be used as a temporary home for children when the host 
family wished to go on holiday and for some children of secondary school 
age.  These measures, it was hoped, would help to ease billeting problems.  
The residential hostels established in Scotland included Barns House for 
‘difficult boys’ from Edinburgh, and Nerston House in East Kilbride, on the 
outskirts of  Glasgow, also for problem children.  These were both up and 
running during the summer of 1940.  Boyd, writing in 1944, claimed that 
these were run efficiently and became ‘permanent and integral’ to 
Glasgow’s Child Guidance Services.186  Sir Alexander MacGregor187 and 
J.G. Craw have endorsed Boyd’s claim in respect of Nerston Residential 
School.188  Since Nerston continued to function until 2009 as a residential 
clinic and school its contribution in the social welfare of the area can be 
assumed.  Barns Residential School was officially closed in 1954 when the 
original owners of the house required it to be returned to them.189  
 
Just as in England and Wales, Scotland’s hostels were used as an alternative 
means of accommodation for children and mothers who could not be billeted 
in private households as a result of their poor condition and/or bad 
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behaviour. Accusations of bad behaviour included bed wetting and running 
away.  Titmuss reported that the original hostels were run on ‘makeshift’ 
conditions with untrained staff and ultimately became dumping grounds for 
supposedly difficult children.  From forty-eight hostels surveyed more than 
half were found to contain children who displayed some symptoms of bad 
behaviour.190  These centres were generally referred to as hostels for 
problem children until the services were reorganised in 1941, when attention 
was finally given to the organisation and care required for resident children.   
Boyd’s survey was particularly positive on the way camps and mansion 
houses were organised as residential homes and schools for evacuees.  The 
speed of return, behaviour, manners and health, he believed, all compared 
favourably to billeting in households especially for older children.191   
 
When the second evacuation scheme was mooted in March 1940, parents 
who had not already subscribed to the first scheme were invited to register 
school age children for the second wave.  This proved to be only partially 
successful, as Boyd’s figures show that just 3,000 children in Edinburgh and 
5,000 in Glasgow were registered to be sent to receiving areas over the 
following weeks of September.192   Leaflets were sent to all districts to be 
distributed to householders.  These were to be returned indicating their 
willingness to host a second evacuation scheme.  This scheme was to operate 
quite differently from the first and would not be undertaken until aerial 
bombardment had begun.  This was quite distinct from the Anderson 
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Committee discussions influenced by the Spanish and Chinese bombings in 
the 1930s which stressed the pro-active over the reactive. 
 
The Ministry of Health and the Department of Health in Scotland were well 
aware of the need to proceed with caution and sensitivity towards the people 
in the reception areas in order to gain support for a second wave of 
evacuation.  Assurance had to be given to potential carers in reception areas 
that the problems highlighted the previous September would not be repeated.  
One such problem faced by carers in the first wave of the evacuation scheme 
was that children often arrived in reception areas in a poor physical 
condition.  This was due in part to the fact the evacuation scheme began at 
the end of the summer holidays and schools were still closed.  As a result 
school medical inspections could not be carried out on the children and any 
minor ailments dealt with before they were sent away.       
 
The second evacuation scheme was only to be offered to children of school 
age, and schools were to be evacuated as units.  Parents willing to send their 
children would be required to guarantee that they would leave them in the 
reception area until the school parties returned.  The second wave would not 
be implemented until medical inspections were carried out in the sending 
areas to ensure that children were clean and free from disease before being 
evacuated.  This was only possible once schools in sending areas had 
reopened in the weeks and months after the initial mass evacuation in 
September 1939.  Children who failed to meet the medical requirements for 
evacuation would not be sent.  Clothing and footwear would also be checked 
to ensure it would adequately meet the needs of the evacuees before they 
embarked on the scheme.  The use of large houses and camps would be used 
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as clearing stations where possible and could be used to house those who 
could not immediately be billeted.  This would help to ensure evacuees were 
placed in appropriate billets and would alleviate the need for haste in 
billeting.  Boyd reported on the vigilance of the DHS in ensuring that regular 
checks were made on those children registered for evacuation, and their 
clothes and footwear were inspected at regular intervals.193   
 
There was nevertheless a significant problem in planning the second wave of 
evacuation in that parents in sending areas and householders in receiving 
areas were less than enthusiastic about a second evacuation scheme.  Parsons 
noted that by April 1940 only 95,000 had registered, 220,000 had refused, 
and the vast majority, a further 842,000 had abstained from making a 
commitment either way.194   In Scotland there was unmistakable hostility to 
a second wave and leaflets sent out by local authorities in receiving areas 
produced few favourable returns.  In Selkirk, for example, the head of the 
County Council refused to send the leaflets out at all.  In a letter of response 
sent to the Secretary of the County Council Association, the Council leader 
claimed that, ‘speaking generally nobody now wants evacuees’ and that the 
‘general view taken in the landward part of this county is that the 
Government Scheme is wrong in conception and wrong in practice’.195   
 
In Inverness approximately 6000 leaflets were sent out, with fewer than 100 
householders returning a positive response to having evacuees.  Inverness 
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County Council suggested that the only solution in that area for housing 
evacuees would be in empty shooting lodges as it would be ‘infinitely less 
troublesome and much more satisfactory’.196  In Stirling 14,000 leaflets were 
distributed with only 150 positive returns.197  These figures give some 
indication of the cool reception the second evacuation scheme was given. 
The figures changed very little across other areas of Scotland with 
householders responding that only in the event of severe and continued 
bombing raids would they be prepared to take evacuees.  This type of 
hostility towards evacuees in some reception areas was evident from an 
article in the Stirling Journal and Advertiser.  The headlines on 21 March 
1940 stated that Bridge of Allan Residents “Would Prefer Jail” than be 
involved in a fresh scheme.198  The article stressed that the majority of 
householders in the area were ‘emphatically’ against the proposal.  In 
response, a representative from the DHS asserted that compulsory billeting 
could be enforced.  This idea was met with hostility from a significant 
number of local residents. 
 
In the early months of the war non-compliance with billeting regulations 
carried the threat of householders having to face a complaints tribunal.  
According to evidence held with Falkirk Archives, a DHS Circular No. 54 
was sent out on 27 August 1939 in which local authorities were requested to 
take steps to constitute billeting tribunals in local areas.  Billeting officers 
were instructed that: 
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(d) …any person who fails to comply with the requirements of a 
billeting notice commits an offence.  If any person refuses to comply 
with the requirements of a billeting notice, the case should be reported 
to the Chief Reception Officer or the Chief Billeting Officer in order 
that he may submit it to the Procurator Fiscal.199 
 
The fate of those who did not comply with billeting regulations lay with a 
Complaints Tribunal who were instructed that:  
 
(11) …any person who is aggrieved by the service upon him of a 
billeting notice…may, subject to and in accordance with rules made 
by the Secretary of State, make a complaint to the above tribunal.  
Upon hearing the complaint the tribunal may cancel or vary the 
billeting notice, as the tribunal thinks fit.200  
  
Householders did not want to host evacuees for many and varied reasons.  
Apart from the problems connected with strangers living in their homes, 
residents in rural areas were worried about the pressure extra bodies were 
placing on the essential amenities.  When the residents of Cupar, then a 
relatively small village in Fife, were approached regarding accepting a 
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second wave of evacuations, one of several reasons given as to why they 
were hostile to the scheme was the shortage of water in the area.201      
 
Due to the low returns and lack of enthusiasm for a second evacuation 
scheme, consideration was given to imposing compulsory measures. The 
views of MPs differed considerably on this issue.  The continuation of a 
voluntary scheme evoked substantial opposition between MPs who felt that 
enforcing compulsory evacuation was the best way to safeguard children 
from danger.  Government thinking behind the continuation of voluntary 
evacuation rested principally on the fact that evacuation carried no absolute 
guarantee of safety.  In the Commons, Malcolm MacDonald, Minister of 
Health, outlined the main arguments both for and against compulsory 
evacuation.202  Although he was in favour of compulsory evacuation, he 
realised that if compulsion was applied and parents did not adhere to the 
law, a penalty of some kind would have to be imposed.  His argument rested 
on how unreasonable it would have been to force parents to send their 
children away.  He questioned how parents should be dealt with if they 
refused to send their children and suggested that if compulsion was imposed: 
 
One lot of police would have to take the children, in many cases out 
of the very hands of their parents, and take them off to the trains 
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which would convey them to the reception areas.  Another lot of 
police would have to take the parents and march them off to prison.203   
 
In reply, Thelma Cazalet, Conservative MP for Islington East, believed that 
persuasion had failed in view of the fact that only one in four children had 
been registered for evacuation.  It was, she said: 
 
…the absolute duty of the government to arrange for compulsory 
evacuation…of all children of school age while it can be done with 
comparative ease or in an orderly fashion.204 
 
At odds with the Minister’s suggestion that parents would have to be 
marched off to prison, she claimed that if compulsion were applied, parents 
would be ‘only too glad to have their minds made up for them.205  
Contrasting opinion between compulsory over voluntary evacuation 
continued between MPs.  Ultimately the government did not enforce 
compulsion at any point in the war.   
 
Since compulsion was not a legal option as a means of removing people 
from danger, a media campaign was launched in order to encourage parents 
to send their children to safety.  Propaganda posters urged mothers to send 
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their children out of danger areas and leave them in reception areas.  There 
were many posters aimed at influencing parents and, indeed, one had a 
biblical connotation where a mother, representing Eve in the Garden of 
Eden, was being tempted by Hitler whispering in her ear to take her children 
back.206  The poster propaganda continued and was backed up by other 
forms of media intervention including a weekly radio broadcast by J.B. 
Priestley, newspaper articles and a number of films aimed at encouraging 
both host and evacuee to embrace the evacuation scheme. 
 
Dr Edith Summerskill, Labour MP for West Fulham, criticised the approach 
Ministers had taken on the issue of compulsion.  She spoke of the lack of 
compassion they had shown towards mothers who were predominantly the 
target audience.  Evacuation she said was ‘one of the biggest social problems 
which has ever been presented to any government’ yet ‘night after night a 
man’s voice comes over the ether to all these women, with the same 
stereotyped speech’.207  She believed these were the speeches of statesmen 
which would not reach women who were going to part with their children as 
they were delivered ‘just as the Chancellor of the Exchequer might be 
speaking to the nation’.208   She said that if women were to be persuaded to 
send their children away then Ministers must: 
 
Get women from the reception areas, teachers, kind women, women 
with children, women who [understood] the problem and put them on 
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the air.  Let their voices go through to the kitchens of the nation where 
the women listen in.209   
 
In Clydebank near Glasgow, women conducted just such a propaganda 
campaign.  In the Clydebank Press, the local weekly newspaper for that area, 
the WVS produced a column on ‘Evacuation Notes’.  In one particular issue 
encouraging parents to register their children for evacuation they claimed 
that: 
Every day, nay every hour, the danger of air attack grows 
greater…You, yourself, will almost certainly be compelled to bear 
what Barcelona bore, to feel what France felt and suffer some of the 
pangs that tore Poland.  And your children, what of them?  Innocent, 
and largely helpless, are you going to allow them to be butchered and 
mangled before your eyes without making some effort to save 
them?210 
 
It has not been possible to assess how successful this or any other form of 
propaganda was in influencing British mothers to send their children away.  
Parsons has claimed that no research was carried out on the subject by Mass 
Observation (MO), the independent team of social researchers who 
documented the everyday lives of Britons from 1937 through collections of 
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letters and diaries.  Parsons did observe that former evacuees watching films 
from the time found them patronising.211 
 
An alternative to the official evacuation scheme was an assisted private 
evacuation scheme.  This allowed people to decide for themselves where 
they would go and to whom.  With the exception of Titmuss none of the 
historians who have written about the evacuation process have given 
particular attention to the assisted scheme.  The scheme was introduced by 
the government in June 1940 as part of the second wave of evacuation.  The 
assisted scheme helped mothers with pre-school children to leave London 
suburbs that were being subjected to intense bombing, and it was extended 
in October 1940 to include other vulnerable people such as the blind, 
expectant mothers, mothers with school age children and the homeless, the 
elderly, and the infirm.212  This was of some help to the elderly and infirm 
who, in the original report issued in 1938 by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence on Evacuation, were to be ‘dealt with under any general scheme’.213   
 
In effect, the assisted private evacuation scheme provided certificates for 
free accommodation and free travel vouchers for people who could find their 
own accommodation and make their own travel arrangements.  This 
arrangement relieved government and local authorities of the pressure of 
                                                 
211 Parsons, “I’ll Take That One” (1998), p.138. 
212 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.365. 
213 TNA. CAB 24/279.  Report of Committee on Evacuation 1938, Section 96, p.23. 
 99 
having to find accommodation for people other than the original priority 
classes included in the second wave.   
 
This same scheme helped remove some of the pressure on scarce 
accommodation in certain reception areas already taxed by the transfer of 
workers in aircraft industry, new war factories, private firms, banks and 
insurance societies which had relocated to safer areas of the country.  Private 
hospitals and staff were also moved out of danger areas, as were voluntary 
organisations and civil servants.  Scottish industry remained relatively 
unscathed by war and housed some English workers evacuated with their 
firms.  The Clyde Anchorage off the coast of Greenock, used for visiting 
naval vessels, operated an Emergency Port Scheme and 600 dockworkers 
from stevedoring units were billeted in Greenock.214  Some factories turned 
to the production of war materials while others, such as Rolls Royce, built 
shadow factories for war production.  The safe removal of war workers and 
other vulnerable people from danger areas was part of the problem facing 
government and local authorities.  Ensuring people, especially children, 
remained in reception areas until their safe return could, as far as possible, 
be guaranteed, was another.   
 
The lack of enthusiasm for the undertaking of a second official scheme in 
reception areas was matched in evacuation areas. Titmuss believed that by 
the time a second mass evacuation was being considered, ‘air raids and 
shelter life had become part of the everyday life of Londoners’, and 
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therefore they had no real desire to move to the country.215  Evidence of just 
how reluctant people were to leave London during the bombing can be seen 
in the official figures.  It was estimated that 89,000 mothers and children left 
London during October 1940, with a further 12,500 between November and 
December.216  These figures compare unfavourably with the 257,000 
mothers and accompanied children who left London and the metropolitan 
area in September 1939.217  In order to make the official evacuation scheme 
more appealing, some additional enticements were being offered.  In 
reception areas additional services were in place such as more hostels, 
welfare centres and social clubs, where people could escape from rural 
households during the daytime.218  At the same time it was necessary to 
provide householders in reception areas with additional incentives, which 
would make housing evacuees more appealing.     
 
The demand for nursery places increased as a result of war and evacuation 
which was exacerbated by an increase in the birth rate from the early 1940s.  
In Scotland the birth rate rose from 86,899 in 1939 to 90,697 in 1942, 
reaching a peak of 95,941 in 1944.219  The number of illegitimate births also 
increased during the war across Britain.  Figures show that there were 
165,000 illegitimate births between 1941 and 1944.  This equates to over 
41,000 illegitimate births per year compared with the figure of 26,000 for 
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1939 and 1940.220  The Scottish figure for illegitimate live births rose from 
5,192 in 1939 to 7,547 in 1944.221    
 
The care of unmarried mothers and their babies was mainly left to voluntary 
agencies to deal with and their care continued to be a contentious issue 
during the six years of war.  Some progress was made by 1943 in terms of 
provision of improved care by the appointment of social workers whose 
main interest was the health and welfare of both mother and baby.  This 
Parsons perceived as being a positive legacy of the evacuation scheme.222    
 
It could be argued however, that although social welfare agencies stepped in 
to give assistance to unmarried mothers, the stigma attached to illegitimacy 
continued to be a problem beyond the period of the war.  Ferguson and 
Fitzgerald suggested in 1954 that unmarried mothers and their babies 
remained an embarrassment to both local authorities and voluntary workers 
throughout the war.223  In his research on the subject Kynaston has also 
claimed that unmarried mothers were looked upon as being without status 
and suggested that marriage was an integral part of acceptable lifestyle in the 
1950s.224  In her study on maternal welfare Ann Oakley commented that 
illegitimacy was a significant reason for women not attending antenatal 
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clinic.225  While she provides no figures to substantiate her argument she 
concluded that there was no easing of prejudice against the unmarried 
mother for at least two decades after the war.  Some evidence of this may be 
found in the continued existence of homes for unmarried mothers in this era.   
 
Taking new public initiatives and additional private initiatives into account, 
there was little relevant change in the structure between the first and the 
second evacuation scheme.  The difference was that the success of the 
second scheme depended heavily on public participation, and the lack of 
response to the countrywide survey on the launch of a second scheme made 
it impossible to plan accurately for numbers arriving in reception areas.  This 
problem was compounded by the fact that evacuation would only take place 
when bombs started to fall on Britain.  Such a situation presented further 
complications in so far as there could potentially be very little or no advance 
warning before evacuation would have to take place.  In addition, parents 
willing to participate had to agree to leave their children in reception areas 
once they were evacuated and not bring them home early, as had happened 
in the first evacuation.  In terms of the householders in reception areas, they 
were to have an assurance that only children in a clean and healthy state 
would be sent, and those who were not were to be placed in other types of 
accommodation.226  A very slight rise in the payment scheme was also 
offered as an incentive to householders willing to billet evacuees. 
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Figures were discouraging despite attempts to persuade people to leave cities 
and remain in the reception areas.  England and Wales, including a total of 
350,000 unaccompanied children.227  In Scotland by early 1942 there were 
approximately 738,000 evacuees of all classes in reception areas. Although 
people did move when heavy bombing began, when the German army 
turned attention on Russia many were disinclined to remain away from their 
homes indefinitely.   
 
In Scotland the worry over a second mass evacuation was unfounded as 
plans were only to be enforced in the event of aerial bombardment.  The 
only other extensive evacuation took place following the blitz on Clydebank 
in March and May 1941.  Boyd reported that, following the March bombing 
of Clydebank and the nearby Glasgow district of Knightswood, a total of 
120,000 people were evacuated from the Glasgow area.228  This massive 
bombardment engendered a feeling of wide cooperation.  Many of the oral 
histories of the people who lived through the bombing and subsequent 
evacuation were testimony to the sense of solidarity which developed among 
the people of Clydebank.  One Clydebank woman described the kindness of 
a relative who lived on a home farm estate in Callander where: 
  
On the Friday evening, twenty six of us went to Callander in a coal 
lorry.  I had an aunt in Callander… she put everybody up, all twenty 
six from that coal lorry.229  
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The Clydebank Life Story Group collated many such accounts of kindness 
during those dark days.  These reports echoed those of Londoners involved 
in the blitz of 1940.  Holman claimed that once the bombs fell ‘foster parents 
knew that they were giving essential protection to children’ and that their 
suffering ‘provoked sympathy, not resentment’.230   Accounts of generosity 
and kindness during the blitz showed that in times of crisis people were 
much more prepared to lay aside their differences.  This attitude differed 
substantially from reports prior to the bombings.    
 
However, these accounts of social unity as a result of shared distress have 
been subjected to scrutiny and debate among historians mainly from an 
English perspective.  Writing about London’s homeless during the war 
Calder described scenes where homeless Londoners trekked miles to find 
homes, only to discover that there were ‘well-to-do people of the suburbs 
and countryside [who] still revealed the bleak class hatred which had 
underlain the first response to evacuation’.231  More recently Harold Smith 
warned against over emphasising the idea of ‘shared solidarity’.232 
 
While the second evacuation scheme was in progress, the British 
government responded to invitations from the Dominions of Canada, 
Australia and South Africa to send children to these places for safety.  The 
overseas evacuation scheme warrants attention at this point in so far as it 
formed part of the official evacuation scheme during the summer of 1940.  It 
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also proved an extremely popular option among the parents of eligible 
evacuees. 
 
Until the introduction of the Children’s Overseas Reception Board (CORB) 
the advantage of being able to send children to the safety of the Dominions 
and the United States was exclusively available to people with substantial 
means.  Overseas evacuations had taken place privately before the outbreak 
of war and in the few months following war being declared.  Approximately 
11,000 children were sent overseas during that time by parents who could 
afford to despatch their children to the safety of relatives and friends 
abroad.233   
 
In 1940 negotiations took place in Whitehall with a view to sending a select 
number of children overseas through the official CORB evacuation scheme.  
Cabinet approved the CORB scheme on 17 June 1940, and two weeks after 
advertising the scheme for children between 6 and 16 years of age, some 
211,488 applications were received from parents wishing to have their 
children included in the overseas scheme.234  This figure included 26,900 
Scottish applications, of which 5,662 were approved.  In fact only 462 
Scottish children eventually left for the Dominions by this method.235  This 
was proportionally fewer than for England and Wales, where departures 
totalled 18,852. 
                                                 
233 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.247.  
234 Michael Fethney, The Absurd and the Brave (Sussex, 2000), p.55. 
235 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.37. 
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While domestic evacuation schemes after September 1939 had been met 
with little or no enthusiasm, the response from parents to send their children 
overseas was, by comparison, overwhelming.  Although no definite 
guarantee could be given for the safety of the children, or specific 
arrangements made for their return, there was no need for persuasion or 
propaganda campaigns to entice parents to send their children abroad.  A 
number of explanations were suggested as to why parents gave their willing 
support for the CORB scheme.  These ranged from the rapid changes in the 
war situation after France capitulated, to the perceived feelings of hostility 
from the working classes towards the privileges of the middle class.236  Yet 
none fully explain why parents would rather have sent their children abroad, 
when travel such as crossing the Atlantic was particularly dangerous. 
 
The CORB scheme was restricted to unaccompanied school children from 
both state and private schools and parents were required to pay a means 
tested maintenance contribution.  Class division was recognised as a 
significant issue in overseas evacuation prior to the CORB scheme and 
formed part of parliamentary debate on the subject from the time of its 
inception.  A number of MPs were critical of the way in which this was 
arranged.  James Griffiths, Labour MP for Llanelli, was outspoken against 
the principle of class distinction which was evident in overseas evacuation.  
He was against the government allowing children of the ‘well-to-do’ being 
able to send their children abroad.  He referred to the 1,454 children who 
had left for the Dominions, and the 298 children sent to the United States in 
June 1940, and argued that that was unacceptable.  His objection centred on 
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the unfairness of the situation as children of the poor were being left behind 
simply because parents could not afford to send them so far afield.  He spoke 
of the need to ensure that the government made it ‘impossible for any 
impression to gain ground in this country that class distinction is to operate 
at a time like this’.237  Churchill was also critical of the overseas scheme and, 
while he did not agree with it in principle, he gave an assurance that the 
government would: 
 
…take pains to make sure that in the use that is made of…offers [for 
overseas evacuation] there shall be no question of rich people having 
an advantage, if advantage there be, over poor.238 
 
Media reports regarding the CORB scheme tended to show that, if anything, 
attempts were being made to ensure children from working-class families 
were being given a fair opportunity for inclusion.  A report in the Glasgow 
Herald on 3 July 1940, for example, stated that fit and healthy children 
would be chosen for evacuation to the Dominions with a ratio of 75 per cent 
from grant aided schools and 25 per cent from non-grant-aided schools in 
England and Wales.  In Scotland, 49 out of every 50 children to be 
evacuated overseas were to come from local education authority schools and 
the remaining 1 of 50 from private schools.239  Fethney’s study confirmed 
that children from working class backgrounds were given as fair an 
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opportunity as possible in the selection process and that the largest 
percentage of children included in the official overseas scheme came from 
households where the father was employed in some kind of manual 
labour.240 
 
While Churchill advocated equal access to overseas evacuation, the Prime 
Minister’s general disapproval of the CORB scheme was expressed in the 
Commons during the same debate quoted earlier, when he said that: 
 
It [was] most undesirable that anything in the nature of a large-scale 
exodus from this country should take place…the full bearings of this 
question were not appreciated by His Majesty’s Government at the 
time when it was first raised.  It was not foreseen that the mild 
countenance given to the plan would lead to a movement of such 
dimensions…241 
 
Writing about the situation later, Churchill claimed he entirely 
‘deprecate[ed] any stampede from [the] country.242 
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In spite of Churchill’s lack of enthusiasm for the scheme it went ahead led 
by Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the 
Dominions.  Organisation and planning for CORB began on 7 June 1940.  
The Dominions Office and the Ministry of Health were responsible for the 
scheme, together with an Inter-Departmental Committee representing twelve 
different departments.  An Advisory Committee was appointed that included 
representatives experienced in children’s care, education and migration. 
 
As numbers that could be accommodated were limited and the volume of 
interest was so great, no more applications were taken after July 1940.  
Nevertheless, permits were still granted to those evacuees willing to go 
privately.  The CORB scheme was hampered by the problem of limited 
availability of necessary escort shipping.  The danger was, until America 
joined the war, ships could not refuel in American east coast ports, and 
convoys travelling from Britain had a naval escort only as far as 300 
kilometres west of Liverpool, after which they were on their own.  The 
scheme went ahead in spite of an initial postponement imposed as a safety 
precaution when escort ships could not be provided in sufficient numbers to 
protect the convoys. 
 
Cabinet decision to implement the scheme when there were not enough 
escort ships available is somewhat contentious.  Fethney argued that it may 
not have been voted for unanimously but was pushed through by the Cabinet 
Secretary at a time when, as an incoming Prime Minister, Churchill was 
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preoccupied with the news of the German occupation of France.243  Whether 
or not CORB had the unanimous approval of Cabinet, the scheme was short 
lived when tragedy struck on the 17 September 1940.  The City of Benares, 
left Liverpool docks on 13 September 1940 carrying 90 CORB children and 
ten private evacuees to Canada in a convoy of nineteen ships.  Parsons wrote 
that until the early hours of the 17 September the convoy had been protected 
by the destroyer HMS Winchelsea.244  Left unprotected the ship was hit by a 
torpedo in the North Atlantic 600 miles from Liverpool.  Lifeboats were 
filled with children and adults fleeing the sinking ship but rescue ships were 
slow to reach them.  It was in the lifeboats in the cold waters of the North 
Atlantic that many of those who had survived the sinking ship eventually 
perished.  The heavy death toll from the City of Benares included 77 CORB 
children and 179 adults and crew.245         
 
The Daily Record and Mail on Monday, 23 September 1940, published a list 
of those evacuees who had tragically lost their lives, and from that list it 
appeared that there were no Scottish schoolchildren among the dead.246  
Eyewitness accounts of the disaster have said that the main cause of such a 
heavy death toll was not the result of the sinking of the City of Benares.  
From the testimony of survivors it seems that the high death toll was partly 
due to the lack of available lifeboats and also the length of time it took for 
those who had managed to secure a lifeboat to be rescued.  Lyn Smith’s 
book includes a significant amount of oral testimony from survivors of the 
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City of Benares.   She wrote in association with the Imperial War Museum, 
where many of the original letters, diaries and oral testimony is held 
regarding evacuation generally and which includes harrowing accounts from 
those who were among the passengers of the stricken ship.  Many of these 
accounts describe the fight for survival in lifeboats in the icy waters of the 
Atlantic.247      
 
This tragic event put an end to the official overseas evacuation scheme 
which, during its operation, had successfully delivered a total of 2,664 
children to the safety of the Dominions for the duration of the war, with 
approximately a further 11,000 by private arrangement.248  Writing in 1998 
Parsons stressed the serious omission of the CORB within the historiography 
on evacuation.  He argued that, through their experience, the overseas 
evacuees were more affected sociologically and psychologically than those 
children who had been evacuated within the United Kingdom.249  Smith’s 
work in 2008 does not sufficiently meet the shortfall in the historiography 
relating to the issues Parsons raised.      
 
While the overseas scheme was abandoned in 1940, the voluntary and 
assisted evacuation schemes within Britain remained open, and in June 
1944, following the V1 bombing raids on London, a final evacuation plan 
was instigated.  This third evacuation which lasted two months did not affect 
Scotland.  This final scheme differed little from the second.  One of the most 
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noticeable variances within this third scheme was the record number of 
expectant mothers evacuated.  Areas affected by both V1 and V2 bombs 
centred round London and the south east of the country.  As evacuees 
headed to the north and midlands, some districts originally designated as 
neutral or sending areas had to be redefined as reception areas. 
 
The V1 and V2 attacks were experienced first-hand by a former evacuee 
who had spent some time billeted with foster parents in Rothesay.  His 
wartime experiences expand far beyond the confines of his months in 
Rothesay.  After a few months as an evacuee he was taken to live in Ilford 
where he experienced the severity of the raids over London when the V1 and 
V2 weapons struck during the last few months of 1944.  He recalled that the 
bombs came three or four nights a week and how, as a deaf person, he could 
still feel the vibration of the explosion.  He told the story of a cinema being 
bombed, killing everyone inside and of a bus he had been travelling on being 
hit by a bomb.  He said of the V1’s:   
 
…when one came you stopped what you were doing and took 
shelter…if a V1 passed overhead then you were okay, but if it stopped 
very near you or just above…you covered your head with your arms 
and waited, if it came down on you then you were dead, wounded or 
saved by things falling around you leaving you safe.250 
 
                                                 
250 Interview with Jack, 10 July 2012. This interview was not recorded but taken in note 
form. Transcript held with author.  
 113 
In the Commons, debate centred on the allegation that the government had 
known of the German flying bomb threat to Britain six months before the 
first attack took place and had instigated no evacuation preparations.  When 
questioned on the subject, Florence Horsburgh, the Parliamentary Secretary 
of the Ministry of Health, and MP for Dundee, whose job it was to arrange 
the evacuation of schoolchildren from major cities claimed that the delay 
until attacks occurred was intentional: 
 
…if we had evacuated the children when flying bombs were not 
falling six months ago, we should have had them all back before the 
flying bombs came.251 
 
This was possibly the right decision given the very high numbers of 
returning children in the weeks and months following the first evacuation.  
In fact, while the flying bombs were still targeting London and surrounding 
areas, evacuees were making their way back to the danger areas. 
 
Historiographical research into the final official evacuation is very limited.  
To date, the most in-depth report on this third evacuation scheme remains in 
the work of Titmuss.  Other reports by Padley and Cole for England and 
Wales,252 the Cambridge survey by Susan Isaacs,253 the Women’s Groups on 
                                                 
251 H of C debate, 21 July 1944, vol. 402, cc. 491-507. 
252 Padley and Cole, (eds.), Evacuation Survey (1940). 
253 Susan Isaacs (ed.), The Cambridge Evacuation Survey: A Wartime Study in Social 
Welfare and Education (London, 1941). 
 114 
Public Welfare in both Scotland and England,254 and William Boyd’s 
report,255 were issued prior to the launch of the third scheme.  Historians 
such as Welshman256 and Parsons257 have tended to link the third scheme 
with the return of evacuees rather than study these events in isolation.  
Parsons commented that as historians of evacuation have tended to focus on 
the first evacuation scheme there is a distinct lack of historiography relating 
to subsequent schemes.258  The lack of historiography concerning the third 
scheme possibly results from the fact that there was a drift back to London 
while bombs were still falling.  However, from Jack’s detailed account of 
the damage and destruction caused by the V1 and V2 bombings, it is 
difficult to understand why more people did not leave the cities which were 
under attack.  Bell claimed that there has been a relative silence around the 
V1 and V2’s, and offered an explanation in the fact that after six years of 
war, and with victory in Europe in sight, although morale was fragile, people 
had grown more resilient.259    
 
The official evacuation scheme was suspended on 8 September 1944, 
although it did take some time before the system was dismantled and all the 
evacuees returned.  In assessing the evacuation scheme as a whole it is not 
possible to measure its success in terms of the number of lives that were 
saved by the process.   
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Looking back to the initial evacuation planning and implementation in 1939, 
Boyd argued that it was based on limited research and took no account of 
basic human nature.260  Little regard was given to family bonds and how 
difficult it would be for parents to make the decision to send their children to 
strangers in unknown destinations and for an indeterminate length of time. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the evacuation scheme in 1939 no one 
appeared to have considered the possibility of the early return of evacuees.261  
Nor had it been anticipated in the early stages that such large numbers of 
people would relinquish their commitment to the scheme and choose instead 
to remain in the danger areas.  In essence, this meant that when the bombs 
dropped there were greater numbers of civilians in the danger areas than was 
originally anticipated.  In the second and third scheme a similar situation 
existed, where evacuees returned while cities were still suffering the effects 
of bombing.  Furthermore, planning of the overseas evacuation was difficult 
as children were exposed to dangerous sea crossings due to insufficient 
numbers of available escort ships. 
 
With the exception of the assisted private evacuation scheme, planning and 
implementation of the second and third evacuation changed little from the 
first.  Availability of accommodation continued to be problematic and early 
return of evacuees to sending areas remained cause for concern.  However, 
the evacuation process may be defended not only as a means of keeping 
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people relatively safe but also for the advancement of social welfare 
throughout Britain.  It was this process which brought people together and 
effectively raised the profile of child poverty and neglect to an audience 
which hitherto would likely have been oblivious to its condition.  In the face 
of total war, government had little choice other than ensure that some 
measure of improvement be seen to be undertaken in order to maintain the 
morale and support of the people.  Such initiatives as the extension of the 
milk-in-schools programme, the extension of maternity care, the creation of 
nursery places for young children and clothing vouchers for children in 
need, were all positive extensions to the care and protection of vulnerable 
people.  Importantly the introduction of the Education Act of 1944 in 
England and 1945 in Scotland was a permanent and progressive welfare 
measure.  There were of course some issues which evacuation could not help 
improve in the long-term, such as the division of class which existed in 
Britain and continued to exist in the post-war period.  These issues will be 
dealt with in more detail in a later chapter. 
 
It could be argued that in view of the speed of the return of the first wave of 
evacuees in 1939, and the relative lack of enthusiasm for any subsequent 
schemes, the whole evacuation process was a failure.  However, the long-
term welfare initiatives which were instigated as a result of the process 
reflect its ultimate success.  When the evacuation scheme was being put into 
operation the official thinking was that bombs would be dropped as soon as 
war was declared.  Had the government not acted in response to the advice 
of experts it would undoubtedly have been criticised for having done nothing 
to ensure the safety of vulnerable people in the cities, as it was predicted that 
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they would be the main target of enemy action.  At the time evacuation 
seemed to be the only really acceptable alternative open to the government, 
and it had appeared to work for the vulnerable people in Spain during the 
Civil War.  Titmuss believed that evacuation was inevitable and explained 
that bombing raids would send people from their homes in panic.  Therefore 
government required to take firm control otherwise chaos and confusion 
would ensue.262 
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Chapter III 
 
The Impact of Evacuation on Scottish Health Care 
 
 
They have looked at him…with shame and a burning sense of neglect 
and wrong, and they have sought to suggest means whereby this 
degradation of childhood can be avoided and a home of the future 
made, even at its humblest, a better place.263 
 
The previous two chapters outline the structure of the official evacuation 
process run by the British government prior to and during the Second World 
War, from its inception in September 1939, until the last evacuees left 
London in response to the threat from V1 and V2 rockets during 1944.  The 
remainder of the thesis will explore the impact of evacuation on the 
development of wartime and post war welfare.  This chapter will cover the 
way in which evacuation influenced developments in health provision.  With 
a focus on Scottish health care this chapter will argue in support of Titmuss 
and Addison in so far as evacuation and its consequences increased the pace 
of mass health care provision. 
 
Analysis of primary source material, including media coverage and 
parliamentary debate from the period, will be taken into account in order to 
support this argument.  Such evidence will be used in conjunction with a 
range of historiography relating to the subject of health care provision both 
before and during the Second World War.  A selection of this material will 
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be considered from historians such as Derek Fraser, who agreed in principle 
with the Titmuss theory, and those who opposed it, such as Macnicol and 
Thane. The central argument focuses on how far war impacted on changes in 
health and welfare.  Fraser’s view emulated that of Titmuss in so far as he 
believed evacuation led to a greater degree of universalism.264   It is 
noteworthy that this agreement with the Titmuss philosophy may have 
stemmed from the fact that, in chronological terms, the distance between 
these two authors was relatively close.  Further to this social history 
techniques were uncommon at the time and therefore history from below 
was not widely considered.  Fraser, like Titmuss, believed that of all the 
problems associated with war, evacuation more than any other influenced 
social policy, since:  
 
Evacuation comprised the two factors which were the crucial 
characteristics of the social policy of the war years…[it] required a 
much greater involvement of the state in social affairs…Evacuation 
[also] acted as a mirror to society and revealed the blemishes that still 
remained, so generating a greater degree of universalism.265  
 
Universalism and the creation of a more egalitarian society was something 
Titmuss believed had evolved through the process of war generally and 
evacuation in particular.  For Addison, the warfare to welfare theory was 
based on the argument that post-war reconstruction, and the future of social 
services, was very much tied to the conduct of the war.  He claimed that the 
years of war, ‘gave way to a spirit of greater welfare and more confident 
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management’.266  This chapter will support this argument by showing that 
because evacuation drew public attention to the existence of a level of 
poverty and deprivation that had hitherto been left uncovered, the evacuation 
process was directly linked to the principle most associated with Titmuss, 
that of warfare leading to welfare.  
 
Addison subscribed to the Titmuss theory through the medium of 
reconstruction.  He stressed that reconstruction could only be planned when 
there was a degree of certainty that ‘the long tunnel of defeat was at an end’.  
For Addison such an upturn occurred following the British success in the 
battle of El Alamein in November 1942.267   
 
Addison’s theory has been challenged by a number of historians who have 
questioned the priority given to permanent social welfare change by top rank 
officials.  This is due in part to two specific observations.  Firstly, Jose 
Harris argued that during the war Churchill failed to attend any of the 
reconstruction committee meetings which therefore diminished its level of 
importance.268  Secondly, Pat Thane questioned the validity of the 
government’s intentions towards post-war social reconstruction with the 
appointment of Labour M.P. Arthur Greenwood as head of the War Aims 
Committee.  In her opinion the appointment was an indication of the low 
priority placed on social reconstruction.269  Thane substantiated her claim by 
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the fact that Greenwood’s War Aims Committee met only four times 
between January 1941 and February 1942, when he was dismissed from his 
post and replaced by ‘the equally ineffective Sir William Jowitt’.270   
Greenwood’s ability came under scrutiny from the Labour Minister Hugh 
Dalton who revealed much about his personality and ability in his extensive 
wartime diaries.  Dalton regarded him, especially in the early years of the 
war, as unimpressive.  His diary entry for 18 June 1940 said that Greenwood 
was:  
 
…very slow and unimperative [and] in danger of being run by his 
officials.271 
 
Dalton’s diary records continued in the following months and years to make 
further scathing comments concerning Greenwood.  For example:  
 
Thursday, 8 August 1940: Greenwood made a long and very dull and 
unimpressive speech yesterday…   
Sunday, 22 December 1940: I dropped a passing hint that Greenwood 
is being much criticised for inactivity…. 
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Wednesday, 28 October 1942: Greenwood…had done extremely well 
at the outbreak of the war, never before or since had he reached the 
same high standard…  
Tuesday, 15 June 1943: Of Greenwood it used to be said in Whitehall, 
when he was a minister, that ‘the poor old chap couldn’t even sign his 
name after midday’.272  
 
Although these diary entries may have been throw away remarks from a 
disgruntled colleague, they help reinforce Thane’s opinion.  Addison also 
questioned the suitability of Greenwood as head of the War Aims 
Committee, and acknowledged that by the time of his appointment he was; 
‘a sad figure whose career was sinking’, and his department had ‘no powers 
to compel action’.  The admission that Greenwood was ineffectual did not 
undermine Addison’s argument on reconstruction.  He believed that the 
‘Labour team’ dominated the ‘powerful Reconstruction Committee’ after 
Greenwood was dismissed. 273 
 
Addison’s argument on the principle of wartime social reconstruction as a 
vehicle for welfare reform was questioned by Macnicol who argued that 
wartime welfare reforms were ‘something of a myth’,274 and claimed that 
there was a ‘qualitatively ambiguous nature [to] welfare innovations’.275  
Thane too questioned the principle of universalism used by both Titmuss and 
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Fraser.  She concluded that there was no clear way of defining the extent of 
public acceptance of redistributive policies during the war, nor was it 
decisive that there was a unanimous enthusiasm within government for 
social reconstruction.276   
 
In spite of such criticism, this chapter will set out to prove that looking at the 
history of Scottish evacuation, the theory of warfare to welfare is a 
convincing one.  It will take account of the wide range of contemporary 
media coverage which evacuation attracted and the resultant independent 
social investigations.  Such analysis will allow an assessment of both 
coverage of the evacuation process and the impact of social investigations on 
healthcare provision in Scotland. 
 
The warfare to welfare argument advocated by Titmuss was exemplified by 
the way in which attempts were made to improve the delivery of health care 
as a result of previous wars.  The British defeat by the Boers in South Africa 
1899-1902 highlighted the necessity for national efficiency.  This was 
addressed with particular emphasis on improvements in child and maternity 
care.  The physical education of children, school meals for necessitous 
children, better nutrition for a healthier urban working class all came into 
question, as did infant and maternal mortality rates.  Improvements in these 
areas of social care were perceived as the most important way forward in 
creating a healthier population.  
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There followed a series of legislative improvements such as the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1908 which made school medical inspection compulsory and 
allowed for school meals to be made available to necessitous children.  The 
Act also made it obligatory for physical education to be taught in schools.277 
The Midwives Act passed in 1902 for England and Wales and eventually 
extended to Scotland in 1915, made midwifery training and registration 
compulsory.278  The Notification of Births Act 1907, and the Notification of 
Births (Extension) Act 1915 gave local authorities in Scotland the power to 
provide health care, where they felt it necessary, for mothers and children 
under five years old.  It was anticipated that early notification of births 
would help improve the chance of survival of babies and mothers in need of 
medical care, which would, in turn, reduce the infant mortality rate which 
was particularly high in Scotland.   
 
The 1927 Midwives and Maternity Homes (Scotland) Act was introduced in 
response to the somewhat high maternal mortality rates in Scotland.  The 
intention of this Act was to increase the number of maternity beds in 
hospitals, abolish uncertified midwives and allow for the inspection of 
maternity homes to be carried out together with a check on their 
administration records.  Reid pointed out however, that although the Act 
kept maternal mortality rates in the public eye it was a decade later before 
there was any noticeable difference.279   
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The warfare to welfare theory fell short to some extent in the 1920s as post 
First World War economic problems and high unemployment were 
compounded by the effects of the Wall Street stock market crash which 
caused a worldwide depression in the early 1930s.  Effectively this meant 
healthcare provision in the inter-war period was ‘unable to tackle problems 
on a scale which lay beyond its powers’.280  Scotland in the 1930s was 
suffering from particularly poor levels of health compared with much of the 
rest of the British Isles.  Poor health was caused by high levels of 
unemployment, low wages, poor housing conditions, with housing shortages 
leading to overcrowding, especially in major urban areas.  These 
longstanding social problems were given a new focus when city children 
were removed from their homes due to the dangers of war. 
 
The Department of Health for Scotland report for 1936 stated that almost 
one-quarter of working-class homes in Scotland were overcrowded.  The 
report also showed that there was overcrowding in at least 35,000 local 
authority houses, representing 22.7 per cent overcrowding. 281  This figure 
compared unfavourably with the 3.8 per cent of overcrowding in England 
according to McCrae.  He claimed that the worst overcrowding was in the 
industrial towns of Clydebank, Coatbridge, Port Glasgow and Motherwell.282   
Poor housing and overcrowding led to disease which was greater in areas 
without proper sanitation.  In the 1930s at least one third of Scottish housing 
lacked either toilets or baths.283  
                                                 
280 Jenkinson, Scotland’s Health 1919-1948 (2002), p.218. 
281 H of C Debate, 24 June 1937, vol. 325, cc.1425-1426. 
282 Morrice McCrae, The National Health Service in Scotland: Origins and Ideals, 1900-
1950 (East Lothian, 2003), p.126. 
283 H of C Debate, 24 June 1937, vol. 325, cc. 1425-1426. 
 126 
Improvements in health care provision continued to be discussed in 
parliamentary debates in the early 1930s, although lack of funding prevented 
much constructive work being undertaken to improve the delivery of health 
care or eradicate the associated problems.  A letter from the Scottish Office 
to the DHS advised that:  
 
…as the Scottish Health Services were being investigated it was 
inadvisable to encourage hopes that drastic alterations would be made 
in the medical service at present available for either the insured or the 
general public.284  
 
Scottish health reform was nevertheless an ongoing topic for investigation.  
In 1933 the DHS appointed a Health Services Committee to review Scottish 
healthcare.  This committee became better known as the Cathcart 
Committee, named after Edward Cathcart, Professor of Physiological 
Chemistry at Glasgow University, who headed the committee in its latter 
stages.  The committee was charged with reviewing: 
 
…the existing health services of Scotland in the light of modern 
conditions and knowledge, and to make recommendations on any 
changes in policy and organisation that may be considered necessary 
for the promotion of efficiency and economy.285 
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The Committee report, published in 1935, made substantial 
recommendations for the extension of health care provision.  These included 
the promotion of maternity care, education in food nutrition for a healthy 
diet, a comprehensive and coordinated system of health care, hospital 
provision and improved laws on sanitation.286  The only recommendation 
that was acted upon in the short term was the extension of the maternity 
services.  This was undoubtedly due to the fact that Scotland suffered from a 
consistently higher infant mortality rate (IMR) than the rest of Britain.287  
For example, in the ten year period 1930-1940 IMR figures per 1000 births 
ranged from 83.0 to 78.3, with a substantial dip in 1938 to 69.6 and in 1939 
to 68.5.  These figures are inclusive of the whole of Scotland although 
regional variations existed with the larger urban areas of Aberdeen, Dundee, 
Glasgow and Edinburgh suffering higher IMR than many rural areas. 
Comparatively, the IMR figures for England and Wales in the same period 
ranged from 60.0 to 57.4 per 1000 births.288  The remainder of the 
recommendations in the Cathcart Report were considered too expensive to 
be pursued in 1936. 
 
A series of speeches by successive Scottish Secretaries between 1936 and 
1939 showed that health care considerations were still on the agenda despite 
the economic restraints of this period, but again little or nothing was done.  
Those involved included three successive Scottish Secretaries: Sir Godfrey 
Collins, Scottish Liberal MP and Secretary of State for Scotland from 1932 
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to 1936,289 Walter Elliot, Conservative MP, and Scottish Secretary from 
1936 to 1938,290 and John Colville, Scottish Unionist Party member and 
Scottish Secretary from 1938 to 1940.291 All believed that healthcare in 
Scotland was steadily improving but were acutely aware that much more 
was required to eradicate the poor state of health of the Scottish population.  
By way of example, Walter Elliot, speaking in the House of Commons in 
June 1937, encompassed the views of all three Scottish Secretaries of the 
period when he acknowledged that: 
  
…no one in Scotland is completely satisfied with the position that our 
country occupies, either actually or relatively.  We feel that there are a 
great number of improvements that could be made and will have to be 
made in our health services and in our housing, and…in some respects 
we compare unfavourably with the great nation south of the border.292   
 
The outbreak of war led to the implementation of considerable changes in 
healthcare through such bodies as the Emergency Medical Services (EMS). 
The EMS were responsible for helping to overcome the deficiencies in 
hospital provision by expanding hospital services.  These services included 
the provision of an extra 20,527 hospital beds, and ensured patients received 
specialist care where necessary.  The EMS were responsible for the seven 
new hospitals which were built across Scotland, from Raigmore in the North 
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to Peel in the South.293  The EMS also helped improve opportunities for 
research and specialised practices in areas of medicine such as neurosurgery, 
anaesthetics and plastic surgery.294  The Titmuss theory is significant here 
as, in political terms, long delayed healthcare improvements now being 
implemented could be seen as an expedient of the wartime situation.   
 
Titmuss’s warfare to welfare argument is particularly effective in terms of 
the health care initiatives which resulted from war generally and particularly 
as a result of the evacuation process.  The wide media attention attracted by 
the evacuation of poor and unhealthy mothers and children from the cities, 
particularly after the first wave during September 1939, helped reinvigorate 
policy initiatives in health and welfare, especially those relating to the 
wellbeing of mothers and children.  In this respect, action came both during 
and immediately after the Second World War.    
 
Reports of evacuees arriving at their destination without proper clothing, and 
in a poor and unhealthy state were published in the press.   The Scotsman 
published letters from householders on the 14 September 1939 and provided 
two examples where complaints had arisen concerning the care of evacuees.  
The first concerned an evacuee mother with three small children of whom it 
was written that she was: 
 
…never about till half-past eight in the morning, but long before then 
the children are up and getting in the way of the morning’s work; Her 
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husband has been long out of work; she has brought no money; she 
expects to be waited on as an invalid; she expects too, that she and a 
delicate child shall immediately receive free all the medicines and 
special foods they have been receiving in the city. 
 
The second complaint recorded concerned children who had been sent 
without proper clothing.  It read: 
 
…a working-class woman has received two children whose father is 
in a well-paid job with no possibility of being out of work.  The 
children were sent to her with a fair supply of pocket money and 
decent upper clothes.  But their underclothing was almost entirely in 
holes, they have no warm things, and they were so dirty that she was 
glad of an offer to scrub them in a fixed-in bath, her own house not 
having such a convenience.295 
 
These are just two of many reports of the poor condition of evacuees whose 
state of health, when it became known, shocked the public at large, and 
when the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, learned of the state of some 
evacuees he wrote to his sister saying: 
 
The stories I have heard about evacuees are awful and there is no 
doubt that the dwellers in the country districts have had a shocking 
revelation of the manners and customs of their town cousins.   
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He went on to quote from his daughter Dorothy who related the feelings of 
one hostess who said: 
 
I never knew that such conditions existed, and I feel ashamed of 
having been so ignorant of my neighbours… For the rest of my life I 
mean to try and make amends by helping such people to live cleaner 
and healthier lives.296 
 
Economic hardship was a significant reason that evacuees often turned up at 
their destination without many of the prescribed requirements.  This was 
undoubtedly due to the fact that often children did not possess many of the 
essential items laid down by the evacuating Committee.  It was unlikely, 
Titmuss believed, that children would have been sent away with insufficient 
clothing while their best clothes were left at home.297  For the unemployed 
who did not receive unemployment or health insurance payments, public 
assistance payments would not run to buying more than basic needs and 
therefore did not allow for the luxury of the extra shoes and clothes which 
evacuees were required to have been provided with before leaving home.  
 
The presence of evacuees, predominantly from urban working class housing, 
who were billeted in middle class homes, helped emphasise the differences 
in the social classes that became a prominent issue in wartime.  Fraser 
agreed with Titmuss that as total war included the whole of society, the 
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barriers of class distinction between the rich and the poor were broken down 
in terms of social welfare.298  However, the class argument has been the 
subject of substantial debate among historians.  Macnicol, for example, 
believed that rather than break down social barriers, evacuation helped 
reinforce the division between social classes.299   A general observation of 
middle class opinion, especially of some of the mothers evacuated with their 
children, was referred to in the social survey conducted by the Scottish 
Women’s Group on Public Welfare.  The report commented on the existence 
of ‘a parasitic attitude’ and claimed that some mothers were ‘utterly 
reckless’ in the use of household supplies.300  Newspaper reports from the 
time tend to support the opinion that mothers evacuated with their children 
were lazy and dirty.  An article in the Daily Mail on 24 April 1943, 
reviewing the ‘Our Towns’ book reinforced this idea and claimed that: 
 
…what stirred the hostesses to bitterness instead of pity here are those 
mothers, dirty and verminous like the children, idle, drunken, bullying 
and profane…The mothers who had never held a needle or cooked a 
square meal for their families, the mothers who had allowed their 
children to grow up like animals, who had given their children indeed 
far less care than their unwilling hostesses would have given to a 
dog.301 
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It is important to note here the existence of newspapers’ establishment bias 
which may have produced a certain amount of prejudice in such articles.  
However, it was generally accepted that some evacuee mothers did expect 
more than they should have from their hosts.  Nevertheless there are no 
statistics to prove that these type of mothers were in the majority. 
It is unlikely that all the mothers evacuated with their children fell into the 
lazy and dirty category, although no successful billeting stories appear to 
have been published relating to evacuee mothers.  The fact that mothers 
were not included in subsequent official evacuations meant that there were 
sufficient negative reports received to encourage government officials, in 
charge of the evacuation scheme, to approach the second scheme with 
caution.   
 
Further evidence that the evacuation of both mothers and children was 
unpopular was clear from surveys carried out throughout the Scottish 
evacuation areas during the early part of 1940.  The project was undertaken 
in order to ensure that householders would be willing to take evacuees 
whenever a second wave was launched.  The results gave a clear indication 
that householders would not welcome a further evacuation scheme unless 
the country was under aerial attack.  One example of this came from the 
County Offices in Viewforth, Stirling on 10 April 1940.  The results of the 
survey there showed that of the 14,000 leaflets sent to householders only 150 
were returned with a positive response to take evacuees.  The County Officer 
commented that:  
 
…the attitude of householders in this county to the government 
evacuation scheme ranges from apathy to marked hostility…in the 
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event of sustained aerial bombardment, however, it is possible that the 
mood of householders would change.302 
 
When the social classes collided under the cloud of evacuation, it sparked a 
series of investigations by independent researchers concerned about the 
problems of poverty and neglect.  Newspapers were quick to report on the 
large numbers of vermin infested and neglected children within days of the 
first evacuation.  For example the Scotsman reported complaints from local 
residents on 7 September 1939, just after the evacuees had arrived in the 
Perthshire countryside.  It said:  
 
…the evacuees billeted throughout the county had come extensively 
from the poorer quarters of Glasgow, and it was unfair that so many 
had been sent out in such a filthy and verminous condition.303    
 
It is not possible to accurately gauge just how many evacuees actually 
arrived in such an unhealthy condition.  There is a likelihood that reports 
may have been exaggerated, especially in rural locations such as Perthshire 
where evacuees were clearly not universally welcomed.  According to the 
Scotsman on 20 March 1940, Bridge of Allan residents held a meeting to 
protest against the sending of further Glasgow evacuees to that area and of 
the proposed compulsory billeting. They objected on account of the 
condition and behaviour of the evacuees who had arrived in September 
1939.  Residents argued that there was a pressing need to protect the ageing 
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population of the town, many of whom were seventy or over, from the badly 
behaved Glasgow evacuees.  The presiding officer, Provost L.A.M. Suttie 
said that: 
 
…in Bridge of Allan…there were many aged and retired people who 
were living in the burgh for health reasons.   [and]…they were not 
prepared to enforce compulsion on their residents and if such were 
required by the Department of Health they would require to find some 
other parties to work this particular scheme.304    
 
There were other important reasons why Bridge of Allan residents were 
opposed to accepting a further wave of evacuees.  This was explained by the 
Town Clerk at a meeting of the Civilian Evacuation Committee on 5 January 
1940, he explained that: 
 
Bridge of Allan was a health resort well known throughout Scotland 
and England, and at the outbreak of war its accommodation had been 
taxed to almost full capacity by the inrush of private evacuees who 
had come to the town at their own expense and reserved 
accommodation either in Boarding houses, or Hotels…quite a number 
of residents also, had taken relatives from the vulnerable areas.305 
 
The outcome of this meeting was that strong representation be made to the 
DHS that: 
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Owing to its proximity to one of Scotland’s most important military 
objectives – the Forth Valley – and to exceptional local 
circumstances.… [Bridge of Allan] should be regarded as an 
unsuitable area for the reception of evacuees.306 
 
The objection was accepted which meant Bridge of Allan residents had 
successfully fought against inclusion in any further government evacuation 
scheme.   
 
Objection to billeting evacuees was raised in other areas.  In the Scottish 
borders around Galashiels and Roxburgh there were numerous complaints of 
children having arrived in a dirty condition with the minimum of personal 
necessities.  The local newspaper, the Southern Reporter, printed an article 
four weeks after the first evacuation, clearly in response to a build-up of 
local anger, convincing Roxburgh residents that their complaints had been 
noted.  The article attempted to assure readers that the local authorities were 
taking steps to ensure something was being done to prevent the continuation 
of the situation.  Householders were told that: 
 
…it was only fair to those who were responsible for those children 
who were brought into the county that they should know the official 
attitude the County Authority had taken up, and that people of the 
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county, whose hospitality had been abused in many cases, should be 
satisfied that they had not been crying in the wilderness.307  
 
In West Lothian too, residents had to be given an assurance that any future 
evacuation would only take place once children had been medically 
inspected.  The West Lothian Courier published an article from the West 
Lothian Billeting Committee giving public assurance that: 
 
…the householder may ask what protection he has against the 
unfortunate experiences of the first evacuation.  Naturally, he wants to 
know whether the children to be received are clean.  Will they be 
clothed and properly booted?  Will they in a word be fit to be received 
into a clean house? 
[The article continued] 
 
In each case the answer is Yes.  No child will be evacuated who is in 
an unclean state.  Over 50 doctors in Edinburgh have been working at 
this job alone.  Dirty children or doubtful cases will be segregated in 
outlying hostels and retained there until they are absolutely clean.308 
 
Moving on from these local reports and local newspaper articles, the 
argument in favour of warfare to welfare is broadened by the wider response 
the first evacuation elicited, of unclean and unhealthy children in reception 
areas throughout Britain.  The National Federation of Women’s Institutes 
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requested the Women’s Group on Public Welfare in England to explore, ‘the 
domestic habits and customs of a minority of town-dwellers, disclosed by 
evacuation’.309  The report was published in 1943 and was followed by a 
similar publication by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare.310  
The editor of the Scottish Women’s Group report, M. Galbraith Cowan, was 
an active member of the Unionist Party and an influential campaigner in 
helping to ease the burden of women’s lives.  She had been part of the 
Edinburgh School Board after the First World War, and successfully 
campaigned for smaller class sizes and school meals during holidays.  She 
worked for the Ministry of Food during the Second World War and her 
influence on the pamphlet may have had some bearing on the success of its 
recommendations.311  The foreword to the report, written by the Scottish 
Secretary, Thomas Johnston, confirmed the importance placed on the issues 
highlighted by evacuation.  Johnston wrote that evacuation had forcibly and 
dramatically brought attention to the extent of poverty and neglect in some 
of Scotland’s larger towns, and that: 
 
…while there [was] no one single simple solvent, but many required, 
and while we shall require to draw upon all the goodwill and 
forbearance we can muster among us in the process of achievement, I 
believe we are going to create cleaner, worthier and healthier 
conditions in which good citizenship will thrive and flourish.312  
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The recommendations of the two reports were based on the problems the 
initial evacuation scheme had highlighted.  Some of these issues had also 
been raised in Cathcart’s report of 1935. These included:  poor hygiene, 
insufficient knowledge of proper nutrition and nutritional values, lack of 
understanding of basic childcare, and behavioural and educational problem 
children.  These reports were part of a wave of enquiries into welfare issues 
during the war. 
 
An evacuation survey conducted in Scotland by Boyd, assisted by a team of 
students from Glasgow University, produced a detailed account of the 
Scottish evacuation process in 1944.313  Richard Padley and Margaret Cole 
had earlier carried out an evacuation survey for the Fabian Society for 
England and Wales that was published it 1940.314  A regional survey was 
also carried out in Cambridge by a team of experts on the effect of 
evacuation in that area.315  The 1941 Cambridge Evacuation Survey gave a 
detailed account of the first evacuation scheme as it happened and offered a 
range of recommendations for future evacuation schemes. These surveys 
taken together with the surveys by the women’s groups:  Our Towns:  A 
Close Up, published in 1943,316 and Our Scottish Towns: Evacuation and the 
Social Future published in 1944,317 made recommendations for significant 
change in the delivery of care and welfare for children and adults.  
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The Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare recommended changes in 
education that would help to ensure both parents and children were taught 
the basics of healthy eating and proper dietary requirements, following 
reports of bad eating habits and the poor diet of some evacuee mothers in 
reception areas.  In Glasgow, according to former Medical Officer of Health 
for the city, Sir Alexander MacGregor, this type of education was already in 
place in 1939.  He reported that teachers from the School of Domestic 
Science carried out a successful scheme whereby they gave cookery 
demonstrations and advice to women either in their own homes or welfare 
centres.318  The Our Towns report clearly demonstrated that much more 
required to be done throughout the country to ensure that educating people 
in the importance of diet and nutrition was being channelled where it was 
most needed. 
 
Promoting the health of mothers and children was also an important factor in 
the English women’s group on public welfare survey.  Their ‘Our Towns’ 
report suggested that an interdepartmental committee of the Ministry of 
Health and the Board of Education be set up to work together to monitor, 
control and supervise health and hygiene matters among both children and 
adults.319   
 
Some of these important issues were already being addressed by the 
government.  Sir John Boyd Orr, who was a pioneer in the field of nutrition, 
health and welfare, studied the impact of nutrition on health and stressed the 
value of milk as an important food source.  In the 1930s Boyd Orr worked 
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with the Reorganisation Commission for Milk.  He believed in, and 
promoted, the nutritional value of milk that became part of the ‘milk in 
schools scheme’.320  This scheme meant that milk was made available to 
schoolchildren on a daily basis, through the local education authorities, 
either free or at a reduced rate, and during the war schoolchildren continued 
to receive free milk.321  The Ministry of Food was established in 1939 which 
made available valuable basic daily nutritional requirements such as milk, 
fruit juices, cod liver oil and vitamins for children and nursing mothers.322   
However, as the evacuation process had shown, these were not always taken 
up in areas where they were most needed.  
 
The importance of free milk for school children during the war as a 
perceived benevolent measure has been countered by Macnicol.  He argued 
instead that there were three very different reasons for its distribution.  He 
observed that although milk was a valuable source of nutrition its 
importance was over stressed.323  His argument was based on the fact that 
free milk helped reduce surplus stocks held by producers and, as milk 
provided a source of protein, it helped cut down the amount of meat required 
by children during rationing.  It also reduced the necessity for means testing 
which defined those children deemed eligible for free milk. Nevertheless, 
Thane argued, and it is generally accepted, that war rationing helped to 
improve nutritional standards nationally and of the working class in 
particular.324 
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Wartime social research, particularly as a result of evacuation, had led to an 
increased awareness of the importance of sustaining the health of mothers 
and children, through improved nutrition.  Pregnant and nursing mothers, 
babies and young children were already a government priority and were 
given access to high value nutritional food and vitamins.325   
 
The publicity afforded to the promotion of the importance of a healthy diet, 
supplemented by milk and vitamins was included in the Secretary of State 
for Scotland’s speech to the Commons in 1944.  Quoting John Boyd Orr, he 
said that: 
 
…a survey of working-class homes in industrial towns in Scotland 
had shown that there was a definite improvement in the health value 
of their diets; the average intake of some of the important vitamins 
and minerals was over 20 per cent higher than in pre-war years.326 
 
Milk and free or subsidised meals were included as part of the daily ration 
requirements for schoolchildren.  However, the costs involved in providing 
school meals was complicated by the evacuation process.  Each local 
authority was responsible for its own budget and had to apply for payment of 
meals for evacuees from the sending authorities.  The extent of the 
administrative complexities involved in collecting small amounts between 
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local authorities is evident from a communication to teachers by the 
Headmaster of Bothkennar School, near Falkirk.  This may be taken as an 
example of the way in which all schools in reception areas had to deal with 
fiscal matters regarding evacuees.  The Headmaster had requested that two 
Glasgow evacuees be allowed school meals at the expense of the Glasgow 
authority and said that these two children were: 
 
…unable by reason of lack of food to take full advantage of the 
education provided for them… (the teachers were required) to keep a 
note of the meals supplied to the children in question and to send me 
particulars, say, at the end of each month so that I may recover the 
cost from the Glasgow Authority.327   
 
Nevertheless the growth in administration was undoubtedly outweighed by 
the fact that children benefitted from nutritional improvements during the 
war.  This was confirmed in 1944 when MacGregor, Glasgow Medical 
Officer of Health, reported that there had been an overall improvement in 
height and weight of school children in Glasgow.  A study of school 
inspection reports showed that children of 5 years old, starting school in 
1944, were taller and heavier than those in the 1930s.  Boys were on average 
an inch taller and two pounds heavier, and girls approximately 0.8 of an inch 
taller and just less than two pounds heavier.328  This was in spite of the poor 
quality and presentation of the food served to children according to Harold 
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Smith in Britain in the Second World War.329   Among those former 
evacuees interviewed for this thesis none had any real complaint about the 
food they were given during their evacuation.   
 
Returning to policy recommendations made with evacuation surveys, the 
Scottish Women’s group report included a call for a better trained medical 
staff, improvements in child welfare services, more child welfare clinics 
with more home visits and an increase in the home help service.  This 
service had started in Glasgow and the surrounding areas in the 1920s and 
some of the recommended changes were put in place before the end of the 
war.  In spite of war budgets and shortages of medical staff as a result of 
call-ups, there was an expansion in the number of health centres and 
antenatal clinics in and around the city of Glasgow by 1944.  MacGregor 
claimed that at the start of the war there had been only 8 doctors and 40 
health visitors, working in 14 health centres.  These figures had increased to 
include 17 health centres, employing 15 medical officers and 75 health 
visitors.  MacGregor quoted that attendance at these centres reached up to 75 
per cent of expectant mothers.330  These figures compared favourably with 
attendance at clinics in Scotland overall which had reached only 51 per cent 
by 1946.331  This evidence suggests that the problems highlighted by 
evacuation and given further attention via social service reports, were 
already being addressed in the war years.   
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The Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare reiterated the 
recommendations included in John Boyd Orr’s 1943 Report on Infant 
Mortality in Scotland.  It recommended increased hospital accommodation 
and improved maternity and childcare which had been highlighted as lacking 
by the evacuation process.332  Although official recognition had already been 
given to the necessity for improvement in this area with the introduction of 
the Maternity Services (Scotland) Act in 1937, Jenkinson noted that its 
implementation had been slow due to the wartime situation.333 
 
During evacuation, arrangements for pregnant women, whether married or 
unmarried, proved problematic.  Hospital care in many rural areas struggled 
to meet the influx of pregnant evacuees in September 1939, and 
householders were often reluctant to provide them with accommodation as 
they did not want the responsibility of looking after pregnant women in their 
homes, especially if they went into labour and did not have ready access to a 
maternity home or hospital.334    
 
Oakley suggested that the Second World War was the best thing that 
happened to pregnant women.335  Her observations were determined by the 
progressive nature of maternity care from the evacuation of pregnant 
women.  When pregnant evacuees arrived at reception areas it was clear that 
rather than billeting them in households, alternative means of 
accommodating them would have to be found.  In the case of unmarried 
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pregnant women, they were very often dependent on charitable institutions 
for their maternity care.  In evacuation areas, local authorities were forced to 
increase the number of social workers to help find pregnant women 
accommodation.   
 
In 1943 an Advisory Committee appointed by the Ministry of Health 
recommended the appointment of one social worker for every 200 to 300 
illegitimate babies.336  Holman has claimed that evacuation played an 
important role in the growth and development of this particular area of social 
service in the post war period.337  The increased number of social welfare 
workers between 1931 and 1951 substantiates these claims.  In 1931 the 
number of male social welfare workers employed in Scotland was 676, by 
1951 that figure had risen to 1,028.  The number of female social welfare 
workers during the same period rose more significantly from 316 in 1931 to 
1,122 in 1951.338  These figures suggest that care of evacuee unmarried 
mothers and their children helped account for the growth in employment of 
social welfare workers.  Further proof of the expansion in social welfare 
workers was the subject of a document produced by Birmingham University 
in 2008, to celebrate the centenary of teaching and researching in social 
work.  This paper claimed that the Second World War gave rise to new and 
improved opportunities for social workers.  It further claimed that social 
workers emerged with a highly positive profile in the eyes of the public and 
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politicians, as a result of their involvement with the evacuation scheme and 
their help with homeless families after the bombing raids.  In the immediate 
post-war the social work course expanded from a two year social studies 
diploma to a three year course in social studies, with six months of practical 
work spread over the length of the course.339   
 
Social welfare services established during the war included an emergency 
maternity service which resulted from the evacuation process.  The need for 
such a service was exacerbated by the lack of enthusiasm from householders 
to give shelter to pregnant evacuees.  Large houses were acquired and 
hostels were set up to accommodate those women in the final stages of 
pregnancy.  These included 125 maternity beds in Lennox Castle in 
Perthshire,340 and 25 maternity beds in Airthrey Castle in Stirlingshire.341   
 
In Aberdeen and surrounding areas a number of cottage hospitals were given 
over to maternity care and, in some places, buildings had to be converted for 
increased numbers of maternity cases.  Haddo House, for example, was used 
as a maternity unit for the duration of the war and served Glasgow evacuees 
as well as some local mothers.  In 1940 Haddo House had 11 maternity 
cases, in 1941 that number had increased to 239.  During 1944, at the peak 
of its use as a maternity unit, Haddo House staff cared for 426 pregnant 
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women.342  The emergency maternity service proved popular in Scotland, 
and the annual number of births in maternity hospitals or maternity homes 
increased from 40 per cent in 1939, to approximately 60 per cent by 1940.343    
Statistically the number of available maternity beds in Scottish institutions 
had risen from a total of 1,460 in 1938 to 2,178 by June 1944.344  Ferguson 
and Fitzgerald described the growth in the maternity services around Britain 
during the Second World War as ‘an indispensable extension of the social 
services’.345  The rise in institutional care for pregnant women was 
associated with the evacuation process which also afforded women who 
resided in reception areas the opportunity for improved maternity care.   
 
Throughout the war pregnant women continued to use the facilities provided 
by the emergency maternity services.  While the great majority of women 
had opted for home confinement prior to the outbreak of war, the popularity 
of hospital and hostel care of pregnant women grew and developed during 
the early 1940s.  The 1939 figures for the Maternity Units of Stirling and 
Falkirk infirmaries show that, from a total of 2000 deliveries, only 440 took 
place in hospital.346  Figures for Airthrey Castle demonstrate how popular 
hospital births had become with over 600 admissions in 1946.347   The 
Medical Officer of Health report for Dundee for 1941 to 1945 noted the 
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increased wartime tendency for confinements to take place in institutions.  
This was due, in part, to the fact that mother and baby could be assured of 
expert care and attention.  Hospital confinement also allowed the mother a 
minimum period of two-week complete rest.348  The wartime maternity 
homes continued to be used in peacetime.  Airthrey Castle, for example, 
continued to function as a maternity unit into the 1960s and Lennox Castle 
until 1964.  These hospitals, hostels and nursing homes provided a safe and 
clean environment for women who might otherwise have had their babies in 
their own homes where wartime conditions may not have been so 
favourable.     
 
The increase in maternity care during wartime evacuation helps to 
substantiate the Titmuss argument for warfare leading to welfare.  From the 
above figures it is evident that there was an increase in the number of 
pregnant women seeking, and receiving, hospital and hostel care in the late 
stages of pregnancy.  These figures include both evacuee mothers and local 
women living in reception areas, who in peacetime may not have enjoyed 
the benefit of a hospital or hostel confinement.  This situation had a twofold 
benefit in that it helped pregnant evacuees while, at the same time, 
effectively created employment in the form of additional social workers, 
who worked to secure accommodation and care for these women in 
reception areas.  This was a further extension of the maternity welfare 
services rooted in the evacuation process.   
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Proof that the welfare and wellbeing of mothers and children continued to 
progress can be seen from the Scottish Home and Health Department who 
reported in 1964 that there were now: 
 
…some 500 child welfare clinics to which mothers [might] bring their 
babies and pre-school children, for advice, medical examination and 
protective inoculation.349  
 
The evacuation process had elicited the problems and responses in the care 
of mothers and children.  It also brought to the attention of a wider audience 
the problems of delinquency, deprivation and neglect.  These problems were 
significant symptoms in the formation of the Children Act of 1948.  John 
Murphy commented that from the ‘crucibles’ of evacuation a picture 
emerged of the conditions in which some children were forced to live.350   
 
Evacuation planning did not take into account how families would cope with 
the emotional trauma of separation or the potential breakdown of family life.   
Nor was any attention given, during the planning stages, as to how 
evacuation might affect the mental wellbeing of children who were sent 
away.  In reception areas the only pre-requisite of householders was the 
number of rooms they had available in their homes and their willingness to 
billet evacuees.  There were no checks and balances on the suitability of 
individuals to take care of other people’s children. 
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While in Problems of Social Policy Titmuss accepted the problem of 
juvenile delinquency, exacerbated by evacuation, he recognised the need to 
exercise caution on the subject.  He warned that youth crime required to be 
dealt with cautiously, as high spirits and hooliganism were more noticeable 
in small communities.  He was sceptical of the interpretation of delinquency 
by local authorities in reception areas where the evacuation scheme had been 
unpopular.351  By interpretation this meant that householders who did not 
want evacuees would find ways of ensuring that they would not be obliged 
to play host to them.  
  
Delinquent, neglected, or deprived children were the responsibility of a 
number of different government departments at the beginning of the Second 
World War. The Ministry of Health was responsible for deprived children, 
and the control and management of juvenile delinquency was the 
responsibility of the Home Office.352   The number of reported cases of 
juvenile delinquency was increased by evacuation, which led eventually to 
deeper government involvement in, and the progress of, the child guidance 
movement.353 
 
The re-education of parents was perceived as the best way forward in 
tackling juvenile delinquency.  In the House of Commons, debate 
surrounding juvenile delinquency centred on the importance of teaching 
mothercraft as a means of attacking the problem.  During a sitting in July 
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1941 a report by the National Association of Maternity and Child Welfare 
Centres was raised by Sir Francis Fremantle, Conservative Party member 
and MP for St Albans.  He claimed that: 
 
…teachers, probation officers, doctors and social workers [were] 
generally anxious for the teaching of mothercraft to be given to 
schoolgirls as the best means of attacking juvenile delinquency… [as] 
a matter of national importance and not merely a question of health.354 
 
Scotland was at the forefront of this experiment prior to the parliamentary 
debate in July 1941.  In April of that year mothercraft, or parentcraft 
teaching, as it became known, was included in the curriculum of a junior 
secondary school in Aberdeen.  This began with the appointment of a full 
time mothercraft teacher and continued to grow and develop throughout the 
1940s.355 
 
Mothercraft was one of the issues which was dealt with in Whitehill School 
in Dennistoun, Glasgow.  The working and daily routine of this inner city 
school can be observed from the original magazines produced during the 
war.  Written accounts by pupils and staff provide an original source of 
information of how school life in the city carried on during the war. They 
uncover some of the inherent problems which pupils and teachers were faced 
with on a daily basis and how they were overcome.    
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Teachers attempted to maintain educational standards as far as possible 
under wartime conditions, living constantly with the threat that air raid 
sirens could disrupt lessons at any time.  Although not directly an oral 
history source, the school magazines from Whitehill School in Dennistoun, 
gives some insight into the difficulties of creating conditions which 
resembled the normal daily school routine as far as possible.    
 
Whitehill School was the largest senior secondary school in Scotland as it 
had merged with Onslow Drive School due to the war and as a result of 
evacuation.356  The articles in the 1941-42 magazines show how attempts 
were made to carry out the rigours and routine of school activities in the face 
of adversity.  The extra-curricular activities such as football practice and 
hobby clubs continued as far as possible.  An article announcing that the 
annual school sports day had continued in wartime read: 
  
We cannot escape the war altogether, and we were reminded of the 
international situation when we saw the bare table where the prizes 
should have stood.  But what is the value of a material prize in 
comparison with the honour of winning?357    
 
Lack of prizes for sports day was just one of the many sacrifices which 
Whitehill and other schools had to sustain as a result of war.  Lack of staff 
was evident from an article advising that teachers had gone with evacuees to 
Altachorvie, Lamlash on the Isle of Arran, at the beginning of the war.  Later 
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in the war the school lost other teachers to evacuation duties in Lanark, Perth 
and Cally House in Kirkcudbrightshire.358    
 
The loss of teachers to reception areas and the shortage caused by war and 
national service did not significantly affect children’s educational attainment 
levels.  This issue was discussed in Chapter III concerning the trends in 
educational standards as a result of war and evacuation.  Whitehill’s 
magazine boasted in 1941 that: 
 
If anyone should ask you how Whitehill School is standing up to the 
difficult conditions of wartime, refer them to the recent examination 
held by the Corporation of Glasgow for the Selection of Junior Clerks.  
There were vacancies for 188, and our School secured no fewer than 
35 of these places.  Of the successful candidates 13 were girls and 22 
boys.  So far as we can find, this is very easily a record 
performance.359  
 
Performance levels continued to rise and the school congratulated itself for 
its advancement.   In 1944 the magazine reported that: 
 
Both quantitatively and qualitatively, Whitehill has worthily upheld 
the best traditions of Scottish education, as demonstrated once again 
by the fact that in this difficult year when the examinations reverted to 
the national standard, after six years of war during which they had 
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been conducted on a regional basis, 72 of the 97 pupils presented 
gained the Senior Leaving Certificate.360 
 
The re-introduction of leaving certificates was important to teenagers in their 
attempt to find employment.  It helped give prospective employers some 
measure of their capabilities at a time when media and social surveyors were 
producing reports of widespread problems of juvenile delinquency.        
The thought behind mothercraft classes lay principally with the way some 
mothers and children had conducted themselves in reception areas.  These 
classes would help prepare girls for their future as housewives and mothers.     
 
Mothercraft classes were established in Whitehill School during the war.  An 
article in the magazine demonstrates the success of these classes.  This 
article demonstrates that there may have been a slight lessening of old 
fashioned and entrenched patriarchal values, and slightly more progressive 
ideas among certain elements of the male school community concerning 
established gender roles, if an article in the magazine is to be taken as 
meaningful.  The essay written by a male pupil complained of the unfairness 
of the Mothercraft classes saying: 
 
We, the fathers of that better Britain of the future…it does seem rather 
unfair that while our sisters are given free explicit instruction in their 
corresponding matrimonial obligations, we should be left entirely 
ignorant of our patrimonial duties.361 
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This type of article shows that school children were perfectly capable of 
progressive thoughts, ideas and ideals.   
 
Tackling delinquency through the introduction of mothercraft classes was 
simply one way of dealing with the problem.  The report by the Scottish 
Women’s Group on Public Welfare stressed the need for a social focus for 
young people in order to alleviate some of the problems associated with 
youth crime and delinquency.  This could take the form of the establishment 
of youth centres and playing spaces in towns.  The report confirmed that 
juvenile crime had risen substantially and claimed that in 1942 these figures 
were approximately 25 per cent (or 4,000 cases) higher than in the first year 
of war.362  Of this total over half were charges of petty crime caused mainly 
by teenage boys.  As the increase in juvenile delinquency was tied to both 
war and evacuation and the consequences ultimately led to the introduction 
of the Children Act of 1948, it substantiates Titmuss’s warfare to welfare 
theory.   
 
Bad behaviour, as a manifestation of evacuation, resulted in the 
establishment of hostels and homes for children who could not be billeted in 
private homes.  Nerston House in East Kilbride, on the outskirts of Glasgow, 
was opened as a residential school for such evacuees.  From 1884 Nerston 
House had been used by the Glasgow United Evangelist Association to give 
underprivileged children a holiday in the countryside more commonly 
known as the fresh air fortnight.  It was taken over in 1936 by Glasgow 
Corporation as a home for deprived children and opened during the war as a 
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residential school.  According to the local historian for East Kilbride, 
‘Nerston Residential School blazed a trail in Child Guidance’ when in 1950 
it hosted a symposium entitled ‘International Course in the Psychological 
Treatment of the Problem Child’.363  Throughout the years the school was 
open it accommodated up to 40 children, both boys and girls, between 5 and 
15 years old whose stay could be anything from six months to one year.  The 
success of this founding institution for delinquent children may be observed 
from the fact that it continued to function as a residential unit and school 
until 2009.   
 
Barns House in Peeblesshire was an institution formed as part of the 
evacuation scheme.  Set up and funded by Peeblesshire County Council, the 
house was used as an evacuation hostel and school for up to 50 wayward 
Edinburgh boys, whose behaviour restricted them from being billeted with 
householders.364  Technically the boys were to be sent to Barns from 
unsuccessful billets, but it became so successful during the war that they 
were sent directly through the Edinburgh Evacuation Officer.365  The school 
was closed in 1953 as the original owners required repossession.  
 
Recognition of childhood problems enhanced by the evacuation process 
helped strengthen and develop the Child Guidance Movement which had 
been in existence in Britain since the 1920s.  In 1939 there were 60 child 
guidance clinics in operation, by 1945 the number had increased to 
approximately 100 and, as Stewart pointed out, child guidance became 
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embedded in the post-war welfare state.366   Stewart claimed that child 
guidance practitioners came to recognise the importance of family and 
environment on the mental and physical condition of evacuated children. 367   
Murphy too has said that child guidance was a progressive move towards 
positive developments in childcare, deviance and family problems.  He felt 
however that Scotland had lagged behind England and Wales in 
implementing the terms of the Children Act of 1948, mainly in connection 
with institutional care which took longer to phase out in Scotland.368   
Murphy claimed that the speed with which the wartime government 
intervened on the issue of childcare and neglect resulted from two important 
issues.  These were not specifically connected to Scotland but profoundly 
impacted on welfare development throughout the country.  The issues were 
the death of Dennis O’Neill while in foster care and a letter to the Times in 
July 1944 by Lady Marjory Allen, an influential figure in the promotion of 
child welfare.  She focused especially on the care of children in institutions 
and the inner cities and was chairman of the Nursery Schools Association of 
Great Britain, and founder of the World Organisation for Early Childhood 
Education.  Her influence extended to government circles by association, as 
she was married to Baron Clifford Allen of Hurtwood, who had been 
Treasurer and Chairman of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and Director 
of the Daily Herald newspaper.369    Her letter to the Times called for a 
public inquiry to assess the out of date conditions in which neglected, 
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destitute and orphaned children lived. Allen stressed the need for adequate 
and trained staff, a central administration fully responsible for the care of 
children, and assessment of each individual child’s needs before they were 
placed in foster care.  She wrote that:   
 
The social upheaval caused by the war… increased this army of 
unhappy children [and presented] the opportunity for transforming the 
conditions. 370  
 
The public interest stimulated by the evacuation scheme, Lady Allen’s letter 
to The Times and the death of Dennis O’Neill resulted in the formation of 
two committees, set up in 1945, to investigate the extent of child deprivation 
and neglect, especially among orphaned children and those left orphans as a 
result of war.371  The reports produced by these committees, headed by Myra 
Curtis in England and James Clyde in Scotland, led to the Children Act of 
1948.  
 
The Children Act of 1948 may be perceived as a direct result of war and 
evacuation in terms of the speed with which it was administered.  It was 
designed for the protection of children and essentially changed the way care 
was administered to children up to and including those aged 17 years old, 
who were abandoned, orphaned or required to be in care as a result of 
parental neglect.  It effectively replaced the Poor Law for children in public 
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care.  Under the terms of the Poor Law orphaned or abandoned children 
would have automatically been placed in institutional care.     
 
The new legislation allowed local authorities the discretion to implement the 
act in the best interest of the child and extend care and welfare accordingly, 
either as institutional care or boarding out in foster homes. It also gave local 
authorities the power to decide if and when such children were in a fit and 
healthy state to return to a safe family environment.  Provisions within the 
Act included recommendations by Curtis and Clyde: 
 
...to provide a comprehensive service for the care of children who 
have not the benefit of a normal home life.  It will contain new 
provisions replacing those of the Poor Law, as respects such children, 
and will implement the main recommendations of the care of Children 
Committee (Cmd. 6922) and the Scottish Committee on Homeless 
children (Cmd. 6911).  [Known respectively as the Curtis Committee 
and the Clyde Committee].372 
 
Murphy referred to these changes in the care and welfare of children as 
‘revolutionary’ and to the act itself as a ‘liberal and great Act’.373   He 
considered it to be the cornerstone of the future of social work in Scotland.  
On a less positive note, he pointed out that while the Children Act of 1948 
offered protection to deprived children, there was no provision made for the 
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practice of preventative work.374  However, the Act effectively led to the 
Kilbrandon Report of 1964, on which the whole approach to the care issues 
for children and youth justice is based.375  
 
Social surveys, conducted as a result of wartime evacuation, helped 
reinforce the case for the warfare to welfare argument, which leads to the 
conclusion that evacuation and some of its consequences did indeed help to 
ensure the health and welfare of children.  An indication of the success of 
the work and recommendations of social investigators, concerning children, 
can be gleaned by making a comparison with the care and welfare provided 
for the elderly during the war.  Where improved maternity and child care 
resulted from war and evacuation, elderly care was a glaring omission from 
the process during the war.  With the exception of Murphy, there is an 
absence of historiography surrounding care for the elderly in Scotland 
during the Second World War.   
 
Generally, elderly care during the evacuation process was left very much in 
the hands of voluntary organisations and they, as a group, were given little 
priority in terms of social planning.  There was not the definitive plan for the 
evacuation of the elderly that there had been for children.  Children were the 
future, and the main focus of the evacuation scheme was school age 
children, young children with their mothers, and expectant mothers.  
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The plan for the infirm and aged was that they be dealt with under the 
general scheme.376  When the assisted evacuation scheme was introduced it 
included those old people who lived in their own home.  The plans for the 
elderly followed the same administrative arrangements as for all others 
included in the scheme, whereby, those who had relatives or friends they 
could go to, if the need arose, would have their travel and accommodation 
paid by the government.  
 
In contrast, and in concluding this chapter on Scottish health during the war, 
child health care changes were speedily implemented during the early 1940s.  
This can be attributed, in part, to the substantial amount of adverse media 
coverage which wartime evacuation attracted, and through the impact of the 
many social surveys conducted. These changes included increased maternity 
care and a wider focus on childcare and child neglect. Longer term goals 
such as ensuring proper diet were also given renewed attention.  
 
Evacuation made an immediate and longer term impact on welfare policy 
and provision. The war and welfare argument of Titmuss and Addison is 
supported by the fact that without evacuation there would potentially have 
been no visible, or immediate, need to employ the extensive health care 
changes that were introduced for mothers and children during the Second 
World War.  There is no doubt that evacuation served to highlight the extent 
of the poverty and deprivation that existed in Scotland, and indeed 
throughout Britain, in 1939.  The high profile of evacuation in the early 
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stages of the war prompted social investigators to work towards finding a 
solution to the problems evident among some child and adult evacuees.  
Evacuee mothers and children drew attention to the need for better nutrition, 
health and hygiene.  One of the most significant developments during 
wartime was the growth in child guidance clinics, and the advancement in 
the care of neglected or deprived children, which was once left in the hands 
of voluntary workers.   The practice of promoting health in clinics, and in 
schools, which had begun long before the outbreak of war, continued long 
after the war ended, although this area of care was generally accepted as the 
role of the female and was very much gender driven. 
 
Although there had been improvements to maternity services in the 1930s, 
the care plans implemented for evacuated mothers helped to draw attention 
to the pressing need to extend maternity and childcare.  These services 
continued to grow and develop substantially in the post war period. The 
growth in the number of health and antenatal clinics, and an extension to 
maternity care in rural and urban areas, were all consequences of the mother 
and child evacuation policies that helped improve post war welfare. Where 
home confinement was often the only option available to working class 
women, the evacuation of pregnant women helped impress upon mothers the 
benefits of hospital births, and in the post war era hospital births increasingly 
became a popular option for women generally.  
 
The publicity that wartime evacuation attracted, through substantial media 
coverage and social surveys, and the resultant improvements in the health 
and welfare system put in place for mothers and children, give particular 
relevance to the warfare to welfare theory.  The future depended on ensuring 
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a nation of healthy children who would grow into strong healthy adults, 
therefore their health and welfare was strategically important. 
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Chapter IV 
  
Religion and Evacuation 
 
 
…Whittingehame I consider the happiest year of my life in retrospect: 
the camaraderie, simplicity, and last unaffected and carefree year of 
my youth, the Chaluzik spirit with its enthusiasm, singing religious 
services, dancing and emerging puberty.377  
 
This quote was from a Jewish evacuee who was sent to Whittinghame House 
in East Lothian during the Second World War.  The house was opened as a 
residential school which allowed Jewish children to continue their academic 
and religious education during their evacuation.  The continuance of 
religious education and affiliation during the Second World War, and in 
particular during the evacuation process, was of paramount importance to 
religious leaders, while among the evacuees interviewed for this thesis there 
was a seeming lack of concern about religion.  Jewish writer Ruth Inglis 
pointed out, during the planning stage of the evacuation scheme no 
consideration was given to the religious implications of placing Jewish 
children with Catholics, Catholics with Protestants or atheists with the 
devout.378  This was a significant problem for religious leaders and parents 
of all faiths, and led eventually to some parents making the decision to bring 
their children home.   
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Religious organisations sought, by different means, to address this by 
attempting to tailor Scottish evacuation measures in order to preserve the 
faith of their congregation and it is that which forms the basis of this chapter.   
This chapter will carry out a comparative study focusing on the way in 
which religious organisations dealt with evacuation and their efforts to 
ensure the continued religious welfare of evacuees. The main intention of 
this exploration is to establish how far Church leaders in Scotland were able 
to influence and/or strengthen religious control over this aspect of the 
evacuation processes.  Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, the two main 
religious denominations in Scotland at the time, will be the principal focus 
of attention.  Smaller religious groups, namely Judaism and Quakerism, will 
also be considered.  These two smaller religious organisations were equally 
committed to sustaining the religious welfare of evacuees.  Comparison will 
include consideration of the ways in which these organisations dealt with the 
aspect of religion during the evacuation process.    
 
This evaluation of religious responses to the challenges of evacuation 
extends the broad theme of the Titmuss argument that warfare ultimately led 
to welfare.  The theory here differs slightly as war and evacuation was 
effectively more beneficial to the Roman Catholic community than other 
faith groups as Fitzpatrick pointed out, ‘War-time exigencies tended to 
weaken the barriers that still existed between the Catholic minority and the 
community as a whole.’379  The education reform Acts passed at the end of 
the First World War and towards the end of the Second World War show 
that in terms of educational provision the welfare Catholic school children 
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advanced.  Evacuation and war was moreover instrumental in bringing 
people of different faiths together in a way that would not have been 
possible in peacetime.  The particular focus here is on the progress and 
development of the religious welfare of evacuees and the way in which the 
evacuation process resulted in a greater degree of collaboration between 
Church and State.380  The argument in favour of warfare to welfare in 
relation to improvements in religious education was evident at the end of the 
First World War with the introduction of the Education (Scotland) Act 1918. 
The Act was particularly favourable to the continuation of religious teaching 
especially for denominational schools.  The provisions of the Act included 
arrangements to bring denominational schools into the state system.  This 
was particularly helpful to Catholic schools as they had been financed, built 
and run by the Catholic Church until that time.  According to Fitzpatrick the 
Act effectively rescued them from ‘the Slough of Despond into which they 
were in danger of sinking’, and helped initiate ‘major developments at every 
level of the formal educational structure’.381  While the introduction of the 
Act took some of the financial pressure away from the Church, it maintained 
control over the recruitment of teachers and ecclesiastical teaching.  This 
situation remained unchanged at the outbreak of the Second World War 
when the evacuation process threatened to disrupt the control of religious 
teaching of Catholic children.  The Catholic Church hierarchy became 
politically involved in affairs relating to evacuation after September 1939.   
  
For Roman Catholic schoolchildren any evacuation issues which arose were 
particularly acute.  Fitzpatrick’s study of Catholic secondary education 
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revealed that at the beginning of the Second World War 70 per cent of 
Scotland’s Catholics lived in the industrial and congested centres of the 
south-west, with the majority living in the city of Glasgow, which was the 
main centre of Catholic secondary education.  He claimed that receiving 
areas were ‘almost totally devoid of Catholic population, and would be terra 
incognita to evacuated Catholic families’.382  He believed this inevitably 
resulted in the vast majority of Catholic evacuees being taught in non-
denominational schools.383  Fitzpatrick’s work is important here as it 
covered the role of religion in education in the inter war years and during the 
evacuation process, finishing with religious changes in education in the 
1970s.  Fitzpatrick’s analysis shows that Roman Catholic clerics strove to 
maintain a high level of religious teaching in schools in the 1930s, with 
children under instruction from Catholic teachers as far as possible.384  
Catholic clerics reacted negatively to the evacuation process due to the fact 
that they feared exposure to other religions would influence Catholic 
children to stray from their faith.  Their views are evident from the 
somewhat acrimonious correspondence between the Catholic hierarchy and 
Scottish government Ministers during the war which will be discussed later 
in the chapter.   
 
The broader aspect of religious education during this time has been 
considered by several historians of evacuation.  Writing during the war, 
Boyd dealt with religion in statistical terms in the Scottish evacuation 
survey.  From a religious perspective the survey focused on the Protestant 
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and Roman Catholic divide in order to assess how far religion impacted on 
the return of evacuees from reception areas.  These figures will be used later 
in this chapter with a view to determining whether there was a correlation 
between the return of evacuees and the actions of the Catholic Church 
hierarchy, which were designed to ensure continuity of Catholic adherence 
among evacuees.  Titmuss had noted that Roman Catholic Church leaders 
were eager to ensure facilities were put in place to allow evacuees to 
continue their religious education in reception areas.385  Lloyd’s study of 
Scottish schools during the Second World War is a valuable contribution to 
the consideration of the continuity of religious education during the 
evacuation process.386  His research described the effect modern war had on 
educational welfare and stressed that in Britain war had an impact on 
educational reform.  For Lloyd educational change, in the form of the 
passing of the Education Act in 1944 in England and 1945 in Scotland, 
helped reinforce the importance of the warfare to welfare theory as it was 
inclusive of progressive education, health and religion.  The Act stated that it 
was:  
 
…the duty of every education authority to secure that adequate and 
efficient provision [be] made throughout their area of all forms of 
primary, secondary and further education.387 
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Adequate and efficient provision of all forms of education included 
providing for Roman Catholic children.  On the subject of Catholic 
secondary schools, Fitzpatrick pointed out, ‘post-primary schooling would 
be organised in institutions equipped to meet the needs of all pupils for the 
period of their compulsory schooling’.388  This at once transformed and 
expanded the Catholic secondary sector, which had suffered from lack of 
accommodation and staff, to cater for the growing Scottish Catholic 
population.389  War had driven home how important education was to the 
preservation and survival of the British people, and the raising of the school 
leaving age to 15 years prescribed secondary education for all.390  
 
Religion, as an aspect of the British rather than Scottish evacuation process, 
has been included in the work of Holman, Welshman and Summers.391  In 
addition, historians such as Vera Fast have helped to demonstrate the 
parallels that existed between Jews and Roman Catholics during the 
evacuation process.392  Her work will be discussed here in conjunction with 
archival material collected from the Jewish Synagogue in Garnethill in 
Glasgow, which also provides some oral testimony from Jewish evacuees.  
The available documentation from Quakers, or the Society of Friends, 
relating to evacuation is sparse.  However, the related work by Roger 
                                                 
388 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.124. 
389 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.103. 
390 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.115 
391 Holman, The Evacuation (1995). Summers, When the Children Came Home (2011). 
Welshman, Churchill’s Children (2010). 
392 Vera, K. Fast, Children’s Exodus: A History of The Kindertransport (London and 
New York, 2011). 
 171 
Wilson, David Wills and Louise Millbourn has been drawn on here for 
comparative purposes. 393 
 
The discourse will initially focus on Roman Catholicism and the efforts of 
Church leaders to ensure that the religious welfare of Catholic evacuees was 
given due consideration during the war.  Research shows that the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy were the leading protagonists on issues of planning and 
the instigation of the evacuation process.  These arrangements had taken 
place without any consultation with church leaders.  Their interventions 
helped influence the future religious welfare of Roman Catholics   
   
The second religious organisation which is the subject of this research will 
be Judaism.  Archival material concerning Scottish Jews is used here to 
compare with other faiths’ responses to the evacuation process.  
Historiography relating to the Jews in wartime Britain confirms that the 
Jewish hierarchy tried to intervene to ensure Jewish children went to Jewish 
homes. Their work and effort to sustain the religious welfare of evacuees to 
some extent mirrored that of the Roman Catholic community.394   
 
The Church of Scotland, although the largest religious denomination to be 
discussed, appeared less concerned with continuity in religious adherence 
among evacuees. As Fitzpatrick pointed out, receiving areas were ‘almost 
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totally devoid of Catholic population’,395 therefore there was every 
likelihood that Church of Scotland children would be placed in homes with 
families of that faith.    
 
An initial search of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland papers 
for the Second World War shows no sign that the Committee involved was 
particularly concerned over the continued religious adherence of evacuees.  
A further search of the Kirk Session records for individual presbyteries in a 
number of reception areas, and at least one evacuation area, was slightly 
more informative.       
 
The response of other faiths in dealing with religious welfare during the 
evacuation process will conclude with the Society of Friends, or Quakers.  
Quakers played an active role in overall emergency relief work during the 
war, both at home and abroad.  Historiography relating to their work and 
effort to maintain the religious adherence of their congregations, will be 
discussed in conjunction with the Roman Catholic, Jewish and Church of 
Scotland organisations.  
 
The religious interests of Church leaders on issues relating to the evacuation 
process involving Scottish children has been left comparatively under 
researched.  With the exception of Fitzpatrick and Lloyd, both of whom 
have used the religious aspect of the evacuation process in conjunction with 
educational changes, little analytical written work exists concerning the 
relationship of religion with evacuation during the period, especially in 
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Scotland.  Holman’s work briefly touched on this connection and suggested 
that evacuation was, in part, responsible for a degree of unity between the 
churches during the war.  This collective conscience, he believed, led 
churches to proclaim the need to work together for ‘spiritual renewal and the 
fight for social regeneration’.396   The media attention attracted by the poor, 
and often unhealthy, condition of evacuees in reception areas prompted 
church leaders to believe that ‘Christians must battle for a better Britain’.397      
 
Welshman, who discussed religion in association with the evacuation 
process, noted that the Catholic Church hierarchy in England reacted in the 
same way as the Scottish Catholic clerics when Catholic children were 
evacuated to Protestant homes.  He referred to a letter from Arthur Hindley, 
the Archbishop of Westminster to Sir Maurice Holmes, Permanent Secretary 
of the Board of Education.  This letter requested the removal of Catholic 
children from scattered villages so they could be relocated to more 
appropriate areas.398    
 
Welshman commented that this had been a problem in the case of children 
evacuated to North Wales from Liverpool and Merseyside.  Other than this 
Welshman said very little regarding the problem of religion in connection 
with evacuation other than those included in the testimonies he collected 
from evacuees.  This would indicate that church policy regarding the 
evacuation process has been largely neglected.399  Problems concerned with 
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mixing different faith groups was touched upon by Summers, in her account 
of evacuation in England.  She recorded the oral testimony of an evacuee 
whose post war conversion to Catholicism caused a permanent split from her 
strict Methodist family.  The process began when she realised how much she 
enjoyed the experience of being taken to mass by her foster parents during 
her evacuation.400  Felicity Goodall wrote of a different type of association 
between religion and evacuation, including an account of parents of a child, 
who, as she was evacuated to Canada missed her First Communion.401  
These are just two brief examples of how discussion on faith matters focused 
on individuals with anecdotal evidence, rather than church policy. 
 
With the exception of Fitzpatrick and Lloyd, historians who have mentioned 
religion in their respective studies of the war years have generally 
overlooked the fundamental importance of religion in the evacuation 
process. Where religion is included in the historiography of the Second 
World War, it is usually emphasised in relation to the importance of prayer 
as a comfort in times of danger.  It is also mentioned in connection with the 
involvement of the Churches in helping the war effort, often linked with the 
work of other voluntary agencies.  Calder, for example, referred to religion 
during the war from the point of view that it created some sort of public 
solidarity.  One other point noticeable in wartime Britain was the growth of 
Catholicism.  There had been a steady growth in Catholicism in the 1930s 
and Calder claimed that Catholic priests had ‘found converts at a steady rate 
of eleven or twelve thousand a year’.  Numbers increased during the war as 
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‘…every labourer from Eire and every Italian prisoner of war who decided 
to settle in Britain was more grist to the Papist mill’.402    
 
Gardiner, in her book on the London Blitz, attributed this growth to the 
influx of Irish immigrants and the demand to convert for anyone marrying a 
Catholic.403  Catholic families tended to be generally larger than families of 
other faiths and devout Catholics tended to follow the strict teaching of the 
Catholic Church which prescribed regular attendance at services, especially 
Sunday Mass.  Fitzpatrick recorded an increase of six per cent in the Scottish 
Catholic population from 662,000 in 1931 to 702,000 in 1941.404  The long-
term growth in Catholicism recorded by Brown, whose research, from a 
Scottish perspective, showed that between the years 1941 to 1972, 116 new 
Catholic parishes were created.  These were most numerous in areas where 
new towns were built after the war and this figure equates to a rate of four 
new parishes per year.405   
 
A contentious area covered by the evacuation process was the 
Protestant/Catholic divide in Clydebank, which was included in Boyd’s 
survey.  In this work statistics were recorded of the numbers of Roman 
Catholics and Protestants, the two most popular faith groups living there, to 
find a link between religion and the number of evacuees sent from the town 
and the speed of their return.  Clydebank’s population was 48,000 and was 
made up predominantly of working class families.  The study was carried 
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out between Catholic and Protestant children from the eight schools in the 
area.  Six schools were Protestant with an inclusive role of 5,280 and two 
schools were Catholic with a combined role of 2,360.  The total number of 
children evacuated under the government scheme from the Protestant 
schools was 1,814, and there were 838 from the Catholic schools.406    
Boyd’s survey of returning evacuees was taken from a random sample of 
both Catholic and Protestant school children on a pro-rata basis. It included 
issues ranging from the attitude of parents to evacuation, aspects of housing, 
family size, age, gender and religion.  Boyd found that in both Catholic and 
Protestant households, there was a direct relationship between family size 
and the numbers evacuated.  The study showed that the larger the family the 
greater the tendency for the children to be evacuated.  Catholic mothers were 
evacuated with their families in greater numbers than Protestant mothers, 
therefore a smaller number of unaccompanied Catholic children were 
evacuated.  
 
Gender studies revealed a greater number of boys evacuated than girls 
amongst both Catholic and Protestant school children.  Where mothers were 
evacuated with their children, Boyd confirmed that they were more likely to 
return earlier than unaccompanied children.  Making the decision to return 
could be taken and arrangements made more quickly than if a child was 
unaccompanied, and the frequency of parental visits also had a bearing on 
the speed of return.  Boyd found that Catholic children returned home sooner 
than Protestant children and suggested that this was due, in some part, to the 
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difficulties encountered when evacuee and host had different religious 
beliefs.   
 
Crucially, Boyd’s survey suggested that when Clydebank parents, both 
Catholic and Protestant, made the decision to have their children included in 
the evacuation process, the question of religion was not initially a high 
priority.407  However, the religious welfare of evacuees became a 
fundamental issue of evacuation due to the reaction of the Roman Catholic 
Church.  Titmuss recorded that in the eyes of the church spiritual health was 
more important than physical safety.  He based this remark on 
correspondence between the Catholic Church hierarchy and the Scottish 
Secretary.  In a footnote he referred to an encyclical, issued by the 
Archbishop of Edinburgh, which urged Catholic parents to bring their 
children back from reception areas where there was no access to Catholic 
Church or school.408  An article in the Glasgow Observer and Scottish 
Catholic Herald in October 1939 confirmed that Catholic clerics believed: 
 
The soul is more important than the body, and if Catholic parents find 
that the religion of their children is going to suffer, no one can 
condemn them if they prefer the risks of the evacuated areas and seek 
to return to their churches and schools.409 
  
This was a fairly extreme measure, adopted only after priests in reception 
areas had done all that they could to place as many Catholic evacuees as 
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possible in homes where they would have access to schools and churches of 
their own faith.  Examples of the work done by priests is evident from 
reports printed in the Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald in September 
1939.  These included: 
 
The evacuees who have been settled in a number of Fife villages, 
where there is no Catholic Church or school, are likely to change their 
quarters this week.  …parish priests in the district have not been idle 
in this respect, working to get Catholic children settled in Catholic 
houses, where they can attend their church and school.410 
 
Working towards a satisfactory solution to the question of continued 
religious education was similar in the Border areas.  A quote from an East 
Lothian evacuation area states: 
 
In answer to Fr. Connolly’s query concerning facilities for Catholic 
religious instruction, the Director of Education said he thought that 
some arrangement would require to be reached but…there would be 
difficulties where there were mixed classes.411  
 
And in the north arrangements had been made where: 
 
…two classrooms [have] been set aside in Carnoustie public school 
for the use of Dundee Catholic evacuees from St. John’s.  Thirty 
                                                 
410 Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald, 15 September 1939, p.3. 
411 Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald, 15 September 1939, p.7. 
 179 
junior pupils [have] been provided for in the subscription school, and 
25 infants are being taught in St Anne’s Church.412  
 
Immediately after the first evacuation, and while priests were trying to help 
Catholic children to be re-billeted, the Church hierarchy was in consultation 
with Scottish government representatives.  During one of the first meetings 
of a fairly lengthy debate, Archbishop McDonald of St Andrews and 
Edinburgh voiced his annoyance that: 
 
Evacuation carried out in September 1939 had been arranged by a 
Committee on which the Roman Catholic Church had no 
representation and in this evacuation the interests of Roman Catholic 
children had been disregarded.413  
 
Catholic Church leaders were anxious that the Church would be represented 
in any future discussions on evacuation to ensure that the religious welfare 
of Catholic evacuees would be given due consideration. The Glasgow 
Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald carried many front page stories 
alerting people to the potential danger to the religious welfare of evacuees.  
In the article of the 6 October 1939, referred to above, it said that: 
 
Strong criticism of the manner in which the evacuation of Catholic 
school children has been carried out by the authorities is made by 
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Mgr. McGettigan, V.G. …The breaking up of Catholic schools and 
the subsequent separation of the pupils miles from each other in areas 
far from Catholic schools and Churches and the placing of Catholic 
children not only in non-Catholic homes but also in non-Catholic 
schools will lead…to a lessening of the prime need of Catholic 
schools for Catholic children in the eyes of parents and the public 
authorities.414 
 
Roman Catholic clerics were concerned that Catholic evacuees would lose 
their faith, especially if they were encouraged to take part in other types of 
religious ceremonies.  Another newspaper article in November reiterated 
earlier concern for the religious educational welfare of Catholic evacuees.  
The Archbishop of Glasgow, Donald Mackintosh, said that: 
 
Many of these children…are scattered up and down Scotland in 
relatively small groups.  This makes it most difficult, if not almost 
impossible to attend to the Catholic education and to the spiritual 
welfare of the children. 
 
The Archbishop went on to argue that: 
 
By the arrangements now being made by the civil authorities for the 
education of evacuee Glasgow Catholic children, what was formerly a 
rare and temporary exception is being made the rule, namely, the 
frequenting of non-Catholic schools by Catholic children.415 
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This type of situation was also the subject of correspondence between the 
Archbishop McDonald of St Andrews and Edinburgh and Monsignor 
McDonald, the priest in charge of the Catholic Church in Buckie.  The 
Archbishop claimed that there was a workable centralisation scheme 
operating in Fife and he encouraged Monsignor McDonald to put pressure 
on parents to demand a similar centralisation scheme for Catholic children 
evacuated to areas in the north of Scotland.  The Archbishop claimed that in 
Fife: 
 
We got a number of parents to complain and to demand re-billeting. 
They demanded, failing this, that their children should be sent 
home…this was a matter of conscience and supreme importance, and 
that the parents and the Ecclesiastical authorities would be compelled 
to drive it to extreme limits.  This [created] much feeling at the very 
time when the government [was] anxious to have the whole country 
with it…416  
 
The Archbishop went on to say that: 
 
When parents found that reasonable facilities for the practice of their 
religion and for religious instruction of their children were denied 
them they returned home.  Now a mere handful of children remain.417 
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Monsignor McDonald, from Buckie, had managed to find good homes for 
forty children within easy access of Catholic Church and school.  However, 
in reply to Archbishop McDonald, he set out his fears regarding seven 
Catholic children in the surrounding countryside of Portknockie who were 
not prepared to move to a central area close to these facilities.  He noted that 
the parties involved, including parents, children and Protestant guardians, 
were unwilling to allow children to move to a more accessible area for the 
continuation of their religious education.  He was concerned that a situation 
would develop whereby: 
 
…if the children [were] left in the Protestant homes…many of them 
[would] lose the faith.  Some of them are being taken to the kirk and 
to prayer meetings and when you protest you are told the children 
want to go.418   
  
A circular from the Guild of Catholic Teachers to Catholic teachers and head 
teachers, in October 1939, stressed that it was not acceptable for Catholic 
children to be scattered in small units where they would be absorbed into 
non-Catholic schools without a Catholic teacher.  It emphasised the fact that 
Catholic evacuees should, if possible, be billeted with Catholic families, 
with access to a Church and school of their own faith.  If this were not 
possible then an acceptable solution would be to open centres where 
Catholic children could continue their religious education: 
 
                                                 
418 SCA. DE124/7/11. Letter by Monsignor McDonald of Buckie, to Rev. A.T. 
McDonald, Archbishop of St. Andrews and Edinburgh, 19 November 1939. 
 183 
Where there [was] a Church and no school but possible 
accommodation for classes… where there [was] neither a Church nor 
school but which evacuees could be placed in sufficient numbers to 
warrant a priest and teachers being sent to them…419 
 
Following on from this the Archdiocese of Glasgow issued a questionnaire 
for use in reception areas, to assess the viability of sending priests and 
teachers to areas where evacuees had no access to their own school or 
Church.420  Where it was not possible for them to have access to both and be 
billeted with Catholic families, the Archbishop suggested that Catholic 
evacuees should be accommodated in hostels.  The Church’s enquiries 
estimated only 198 Catholic children were without access to either their own 
church or school in northern districts such as Ballater, Inverurie, Braemar 
and Fraserburgh.421  These numbers were insufficient to make building a 
separate hostel viable in a central reception area.  
 
In conjunction with the work of ensuring schoolchildren were given the 
opportunity to continue their religious education, Catholic clergy also 
worked towards the continuation of the religious welfare of nursery age 
children, evacuated with their mothers. Where possible they wanted pre-
school children to have access to Catholic nursery schools with Catholic 
teachers fully trained in religious teaching in evacuation areas.  
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The aim of the Catholic nursery school system, whose expansion had been 
ongoing since the 1930s, was to provide at least one Catholic nursery school 
in each diocese of Scotland.422  This intention was debated into spring 1939 
when it was decided that the Catholic Ecclesiastical Authority would 
provide nursery schools in all the populous centres throughout Scotland.  A 
minute of the Committee investigating the issue noted: 
 
Neutral nursery schools would be the thin end of the wedge of 
secularisation.  [In] Glasgow the authorities were establishing four 
nursery schools.  In Edinburgh the authorities were establishing six 
nursery schools.   Neither corporation was making special provision 
for Catholic children.423 
 
The expansion of non-denominational nurseries during the war, in the cities 
and in reception areas, alerted Catholic clergy of the need to carry on with 
the expansion of Catholic nurseries and to employ more fully trained 
Catholic teachers.  Wartime nursery classes were opened in primary schools 
and mothers’ clubs also ran nurseries.  In and around the city of Glasgow 16 
nursery schools were established, 22 in Edinburgh, with a further 4 opened 
for mothers working in industry.424  The feeling among the Catholic clergy 
was that Catholics could not accept nondenominational nursery schools and 
felt that: 
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Though attendance at such schools was voluntary…the tendency was 
towards compulsion and worse still, towards schools, 
undenominational in character.425  
 
The struggle to ensure continuance of the Catholic faith amongst evacuees 
was acknowledged by local government.  However, neither the DHS nor the 
SED could guarantee that Catholic evacuees could definitely be placed in 
receiving areas with access to a Catholic Church and school.  The best that 
could be done under the circumstances was to request evacuation officers in 
all sending areas to meet Roman Catholic requests, as long as this did not 
mean unfair treatment for Protestant children.  The under-Secretary of State 
for Scotland, Captain McEwen, was also prepared to consider, where 
appropriate, the appointment of Roman Catholic billeting officers, although 
he doubted whether it would be wise in cases where the receiving 
householders were Protestant.426  This gave the Scottish Catholic clergy 
some reassurance that the local authorities in reception areas were prepared 
to relocate Roman Catholic evacuees where possible.  This had been done in 
all but one Scottish local authority reception area which has not been named 
by the Scottish Office since the local council had refused to co-operate.  The 
remaining local authorities agreed that where possible Catholic billeting 
officers would be appointed in reception areas.427   
                                                 
425 SCA. DE126/4/1. Nursery and Special Schools Minutes 1938-39.  Minutes of meeting 
held in the Vicariate, 160 Renfrew Street, Glasgow, 3 November 1938.   
426 SCA. DE124/8/5. Evacuation Edinburgh and General 1940, January-February.  
Department of Health for Scotland Meeting, 2 February 1940. 
427 SCA. DE124/8/5. Meeting between Scottish government officials including the Under 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Captain McEwen and Representatives of the Roman 
Catholic Church including: Archbishop Mackintosh, Archbishop McDonald and Bishop 
Maguire, 2 February 1940.   
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For Catholic evacuees who were billeted in camps, Captain McEwen was 
prepared to make some provision for: 
 
…the religious instruction by Roman Catholic teachers, and 
facilities…for the holding of services in the camp by any of its clergy 
whom the Roman Catholic Church may designate for this purpose.428  
 
Catholic clergy were not satisfied with the way in which camp schools were 
to be organised.  The situation would have been more acceptable had there 
been at least one for Catholics only.  In spite of all their protests, when the 
dangers of bombing became a reality and parents had to move their children 
to safety, the problems raised by religious bodies such as the Roman 
Catholic Church were never seriously raised again during the remainder of 
the war.429  Nevertheless, the complaints of the Catholic hierarchy during the 
early years of the war demonstrated how far they were prepared to go at that 
time to ensure the continued religious welfare of their congregation. 
 
In contrast to the Catholic clergy, some Roman Catholic evacuees seemed 
unconcerned about their religious wellbeing.  During interviews about their 
experience of evacuation conducted for this thesis no significant fears were 
expressed over religion.  This is also reflected in the interviews collated for 
the ‘2000 Glasgow Lives’ project.  Of the thirty-two people, who were 
children during the war, and who mentioned their evacuation experience, 
                                                 
428 SCA. DE124/9/2. Letter from the Scottish Office, Whitehall, to the Archbishop of St. 
Andrews and Edinburgh, 28 March 1940. 
429 Lloyd, The Scottish School System and the Second World War, Thesis for Doctor of 
Philosophy, October 1979 (held at Stirling University Library), p.97. 
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none made any significant reference to religion.430  This implies that religion 
was not a major part of their overall experience.  Among Roman Catholic 
evacuees interviewed who did express an opinion on religion, being billeted 
with families of other faiths was considered unimportant.  One evacuee who 
remembered being billeted at the home of her teacher in Aberdeen said: 
 
The schoolteacher was very good to us.  We were Catholics, they 
were Protestants and we were made to kneel down and say our 
prayers.  We never did that at home.  At home my daddy would say 
‘come on get into bed and say your prayers’ and that was it, you 
know, but they were very good that way.  There was never any strife 
there and we got on well, we loved the school and had a happy, happy 
time…431   
 
Another evacuee remembered her religious education being carried out in 
school.  She had the opportunity to go to mass once a week thus allowing 
her to continue her religious education.  She said: 
 
The school we were at, what we were told, it was a Catholic school 
we could go to Church once, one afternoon a week and that was for 
our religious education.  But we didn’t have to go, I was one of four 
and I went because I like it, you know!432 
                                                 
430 Glasgow Museums Resource Centre (GMRC), ‘2000 Glasgow Lives’ Collection. Oral 
History Collection. 
431 Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011.  Transcript held with author. 
432 Interview with John and June, recorded on 20 July 2011.  Transcript held with author. 
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In the case of two Glasgow sisters billeted in Balendoch House near 
Blairgowrie, their religious experience, in keeping with their whole 
evacuation period, was very positive.  An interview recorded by Summers, 
tells of how the two sisters escaped a particularly unhappy home life when 
they were evacuated to Balendoch.   Balendoch House, which was home to 
evacuees from ‘the slums of Glasgow’, was run by three members of the 
Christian Guider’s from Kent.  There the sisters found love and friendship 
which they had never known at home.  At Balendoch, one sister was 
‘christened and confirmed’.  She ‘celebrated her first communion on 
Christmas Day 1944, and remembered the experience with deep and lasting 
affection’.433   
 
For Jewish children attention to religious observance was a significant 
feature of the evacuation process.  Fast noted that some Orthodox Jewish 
children who were billeted in non-Jewish homes made a valiant effort to 
follow the rules of their Orthodox Jewish teaching.434  Fast wrote 
predominantly from an English perspective with relatively few references to 
Scottish Jews.  Indeed the religious interests of the Scottish Jewish 
community is absent in much of the historiography relating to war and 
evacuation.  In contrast, religion was one of the most important issues for 
historians dealing with the German Jewish refugees who arrived in Britain 
during 1938 and their subsequent evacuation from English towns and cities 
at the outbreak of war.  
 
                                                 
433 Summers, When the Children Came Home (2011), pp.127 and 136.  
434 Fast, Children’s Exodus (2011), p.102 
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Historiography relating to the kindertransport in 1938, whereby 10,000 
Jewish refugees were given passage from Germany and German occupied 
territory to Britain, is extensive and detailed.435  Much of what has been 
written gives an insightful account of the interests of the Jewish hierarchy, 
and the way in which they dealt with the religious aspect of the refugee 
movement.   
 
Rabbi Schonfeld, Chief Rabbi of the Orthodox Jewish community based in 
east London, wanted Orthodox children evacuated to Orthodox homes where 
their religious observance could be preserved.  Like Roman Catholic priests, 
Rabbi Schonfeld fought to ensure that Jewish refugees be provided with 
facilities for the continuation of their religious welfare.  Fast believed 
Schonfeld felt strongly that there was little purpose in saving a child’s 
physical life ‘only to lose its Jewish soul and identity’.436   
 
The billeting of Jewish refugees with Jewish families was not achieved in 
Scotland.  Only 27 children were placed in Jewish homes compared to 147 
in non-Jewish ones.437  Aaron Haas has claimed that for some Jewish parents 
the fear of their children losing their faith was worse than death.  One 
extreme case reported by Haas on the subject of conversion to Catholicism 
revealed that a Polish mother, who was an Orthodox Jew, claimed that she 
                                                 
435 A selection of these books include: Edith Milton, The Tiger in The Attic: Memories of 
the Kindertransport and Growing up English (London, 2005). 
Frieda Korobkin, Throw Your Feet Over Your Shoulders: Beyond the Kindertransport 
(Pittsburgh, 2012). 
W.G. Sebald, J. Wood and A. Bell, Austerlitz (London, 2002). 
Jennifer Childers, Kindertransport (New York, 2008). 
436 Fast, Children’s Exodus (2011), p.109. 
437 Fast, Children’s Exodus (2011), p.64. 
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would ‘rather see [her] daughter die as a Jew than to grow up as a 
Catholic’.438     
 
There is limited evidence of the reaction of Scottish Jewish parents whose 
children were evacuated under the official scheme.  One case which was 
recorded however gives an account of a young Jewish evacuee who had 
been so impressed by the ‘Band of Hope’, a Christian organisation for 
Protestant children, she wanted to join.  She claimed that once her parents 
were made aware of this they immediately brought her back to Glasgow.439   
This incident demonstrates the parallel reaction to proselytization which was 
shared by both Jews and Roman Catholics.   
 
Among other Christen denominations, the fear of conversion also caused 
concern.  Rev. W.W. Simpson, a Methodist Minister, contributed 
extensively to developing Jewish-Christian relations.440  He worried about 
acceptance of those who wished to convert by both Christian and Jewish 
communities.  In a letter printed in the Jewish Chronicle entitled: ‘The 
Conversion Menace: A Christian’s Observation, he warned that: 
 
There have been cases [where] Christian foster-parents of Jewish 
refugee children have done their best to influence those children 
towards the acceptance of Christianity…The Jew who becomes a 
Christian turns against everything Jewish, is not only a loss to his own 
                                                 
438 Aaron Haas, In the Shadow of the Holocaust: The Second Generation (Cambridge, 
1996), p.156. 
439 Scottish Jewish Archives Centre (SJAC). F0009 Serving Their Country 4: World War 
Two – Personal Stories and Memories. 
440 www.notredamedesion.org/en/dislogue [Accessed: 7 February 2014]. 
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community but must also be something of an embarrassment to the 
community with which he has associated himself…the Jewish 
community is left with the problem as to how to safeguard itself 
against such loss in the future.441   
 
Safeguarding the religious future of Jewish children was of particular 
importance to Jewish educationalists.  Professor Selig Brodetsky, at a 
meeting of the Joint Emergency Committee for Jewish Education stressed 
that:  
 
…the most important function of the community was to educate the 
next generation, but up to the present it had been treated as a sort of 
incidental event in communal life… The most effective way of 
dealing with the boys and girls was to introduce them to traditional 
Jewish life at a very early stage.  …a Jewish boy or girl who did not 
understand Jewish hopes and aspirations for the future was not really 
taking full part in Jewish life.442 
 
Problems relating to the continuation of their faith was compounded by 
feelings of anti-Semitism in some areas of the country.  Ben Braber has said 
that although Glasgow Jews could count on strong public feelings of 
fairness, they had also to deal with vicious prejudice.443  Anti-Semitism was 
fairly widespread and there were reports of difficulties in housing Jewish 
                                                 
441 Jewish Chronicle, Friday, 19 January 1945, p.6. 
442 Jewish Chronicle, Friday, 16 March 1945, p.5. 
443 Ben Braber, Jews in Glasgow 1879-1939: Immigration and Integration (Middlesex, 
2007), p.187.  
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children evacuated from Garnethill Hostel in Glasgow to Perthshire.  The 
extent of the problem was such that the Glasgow Education Authority was 
prepared to meet the costs involved in sending these children elsewhere.  
The Jewish Chronicle stated that: 
 
Difficulties regarding housing of the 27 children evacuated from the 
Garnethill Hostel….should be transferred to the proposed Skelmorlie 
Hostel.  The Glasgow Education Authority have indicated that they 
are willing to convert the proposed hostel…into a special school.  
They would provide teachers, furniture, beds, and bedding but 
responsibility for rent, rates, heating, lighting, would fall upon the 
Glasgow Jewish Education Board.444  
 
A contrary report on the same day claimed that Jews and Christians were 
forming a new understanding as a result of evacuation.  The President and 
Chairman of the Society of Jews and Christians, the Very Rev., the Dean of 
St Paul’s and Rabbi I. I. Mattuk, noted in the Bulletin for January 1940: 
 
…the placing of many Jewish mothers and children in Christian 
homes as a result of evacuation has made possible new understanding.  
One “symptom” of what is happening, it is declared, has been the 
interest shown by Christian billeting hosts in the correspondence 
religion lessons sent out to the children from the Synagogues in 
London.445 
 
                                                 
444 Jewish Chronicle, Friday, 26 January 1940, p.17. 
445 Jewish Chronicle, Friday, 26 January 1940, p.15 
 193 
Safeguarding evacuees from potential outside religious influence could be 
ensured by means of private evacuation.  For Jewish families living in and 
around Glasgow whose children were not evacuated under the official 
evacuation scheme, the Ayrshire coast was a popular destination for sending 
their children to safety.  There was a very active Jewish community in that 
area and in the twenty years between 1931 and 1951 the Jewish community 
in Ayr rose from 37,000 to 42,000.446  This was a fairly substantial growth in 
an area which had a total population of 285,217 in 1931.447   
 
Religious worship and the celebration of special Jewish festivals carried on 
in Ayr for the growing community of Jewish evacuees.  Events such as 
Chanucah continued amongst the Jewish community in Ayrshire during the 
war.  These events were catered for at the Invercloy Hotel, which was a 
popular venue for this and other special celebrations.448  The Ayr Masonic 
Halls was another popular venue where teaching took place for four hours 
every Sunday.449  By arrangement with the Jewish School, the Talmud 
Torah, Hebrew classes were held in Largs High School, another popular 
venue.450   Meanwhile Synagogue premises were acquired at Sandgate.451 
These arrangements meant that the Jewish congregation, including evacuees, 
in and around the Ayrshire coast could continue to practise their religious 
                                                 
446 Nathan Abrams, Caledonian Jews: A Study of Seven Small Communities in Scotland 
(North Carolina, 2009), p.43. 
447 These figures were from the Carnegie Library, Local History Department, Ayr. 
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observance without undue fear of outside influence.  Arrangements were 
also put in place to have kosher meat and unpasteurised milk sent from 
Glasgow until these could be supplied by local butchers and farmers.452   
 
In the Scottish Borders, Whittinghame House, another location given over 
for Jewish refugees and evacuees, was opened in January 1939.  The house 
and the estate were leased to Whittingehame Farm School, a non-profit 
organisation.  Educational tuition included English and Hebrew classes, 
religious education and agricultural skills.  Opening with a roll of 51 
children the numbers rose very quickly to 160.   Between January 1939 and 
September 1941 three to four hundred children passed through the school.453  
As evacuees returned home numbers diminished and the school was closed 
in 1942.  However, a measure of its success was recorded via a letter printed 
in the Jewish Chronicle on its closure in February 1942 where it was noted 
that: 
 
…of the boys and girls who completed their training at Whittinghame 
since its inception in 1939, 16 went to Palestine and about 110 
(representing a big percentage of those trained and suitable for an 
agricultural life) have settled on the land in this country.454    
 
Ernespie House, in Castle Douglas, then a fifty year old mansion house, was 
opened as a residential school for Jewish evacuees from Glasgow.  Chaim 
                                                 
452 SJAC. F00025.  Serving Their Country: World War Two – Personal Stories and 
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Bermant, a Jewish evacuee from Glasgow who was sent to Ernespie House 
after a spell in Annan described it as being rather like a public school.  This 
was made available by the Glasgow Jewish Board of Guardians when 
accommodation for Jewish evacuees became inadequate in Annan.455  The 
history of Ernespie House in relation to its use as a residential school for 
evacuees has been relatively under researched.     
 
Boyd’s survey paid little attention to Jewish evacuees, possibly due to the 
fact that, by comparison to Catholics and Protestants, their numbers were 
relatively few.  He briefly mentioned Ernespie House in his account of 
evacuation, where he discussed the takeover of large houses to be run as 
schools during the war, but overall his coverage of education and religion 
was not comprehensive.  His survey presented detailed information of some 
of the other residential schools, for example, Catholic, Protestant and non-
denominational establishments acquired for evacuees, but he gave no 
specific details of Ernespie House.456  Whittingehame House was also 
overlooked in Boyd’s study possibly as his main focus was on the 
Catholic/Protestant divide.  The results of this research into the evacuation 
of Jews in Scotland during the Second World War helps fill this gap.   
Bermant, who went on to become a Rabbi, has recounted his experience as 
an evacuee both in Annan and at Ernespie House.  He spoke frankly about 
his approach to religion during his life in Glasgow and in Annan before 
being sent to Ernespie.  He claimed he had: 
 
                                                 
455 Bermant, Coming Home (1976), p.84. 
456 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.143. 
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…no intention of renouncing Judaism…and certainly no wish to do 
anything which would have estranged me from my family…but I 
wanted to be one of the lads, a boy among boys, and did not want to 
be separated from them by religious externals.457 
 
Bermant had been bullied at school in Glasgow for being Jewish, but when 
he was sent to Annan he was particularly pleased to have been bullied for 
being an evacuee, or one of the ‘Glasgow khillies’ (his spelling), rather than 
a Jew.458  Despite being the son of a Rabbi he expressed no strong feelings 
over any challenges to his religious adherence, hence his approach to 
religion was similar to that of Roman Catholic evacuees interviewed for this 
research.  Although Bermant followed the Jewish faith throughout his life he 
questioned some of the strict rules and regulations which were required of 
Orthodox Jews.459  Other Jewish children were less able to do this and there 
are accounts of Jewish children who were deeply concerned that during the 
evacuation process they would not be upholding their faith if they were to 
carry gas masks on the Sabbath.460  There was a further threat to the spiritual 
welfare of Jewish evacuees during the war when their kosher diet came 
under threat.  When Jewish children were placed in non-Jewish homes hosts 
often had either little or no knowledge of their dietary requirements, 
although this problem was solved in some reception areas where canteens 
were set up and served kosher food.   
 
                                                 
457 Bermant, Coming Home (1976), p.67. 
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There are many similarities between the Roman Catholic and Jewish 
communities which were highlighted by the evacuation process.  However, 
one visible difference was in the importance placed on the quality of 
religious teaching.  For Roman Catholic clergy there was an overwhelming 
desire that only those teachers schooled in the Catholic faith during their 
teaching practice should be allowed to teach children in Catholic nursery, 
primary and secondary schools.  The importance Church leaders placed on 
these teachers was evident from the minutes of a special Committee meeting 
in the Vicariate in Glasgow before the outbreak of war.  This Committee 
worried that not all Catholic teachers were suitable for teaching Catholic 
children and it was essential that they should have good Catholic teachers, as 
‘they [came] next in importance to priests’.461  The Committee saw a danger 
in student teachers being assigned to non-Catholic tutors and they believed 
that ‘teachers finishing their training were often insufficiently instructed in 
Dogma…even amongst nuns and Brothers dogma was woefully 
insufficient’.462  This, they believed, should render them unacceptable to 
teach Catholic children.  The call to national service during the war 
adversely affected the number of Catholic teachers, and indeed teaching staff 
generally, whereby retired teachers and young graduates were called on to 
fill the gap.463 
 
By comparison, according to Bermant, while Jewish leaders insisted that 
Jewish evacuees were placed in households where they could continue their 
                                                 
461 SCA. DE126/4/6. Special Committee Minute 5, A Meeting of the Special Committee 
was held in the Vicariate, Glasgow, 27 April, 1939. 
462 SCA. DE126/4/6. Special Committee Minute 6, A Meeting of the Special Committee 
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religious education, there was considerably less emphasis placed on the 
standard of teachers.  Bermant drew on his experience at Ernespie House as 
a pupil and eventually as a teacher to support this allegation.  He stressed 
that Jews had little regard for teachers, whom he declared were ‘unfortunate’ 
and who were ‘not much use at anything else, and even where teachers had 
considerable knowledge, they had no sort of training’.464   According to 
Bermant, in places like Glasgow, religious teaching was mainly done by 
boys in their last year of school or first year of university.  Bermant’s 
statement relating to the teaching practice of Jewish children is in sharp 
contrast to the ideal the Glasgow Catholic hierarchy was working towards on 
the eve of the war.   
 
Focus thus far in this chapter has surrounded Roman Catholic and Jewish 
organisations.  Both these organisations were active in working for the 
continued religious adherence of their communities during the evacuation 
process, particularly the Roman Catholic hierarchy.  For Church of Scotland 
evacuees there was less importance placed on their being billeted where they 
would have access to their own church and school.  A 1950s study estimated 
that approximately 2.1 million adults in Scotland were members of a 
Christian Church and the Church of Scotland accounted for 63.5 per cent of 
that total which made it the largest organised religious body in Scotland.465  
As the majority of the evacuees were Church of Scotland it was therefore 
more likely they would be placed in homes of the same faith.   
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Another established church, the Church of England, acknowledged 
evacuation as a potential cause of disruption to the religious life and 
education of evacuees.  Together with the Free Church movement (Christian 
Church which dissented or seceded from an established church), the Church 
of England, through the Commission of Churches, appointed a Committee to 
survey the extent of disruption being caused by evacuation.  The Committee 
reported that: 
 
…the grave defect in the official evacuation scheme that…took no 
account of the religious needs of those concerned and ignored the 
bodies whose function it is to supply them.466    
 
It further claimed that: 
 
Evacuation struck hard…at the organised church life of the sending 
areas.  The departure of so many children, mothers and teachers 
disrupted congregations no less than homes.  It destroyed or seriously 
depleted Sunday schools and youth societies, the nurseries of the 
Church; subtracted workers and leaders; left dismal gaps in the pews; 
decimated choirs; torpedoed budgets…Congregations carried on as                                                                                                     
best they could in this sorry state of things and strove gradually to 
build things up again as the tide of evacuation began to turn.467  
                                                 
466 The Report of a Survey Committee appointed  by the Commission of the Churches for 
International Friendship and Social Responsibility, Evacuation and the Churches (1941),  
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International Friendship and Social Responsibility, Evacuation and the Churches (1941), 
p.34.  
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Brown’s study of Scotland confirmed a fall in the average total of Church 
attendance between 1931 and 1941 by almost 5 per cent.  He estimated that 
from this figure 63 per cent was due to ‘a steepening decline in Sunday-
school enrolment…during war-time child evacuation in 1939-41’.468    
 
The post-war growth in Church membership and the new housing 
developments in Scotland resulted in a church extension programme.  The 
result of research into Protestant Church Extension Ministers by Reverend 
H. Stanley Wood highlighted a drive to improve and renew church 
adherence after the Second World War.  New churches were erected 
alongside the new towns built on the outskirts of the cities.  Wood described 
these church extensions as the ‘greatest boom of abstract new Churches in 
the twentieth century’.469  He believed that these new churches helped to 
establish national evangelism. 
 
Historians who expressed an opinion on religion during the war mentioned a 
decline in church attendance and Gardiner believed that Church membership 
had been in decline since the First World War.470  Holman also mentioned 
the decline in church attendance noticeable since before the outbreak of war, 
but he believed that during the war people were more ‘receptive to the 
concept of a protecting God’.  He explained this in terms of the Christian 
way in which people cared for evacuees, although this did not always 
involve them in the process of taking them to church.471 
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Church attendance was hampered by wartime conditions as Kirk Session 
records confirmed.  In a number of sending and receiving areas afternoon 
and evening services often had to be cancelled due to the enforcement of the 
blackout.  Records also show that, in a number of reception areas, Sunday 
schools were being cancelled predominantly through lack of teachers.  In 
some places, such as St Michael’s Parish Church, Lithlithgow, in West 
Lothian, attempts were made to overcome the problem with the introduction 
of training classes for Sunday school teachers.  Arrangements were also 
made to have afternoon services during the blackout.472   
 
The Commission of the Churches reported that circulars and leaflets were 
issued by the Church of England’s Central Council for Religious Education, 
the Free Churches and the Council of Christian Education, giving guidance 
on dealing with supplementing the work of Sunday schools by teaching in 
the home.  To help foster parents a special scheme of home religious 
teaching was developed and aids supplied.  The Commission believed the 
techniques put in place were successful.473    
 
Leaflets entitled ‘The Church and the Children in Wartime’ offered advice 
and guidance for dealing with wartime issues under such sub-headings as: 
Children’s Fears, Nursery Schools for Children under Five, How to Teach 
Children to Pray, Occupations for Winter Evenings in Reception Areas and 
The Difficult Child.  All surrounded the power of prayer in helping children 
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through the separation caused by evacuation.  Notes on religious teaching 
for children in neutral, evacuation and reception areas were contained in the 
leaflet Sunday Teaching in the Homes of the People.474  This emphasised the 
opportunity presented by war and evacuation to enhance the spiritual welfare 
of children through religious teaching in the home.  It outlined the way 
forward in achieving this and stressed that what had happened was 
something: 
 
…often contemplated of Home Religious teaching and of the gaining 
of a closer co-operation between parent and teacher where the child’s 
spiritual welfare is concerned.475 
 
One priest who carried out an experiment on home religious teaching for 
secondary school pupils claimed that classes had a positive effect on the 
children and their families.476 
 
From this information it is evident that the various Churches were alert to 
the need to ensure the continuous religious education of children in 
evacuation areas.  Within the wider ministry of the Church of Scotland 
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however, there was no discussion in the Kirk Session records concerning 
any need for secularism during the evacuation process.  Church records for 
the evacuation areas of Cupar and St Andrews, in Fife; Dunning, in 
Perthshire; and Linlithgow in West Lothian, say little on evacuation in any 
of these presbyteries.  Kirk Session minutes from Dunning Parish Church 
intimated to the Session House that ‘evacuees [and] members of the church 
were invited to communion’.477  In the six years of war these Kirk Session 
minutes made no further mention of evacuees, in spite of the fact that there 
were 300 Glasgow children billeted there in September 1939.  
 
There was no evidence in any of the Kirk Session records from the 
presbyteries mentioned, to suggest that Church of Scotland ministers had a 
direct objection to Protestant children being billeted with families outside 
the Protestant faith during their evacuation.  The Church of Scotland 
magazine ‘Life and Work’ for Battlefield West Church in Langside dated 
September 1940 printed an article in the Minister’s Notes section which 
welcomed Guernsey evacuees to Glasgow, and invited them to join the 
church.  This article professed to ensure that, ‘…as long as the good folks of 
Guernsey are with us they will find a warm place in our hearts, homes and 
church’.478  The article makes no mention of denominational distinction or 
the need to accept only Protestants into Battlefield homes and church.  
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The only direct reference in the Kirk Session minutes reviewed regarding 
evacuated people was recorded on 30 March 1941 at the same Battlefield 
West Church in Glasgow.  It confirmed that the magazine supplement 
should be sent to members of the congregation who had been evacuated.  In 
this case it was to inform evacuees of the news of a new Moderator-
Designate which was included in the magazine.  In St Michael’s Parish 
Church, Linlithgow, a reception area for Glasgow children, the Kirk Session 
records contain no mention of evacuees.  General schooling issues were 
raised; for example, there were a number of complaints included in these 
records concerning cancellation of Sunday school due to the blackout and 
lack of teachers.  However, throughout the six years of war and evacuation 
there are no records as to the religious affiliation of evacuees in any of the 
Session minutes of the aforesaid church.479 
 
At national level, there is no evidence of Church of Scotland concern for the 
religious adherence of Protestant child evacuees.  When day to day concerns 
are examined for areas where evacuees were placed, very few comments 
were made about them.  For example, the records for St Leonard’s Church in 
Dairsie, in Fife, where a number of Edinburgh children were sent, refer to 
the children only in connection with arrangements for badminton.  Initially 
the invitation to play was for children who were members of the church but 
was soon extended to ‘outsiders’.  This would suggest that the sport was 
opened to both evacuees and local children of other faiths living in the 
area.480   
                                                 
479 NAS. Ch2/740/15.  Kirk Session Records for St Michael’s Parish Church, 1939-1945.  
480 St Andrews University, Special Collections, Kirk Session Records for St Leonard’s 
Parish Church, Dairsie, 1939-1945. 
 205 
During the war the Church of Scotland, like other churches, worked to 
maintain the religious welfare of its congregation, and like other religious 
organisations, it played a leading role in many areas of war emergency 
relief.481  Kirk Session minutes from Battlefield Church also recorded the 
way in which practical relief was extended by parishioners during the war.  
This took the form of the provision of ambulance classes, helping to 
coordinate Air Raid Precautions (ARP) squads under the leadership of an 
ambulance section, fire section and wardens.  Churches generally helped 
those rendered homeless by the blitz, providing emergency shelter and food. 
Quakers were particularly active both at home and throughout Europe 
helping the war effort without actually taking part in military action 
 
Barns House, in Peeblesshire, was home to 40 boys evacuated from areas in 
and around Edinburgh who could not be billeted in private homes.  The boys 
who resided there were from various religious backgrounds.  David Wills, 
who ran the home, was a Quaker.  He confirmed that he held Sunday 
morning service in order to dispel the myth of the ‘bogey-man which they 
[thought] of as God’.482  Sunday service was entirely voluntary.  Wills hoped 
it may have turned the boys towards that religion although there is no 
evidence to suggest it did.   
 
For Wills, as for Quakers generally, pacifism was fundamental to their daily 
and religious life and conscience.  Although they did not take part in the 
fighting, Quakers played an active role in the many and varied emergency 
                                                 
481 Langside Parish Church Records, Battlefield West Parish, Kirk Session Records, 3 
June 1940.  Held by the Session Clerk at Battlefield. 
482 Wills, The Barns Experiment (1945), p.86. 
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relief efforts during the Second World War.  These included activities such 
as fire watching, ambulance driving, and organising and running hostels for 
the elderly and evacuees.  On the wider stage Quakers also helped the 
refugee movement of both Jews and Christians throughout Europe.             
 
Comparative study thus far has included the involvement of the Roman 
Catholic, Jewish and Church of Scotland clergy with the evacuation process.  
This line of enquiry has not been possible for the Society of Friends, or 
Quakers, as they have no ordained clergy and no hierarchical structure.  This 
meant that, where Roman Catholic clergy raised an objection to their Church 
being overlooked in evacuation planning, there was no equivalent rank or 
voice among the Quakers.  There is no evidence of Quakers attempting to 
influence children in religious belief beyond the vague suggestion from 
Wills noted above. 
 
There is a wide range of historiography available relating to the history of 
Quakerism, its establishment, and the role of Quakers in the emergency 
relief work carried out during the Second World War.  However there is a 
distinct lack of secondary or archival material which accounts for the way in 
which Quakers dealt with the evacuation process.  The Quaker libraries in 
Glasgow and London hold no account of any involvement Quakers may 
have had in the evacuation process in Scotland.   
 
The work of Roger Wilson, who was General Secretary of the Friends Relief 
Service during the war, provides the main source of information on the 
subject of evacuation.  He recorded the involvement of Quakers organising 
hostels for evacuee children and the elderly, and, in some instances, for the 
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occupation and renovation of houses for the purpose of accommodating 
evacuees.  However, this work omitted any account of Scottish Quaker 
involvement in the evacuation process.483   
 
Gardiner also described the involvement of Quakers in sending supplies and 
workers to the East End of London but she too neglected to quantify any 
Scottish involvement by Quakers in the evacuation scheme.484  The work of 
David Wills is therefore significant in identifying that Quakers did, in fact, 
play a role in the Scottish evacuation scheme through his experience of 
running Barns House. He described Quaker services as being led by a group 
of elders with no figurehead as in other religious organisations.  
 
For Quakers, the religious welfare of the family is therefore in the hands of 
the parents, and there is no concrete evidence to suggest that there were any 
similarities between Quakers and the Roman Catholic or Jewish 
organisations during the evacuation process. Only one piece of evidence of a 
Quaker family wishing to secure accommodation with another Quaker 
family comes from an account by Louise Milbourn.  The reason behind this 
did not come from a threat of outside influence, but rather a letter written by 
her father which stated, ‘…we take a rather pacifist view of things and there 
are many who would not wish to take the child of a Quaker’.485  With the 
exception of this letter there is no evidence available to suggest that people 
would have objected to having Quaker children billeted with them.   
 
                                                 
483 Wilson, Quaker Relief (1952). 
484 Gardiner, The Blitz (2010), p.121. 
485 Milbourn, A Very Different War (2003), p.8. 
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The absence of material concerning Quaker involvement in the evacuation 
process gives an added importance to personal testimony.  This helps piece 
together the ways in which Quakers, like other religious denominations, 
worked through the evacuation process and how far warfare led to an 
increased awareness of the need to maintain religious welfare for its 
congregation.   
 
This chapter has focused on the continued religious welfare of evacuees 
during the Second World War with particular regard to the Titmuss theory of 
warfare to welfare in relation to religion.  Within the overall framework of 
continued and progressive welfare developments this was most apparent in 
the Roman Catholic community, with the fairly rapid expansion of Catholic 
Churches and Catholic schools in the post-war era.  This evidence fills a gap 
in the historiography concerning the relationship between religion and 
evacuation.   
 
The chapter set out to make a comparison of the ways in which different 
religious organisations handled the evacuation process.  The aims were to 
consider the available material relating to four religious organisations within 
Britain: Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Quakerism, in 
order to establish how far these groups had been successful in helping to 
maintain the religious welfare of evacuees during their evacuation.  The 
Roman Catholic Church was especially forceful in its attempt to ensure that 
the religious welfare of its congregation was upheld during the war.  
Through media coverage and meetings with the Secretary of State for 
Scotland it attempted to ensure that as many Catholic children and adults as 
possible had the benefit of continuing to uphold their religious adherence in 
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reception areas.  Their campaign was somewhat unrealistic in so far as there 
was a distinct lack of accommodation in some reception areas to enable 
Catholic children to fulfil their religious obligations.  There was also a 
shortage of Catholic teachers as young men were being called up for military 
service.  Furthermore, Catholic clerics failed to take account of the 
emotional strain of removing children who had settled comfortably in non-
Catholic homes.  The Catholic Church was prepared to put faith before the 
safety of their congregation until faced with the reality of bombing.  
However, once the bombs fell on Clydebank the Catholic Church fell silent 
and accepted the fact that in the short term people’s safety was paramount 
and took precedence over religious welfare.   
 
There was a significant gap in the knowledge of the Scottish Jewish refugees 
and evacuees.  This was piecemeal throughout the substantial historiography 
of the kindertransport and the evacuation process.  It had been dealt with 
predominantly from an English perspective and, with the exception of 
secondary source history relating to Jewish evacuees, oral history testimony 
recorded few individual evacuees who strove to retain their own particular 
faith during their evacuation.  Jewish people had been stigmatised, 
imprisoned and killed in Germany because of their faith.  These atrocities 
undoubtedly influenced the work and effort of religious leaders, in particular 
the Chief Rabbi Schonfeld, who fought hard to retain the religious affiliation 
with their own particular denominations.  
 
Where historiography has dealt with religious welfare it contained 
predominantly anecdotal evidence.  Boyd’s study of evacuation in Scotland 
unusually included a religious case study, this focused on measuring how 
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quickly evacuees returned to their homes in Protestant and Roman Catholic 
families.  Quakers were never mentioned in the historiography relating to 
Scottish evacuees and Jews were mentioned only very sporadically.  Lloyd’s 
research, although valuable in so far as it recorded the correspondence 
between the Catholic Church and the government in Scotland, related to 
evacuation from a purely educational perspective.  Fitzpatrick’s study was 
also limited to measuring the effect of evacuation on Catholic secondary 
education.  
 
The argument that religious welfare was fundamental and integral to the 
wider story of evacuation during the war is evident from the level of Church 
involvement, especially by the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish 
community, as this chapter has shown.  War and evacuation brought a new 
level of understanding and tolerance within those communities forced 
together by war and evacuation.  As Fitzpatrick pointed out:  
 
The Catholic population acquired a new sense of “belonging” in the 
national life, and a new sense of unity with its neighbours.  The ghetto 
mentality, in so far as it continued to exist, suffered a sea-change.486 
 
The legislation contained in the Education (Scotland) Act of 1945 
effectively helped strengthen and promote further integration of the Roman 
Catholic sector into the wider community as Catholic schools and churches 
were built in the vicinity of the new towns of the post-war era.  The new 
towns were built to replace the slum tenements and the provision of new 
                                                 
486 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.98. 
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Catholic schools helped give Catholic children equal academic opportunities 
while allowing them to continue their religious education.   
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Chapter V  
 
The Effect of War and Evacuation on the Children Who 
Stayed in the Cities  
 
  
Those children who stayed behind may have rejoiced at the closing of 
their schools but hunger soon blunted their sense of euphoria.487 
 
This chapter will assess the effect of emergency wartime conditions on the 
education, health and welfare of stay-at-home children.  It will include those 
who effectively opted out by returning home within the first few weeks of 
the war. 
  
At the beginning of the war schools in major cities were closed.  In 
Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee many schools were closed for weeks or 
months, which meant that the children who stayed at home went without 
education and its associated ancillary services.  In reception areas evacuees 
continued to benefit from some form of formal education and were assured 
of free or subsidised meals and milk-in-schools programme as discussed in 
Chapter III.  These services were unavailable to children who stayed at home 
in the initial stages of the war, and as Oddy and Miller indicate above, after 
the initial euphoria of school closure settled down, the reality was that city 
children missed out on weeks or, in some places, months of school welfare 
services.   
                                                 
487 Derek J. Oddy and Derek S. Miller (eds.), Diet and Health in Modern Britain 
(Beckenham, 1985), p.197. 
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The argument running through this thesis is that warfare ultimately led to 
welfare and in order to assess the viability of this theory it is necessary to 
look at the effect of wartime measures on stay-at-home children.  In order to 
reach a valid judgement on how far the argument is sustained with regard to 
stay-at home children, there will be some focus on parliamentary debates 
from the period.  These will be used together with School Medical Officer 
reports and the results of intelligence tests from the Scottish Council for 
Research in Education carried out in 1931 and 1947.488  Boyd’s 1944 social 
survey will be beneficial in understanding why children and parents opted 
out of the evacuation scheme.489  Interviews with former evacuees will help 
provide a personal narrative of life in vulnerable city areas during the war. 
 
The fate of the children who remained in the cities and were exposed to life 
in war conditions has been particularly under researched in the context of the 
evacuation scheme.  In the main, historiography on the subject of evacuation 
is dictated by what happened to evacuees while they were in reception areas.  
Historians whose work included research into evacuation, such as Parsons, 
dedicated a few pages to the early return of evacuees but said nothing in 
particular about those who stayed at home.490  Brown,491 Inglis492 and 
Welshman493 all concentrate their final chapters on the children returning 
home, and Inglis looks at the effects of evacuation on later life.  The lack of 
consideration afforded to those stay-at-homes was undoubtedly due to the 
                                                 
488 The Population Investigation Committee and the Scottish Council for Research in 
Education, The Trend of Scottish Intelligence (London, 1949).  
489 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944). 
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high number of evacuees who returned within weeks of the scheme being 
implemented, therefore the fate of both groups merged in the war narrative 
on evacuation.   
 
Secondary literature on related areas of research of children’s health and 
nutrition include historians such as Bernard Harris.  His work on the subject 
relates to the period between the wars and during the Second World War and 
includes analysis of the School Medical Service in England and Wales.494  
This work will be used as a comparison with Scotland in the provision of 
welfare services.  Alongside this, Jacqueline Jenkinson’s book on Scotland’s 
health provides some important information concerning the impact of war on 
the health of schoolchildren.495   James Rusby’s psychological study of war 
and evacuation is particularly valuable here as it compares the long-term 
impact of stress on both evacuees and stay-at-home children.496     
 
The significant number of stay-at-home children had not been anticipated 
during the planning stages of the evacuation process.  The Evacuation 
Planning Committee, referred to in Chapters I and II, had been aware of the 
possibility of parents being reluctant to part with their children.  
Nevertheless there was an expectation that when the danger of children 
being exposed to war conditions was explained to parents, and the 
evacuation scheme placed before them, they would ‘probably be willing to 
                                                 
494 Bernard Harris, The Health of the Schoolchild: A history of the school medical service 
in England and Wales (Buckingham, 1995). 
495 Jenkinson, Scotland’s Health 1919-1948 (2002). 
496 Rusby, Childhood Temporary Separation (2005). 
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agree to part with their children’.  The reality of the situation was very 
different.497   
 
The number of Scottish children eligible for inclusion totalled 273,450.498  
This figure excluded mothers, teachers and helpers.  Boyd calculated that the 
number of Glasgow evacuees totalled 120,000 during the mass evacuation of 
September 1939, approximately 30,000 fewer than expected.  In Edinburgh 
the figure was 32,000, a third of the registered number, and in Clydebank 
only a quarter of those who registered turned up on evacuation days.499   
Boyd’s figures for evacuees include unaccompanied children, pre-school 
children accompanied by mothers, teachers and helpers.  The official 
Scottish evacuation figure recorded by Boyd was 175,812, although there is 
a small differential in figures between Boyd and Titmuss by over 700 
Scottish evacuees.  Titmuss recorded the number to be 175,066.500 
 
Boyd’s 1944 survey on Scottish evacuation included stay-at-homes.  This 
was as important at the time as it is now as it helped to ‘understand the 
personal side of evacuation’.501   Boyd used Clydebank as a case study and 
for comparative purposes looked at the evacuation areas of Glasgow and 
Dundee.502  Research included looking at the personal, social and emotional 
reasons parents gave for keeping children in the cities.  Questions ranged 
from family size, number of available rooms per household, through to 
                                                 
497 TNA. CAB/24/279. Report of Committee on Evacuation, July 1938, p.21. 
498 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.551. 
499 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.31. 
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501 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.77. 
502 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.81. 
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religious affiliation.  The survey also took account of private evacuation and 
the evacuation of teachers and helpers.503  Boyd also included details of 
home study group sessions, which were prompted by the lack of educational 
provision in the cities.  The scheme was unofficial, initiated by teachers and 
head teachers on a voluntary basis.  
 
The extent of the problem was emphasised by Neil Maclean, Labour MP for 
Govan. Two months into the war he claimed that in the area around the 
Clyde, 7,000 children were ‘running the streets and getting no education’, 
and that teachers were ‘doing their best to draw up plans to teach the 
children in their homes’.504  He said that: 
 
In many parts of Glasgow teachers have taken the children into their 
houses, and are giving tuition there.  If that can be done, it is high time 
that something was done by the government to provide education for 
those children who are running loose in the streets.505  
 
The home study scheme was successful in that it provided for approximately 
9,000 Glasgow children.  In Dundee there were eventually over 800 home 
study groups catering for thousands of children.  Meanwhile in Edinburgh, 
according to Lloyd, group teaching for stay-at-homes attracted positive 
media coverage.506  One such account was printed in the Scotsman:  
 
                                                 
503 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.83. 
504 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1101-1102. 
505 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1143-1144. 
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Throughout the city…individual pupils were receiving instruction for 
periods varying from four to seven hours per week and in some cases 
even more…some interesting and beneficial results…attended the 
group experiments.  The smaller numbers of children have made it 
possible to devote more attention to individuals.507 
 
This view was supported by Barbara who recalled coming home to 
Edinburgh after a short evacuation to Banff and being involved in a home 
study group.  She believed the experience was beneficial to her and she 
enjoyed the group.  She could not recall how many children were included 
or where it took place, although she remembered ‘it was in a big room in 
someone’s house’, and that the home study group lasted for at least a year.508  
Group teaching was an ad hoc arrangement, although its provision indicated 
a growing awareness of the need to ensure that children left in the cities 
should, where possible, be helped to achieve their full potential.    
 
In forming these home study groups teachers were doing what they could for 
children to maintain some contact with education.  Continuing a limited 
education programme would have been helpful to ease children back to full 
time education when the possibility arose.  As a welfare measure home study 
groups helped develop new relationships between parents, teachers and 
children and provided teachers with an understanding of some of the social 
problems children were coping with in their personal lives.509   
                                                 
507 The Scotsman, Thursday, 28 November 1939, p.12 
508 Interview with Barbara, dated 30 June 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
509 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.215. 
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According to Boyd there were 57,485 children in Edinburgh Corporation 
schools and of that 17,811 were included in the official evacuation scheme. 
He estimated that a total of 23,000 of those who had opted out had taken 
advantage of the home study scheme in some way.  Returning evacuees, he 
believed, also took advantage of the home study programme.  A difficulty 
with these group sessions was that they were confined to certain subjects 
such as English and arithmetic, and where possible, history and geography.  
Sessions were mainly held once or twice a week and were conducted in 
private houses, with between 7 to 30 primary and/or secondary pupils taking 
part in a group.  In academic terms it is difficult to assess the overall 
effectiveness of the home study programme other than to say it did keep 
children in touch with education.   
 
Boyd’s educational assessment centred on three sections of the school 
population in his Edinburgh study; infant, primary and secondary sectors and 
found that the infant group responded well to the programme and benefited 
from it.  They were found to be at their correct level or advanced for their 
age when a measure of their intelligence was recorded once the schools 
reopened.  Results from the primary sector, which had the greatest number 
of children, showed that the older and brighter children were less badly 
affected by the experience than those less able.  Teachers found that less 
able children fell behind in direct proportion to their intelligence.  In the 
secondary sector the brightest pupils advanced and progress was stable for 
those with average grades.510 
 
                                                 
510 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), pp. 214 and 219. 
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The decision making process by parents of children eligible for evacuation 
formed part of Boyd’s research.  This research was conducted by sending 
question cards to the parents of every seventh school child in his sample 
areas.  From the 674 respondents, Boyd calculated that in Clydebank 
Catholic boys were sent away in greater numbers than Catholic girls.  
Combined figures for Glasgow and Clydebank also show that more boys 
were evacuated under the official evacuation scheme than girls.  Private 
evacuees included marginally more girls than boys although there were 
fewer private evacuees among Catholic families.511   
 
Economics, Boyd suggested, played a significant part in the decision making 
process with better off families being less willing to send their children 
away.  The size of home and family size were also important factors.  In 
larger families parents were more willing to send their children away than in 
smaller families.  Contrary to this, the study showed that overall religious 
affiliation accounted for 62 per cent of Roman Catholic families unwilling to 
send their children away, as opposed to 35 per cent of Protestant families.512   
Catholic families were faced with an additional problem as Fitzpatrick 
pointed out.  He noted that approximately 70 per cent of the Scottish 
Catholic population lived in industrial towns and cities, the majority of 
whom lived in and around the Glasgow area.  As a result most Catholic 
primary and secondary schools were located in these areas.  As stated before 
it was not always possible therefore to guarantee that Catholic children 
                                                 
511 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.85 
512 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.87. 
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would be taught in Catholic schools in reception areas.  This, he claimed, 
was especially disruptive to secondary education.513      
 
A comparative study of reasons for evacuation and non-evacuation in 
Dundee revealed a similar pattern.  One important issue which was more 
pronounced there than in Clydebank or Glasgow, for non-evacuation, was 
that older siblings were needed in the home.  These children were given 
greater responsibility for taking care of the home and their younger siblings, 
when married women went to work in the city mills.514   It is perfectly 
feasible to assume that this was the case in other cities, especially as jobs for 
women gradually expanded in wartime industries.  When considering the 
issue of stay-at-homes in England and Wales, Titmuss demonstrated his 
reliance on the findings of surveys carried out, especially by Boyd.  His 
discourse on the subject was interspersed with the language of possibility. 
Commenting that:  
 
The factors responsible…were no doubt as varied and inexplicable as 
human behaviour in general… [and] The amount and intensity of 
poverty in some of the evacuation districts may have contributed to 
this confused statistical pattern.515 
 
There was of course the emotional aspect of separating parents and children, 
and when the plans for evacuation became reality many parents simply could 
not be parted from their children.  These emotions Titmuss referred to as 
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being reflected in, ‘the revolution in standards of child care which divides 
the nineteenth from the twentieth century’.516 
 
An expert on child care, Charles McNeil who was wartime Professor of 
Child Life and Health at Edinburgh University regarded the process of 
evacuation as ‘a great social earthquake’.  This underlines the seismic effect 
it had on families in the first weeks of war.517  His description was 
appropriate in the short-term as the evacuation scheme disrupted the lives, 
health and education of evacuees.  For children who were not included in the 
evacuation process, the closure of schools meant that they suffered from a 
lack of education and the benefits of the ancillary services connected to it 
including free milk, school meals and medical inspections.   
 
A few days after McNeil’s comments Colville, (Scottish Secretary) played 
down the impact of evacuation.  In a Commons speech he stated that: 
 
…our educational system is adjusting itself to the abnormal conditions 
in which we are living.  It has had to sacrifice a good deal, but there is 
no suggestion of wreckage.518 
 
In spite of attempts by the Scottish Secretary and the SED to reassure people 
how well the school system was adapting to war conditions in the aftermath 
of evacuation, according to Lloyd, education in the Scottish sending areas 
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‘completely collapsed’.519  Lloyd based his argument on the severe 
disruption to the educational system in and around Glasgow where, he 
believed, many disadvantaged children failed to receive a sufficient 
education, including supplementary services, for the duration of the war.520     
 
Abnormal conditions affecting the educational system began with the 
instigation of the evacuation scheme.  Furthermore, the day on which war 
was declared coincided with the appointed date for the school leaving age to 
be raised from 14 to 15 years.  This promised reform was included in the 
1936 Education Act but was postponed indefinitely on the declaration of 
war. 
 
Education historians such as Paterson and Lloyd are generally in agreement 
that the Second World War caused considerable damage to Scottish 
education.  Paterson, for example, believed that war had a ‘disastrous effect 
on education’.521  This ‘disastrous’ effect included school closure in 
evacuation areas and overcrowded classrooms in areas where schools 
remained open.  While overcrowding and a double-shift systems was in 
operation in many rural areas, schools in reception areas remained open 
throughout the period of the war, which gave evacuated children an 
advantage over stay-at-home children in terms of education.  However, these 
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areas suffered from a shortage of staff through the enforcement of national 
service.          
 
Staffing in evacuation areas was problematic as teachers were required to 
accompany their class to reception areas and remain with the children for the 
duration of hostilities.  This effectively left a shortfall in available teachers 
when city schools were eventually reopened.  When the initial survey was 
carried out by evacuation planners it was found that only 50 per cent of 
teachers showed a willingness to take part in the process.522  Lloyd 
calculated that approximately 3,500 Scottish teachers were included in the 
evacuation process.523  Their tasks extended beyond the classroom and 
included making sure the children were active in leisure as well as 
academically, they were effectively to be in loco parentis.  It is not possible 
to assess how far the constant presence of teachers was helpful in 
maintaining an educational balance in the lives of evacuees.  Non-teaching 
staff were included in similar arrangements to that of teachers. These 
included school medical officers, school nurses, school attendance officers 
and administrative staff who were sent to evacuation areas, again leaving 
city schools without the benefit of a quota of ancillary staff when schools 
reopened. 
 
The evacuation of teachers and the closure of schools in evacuation areas 
caused severe disruption to the broader welfare of stay-at-home children.   
Government officials were well aware of the problems as Colville, in a 
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statement to the Commons, pointed out.  He commented that he understood 
the problem and confirmed that the sending areas of Edinburgh, Glasgow 
and Dundee were providing meals and/or clothing for 11,000 in receiving 
areas, and that the milk in schools scheme had been available throughout.  
The situation was that: 
  
…the lack of the usual distributing centres, that is to say, the 
schools…in the sending areas, has [mitigated] to some extent against 
the operation of the scheme for children who have not been 
evacuated.524 
 
Schools in the centre of Glasgow forced to close due to evacuation included 
Notre Dame Primary where the school log book recorded on 1 September 
1939 that: 
 
School closed as evacuation begun.  All teachers of this school have 
accompanied children who are being evacuated for various 
parishes.525 
 
The next entry does not appear in this school’s log book until 6 October 
1939 when it seems that efforts were being made to accommodate stay-at-
home children in school.  The note said ‘Groups of 20 children taken in 
various rooms left to our disposal’. 
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Similar entries appear in the log books for other schools in and around 
Glasgow city centre.  Garscadden Primary school, in the north-west of the 
city closed on 1 September 1939.  It was not until 27 November 1939 that 
the next entry was recorded noting that:  The school re-opened today with a 
limited attendance of 40 pupils.526  
 
The children of Quarry Brae School were assembled early on 29 August 
1939, the log book noted that:   
  
 The School re-opened today instead of September as intimated. 
Owing to the very serious international situation.  Scholars, pre-school 
children and parents assembled in school at 7 a.m. and were evacuated 
to Stricken, Aberdeenshire on Sunday 3 September.527  
 
At St Paul’s Junior Secondary Roman Catholic School in Whiteinch, 424 
pupils and all members of staff were evacuated to Prestwick in Ayrshire on 2 
September.  The school did not re-open until 28 November when a group 
system of attendance was introduced for stay-at-home children.  It was not 
until 19 February 1940 that sufficient air raid shelters were provided to 
allow full time instruction for ‘senior and top junior pupils’ with the low 
junior and infants in half-time attendance.528  The pattern was almost 
                                                 
526 SR10/3/642/1/1. School log book for Garscadden Primary School, Glasgow, Mitchell 
Library, Glasgow, 1928-1963. 
527 SR10/3/775/1/1.  School log book for Quarry Brae School, Glasgow, Mitchell Library, 
Glasgow, 1924-1959. 
528 D-ED7/253/1/2. School log book for St Paul’s Junior Secondary Roman Catholic 
School, Whiteinch, Mitchell Library, Glasgow, 1905-1939. 
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identical for Scotland Street School,529 Gorbals Public School,530 Govan 
High School,531 and at the Junior Department of Hillhead High School, 
where registration ceased between 1 September 1939 and 12 February 
1940.532 
 
In a number of Dundee schools, such as Morgan Academy, Harris Academy 
and Grove Academy, the aim was to have at least 60 per cent of the roll 
accommodated as quickly as possible, provided they could satisfy the ARP 
authorities that there was adequate shelter accommodation.  Opening the 
secondary schools was the top priority with fifth and sixth year pupils 
having first claim on the available space for full-time instruction and the 
lower school having a minimum of half-day teaching.533  Primary schools in 
the city were to be arranged in such a way that premises could be shared 
between at least two schools in some areas.  This was the case for such 
primaries as Butterburn and Hill Street, Clepington and Dens Road and St. 
Martin’s and SS Peter and Paul.  In October schools opened for medical 
inspections and, where possible, feeding necessitous children providing ‘the 
numbers assembling at any one time [were] small’.534  
 
                                                 
529 D-ED7/275/1/1.  School log book for Scotland Street School, Glasgow, Mitchell 
Library, Glasgow, 1906-1944. 
530 D-ED7/86/1/5. School log book for Gorbals Public School, Glasgow, Mitchell 
Library, Glasgow, 1938-1971. 
531 D-ED7/87/1/4. School log book for Govan High School, Glasgow, Mitchell Library, 
Glasgow, 1923-1941. 
532 SR10/3/663/1/3. Admissions Register for Hillhead High School, Junior Department, 
Mitchell Library, Glasgow, 1937-1951. 
533 Dundee City Archives (DCA). Summary of Meetings of the Education Committee 
held at Dundee, 29 September and 6 October 1939.   
534 DCA. Summary of Meeting of the Education Committee held at Dundee on 24 
October 1939. 
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In and around Edinburgh school records show that the situation was very 
similar.  The most significant difference was that most Edinburgh schools 
recorded an association with the group study programme.  South Bridge 
School log book showed that on 1 September 1939, from a roll of over 1000 
children, 840 were evacuated, 600 to Newport and the others to Wormit.  By 
2 October staff were visiting stay-at-homes to arrange for group instruction 
which by that date amounted to 730 pupils.  The scheme was underway by 9 
October for groups of 12 children at a time, to be taught in various rooms 
put at the disposal of the school by such places as the public baths, the Royal 
Scottish Museum, Pleasance Church and the Total Abstinence Society.  
Pupils from the school on average received four to five hours instruction per 
week.  A total of between 80 and 90 per cent of children attended.  The last 
of this outside accommodation was given up by 5 February 1940 when all 
pupils were accommodated in the school.535 
 
North Merchiston School log book recorded the departure of 477 children 
and adults at the start of September.  Again by October a group teaching 
scheme was in place.  This school was re-opened on 8 January 1940 with a 
double shift system in operation.  By March attendance levels had reached 
almost the full quota with 590 pupils in attendance.536  Dean, Liberton, 
Cannonmills and Castlehill schools adopted similar patterns.537  Each of 
                                                 
535 Edinburgh City Archives (ECA). SL214/1/4, South Bridge School Log Book 1935-
1948. 
536 ECA. SL202/1/3, North Merchiston School Log Book, 1933-1956. 
537 ECA. SL180/1/5, Dean School, no date given. SL196/1/4, Liberton School, 1936-
1965.  SL173/1/6, Cannonmills School, no date given. SL174/1/3, Castlehill School, 
1931-1951. 
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these Edinburgh schools had air-raid accommodation in place by early 1940 
to allow teaching to resume on the school premises.    
 
These are just a few examples of city schools where teaching had ceased at 
the beginning of the war.  These log books demonstrate the sense of urgency 
shown in getting as many schools as possible re-opened.  It should be noted 
however, that attendance could not be made compulsory in time of war for 
children in sending areas, and the reopening of city schools depended 
entirely on how far the safety of children and staff could be guaranteed.  The 
potential for air raid strikes to cause significant damage and incur casualties 
was especially problematic in Glasgow due to the age and design of the 
buildings; many of these old city school buildings had school rolls ranging 
from 1,000 to 2,000 children.  It was important therefore that air-raid 
protection criteria be met before any school could be reopened.538  Colville 
advised members of the Commons that: 
 
A school may open subject to certain conditions [for example] that it 
is not in a vulnerable spot, and that satisfactory air-raid protection is 
available.…expert advice is taken from the officials of the Ministry of 
Home Security as to the amount of protection that is required…the 
A.R.P. authority have to be satisfied before a school can be 
reopened.539 
 
                                                 
538 Lloyd, The Scottish School System and the Second World War, Thesis for Doctor of 
Philosophy, October 1979 (held at Stirling University Library), p.65. 
539 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol 353, cc. 1097-1098. 
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Glasgow’s private schools faced the same challenges in ensuring the safety 
of pupils and maintaining some form of continued education.  There was a 
distinct difference in the evacuation situation for private school pupils when 
compared with other official evacuees.  This was apparent from interviews 
with two former pupils of Laurel Bank Girls’ School.  The school was 
offered accommodation in Auchterarder House and Strathallan Castle, with 
some seniors and staff being housed in surrounding areas.  Research into the 
situation within the private schools environment shows that these children 
were not forced into cold church halls, or suffer the humiliation of being 
lined up for inspection before being chosen by benevolent householders.  
For those girls from Laurel Bank School who were not evacuated, classes 
were organised in a similar way to the home study groups in Edinburgh until 
suitable shelters were built at the school.  One former pupil of Laurel Bank 
School remembered being evacuated to Strathallan Castle and being brought 
home after six weeks.  She recalled: 
 
The juniors were all in Strathallan Castle…I was only there for, at the 
very most six weeks, but I don’t think I was even that length of time.  
…ex-Headmistress reopened the school, she was retired…and she ran 
it for the whole war.  …We used to have an air raid warning parade 
every day.  ...They sent us home when the sirens went off.  …School 
days were shortened or lengthened depending on the blackout time.  
As the war progressed we more or less went back to our normal 
time.540 
 
                                                 
540 Interview with Honour, recorded on 13 November 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
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Laurel Bank School was re-opened within less than two months of war being 
declared.  Shelters were built and the retired Headmistress and former 
teachers came back and remained at the school for the duration of the war.   
 
Park School was fully re-opened by 4 October 1939 with sufficient air raid 
shelter accommodation and the majority of the 270 pupils on the school roll 
were once more being taught in Glasgow.541  The girls from Hutcheson 
Grammar School were evacuated to Sandquhar, near Ayr, and the boys’ 
school was closed but not evacuated.  It quickly re-opened with fifteen air 
raid shelters built in the playground.542  At Glasgow Academy pupils were 
not evacuated and arrangements were made to teach children in private 
houses until shelter accommodation could be constructed.  It has been 
estimated that by late September 1939 over four hundred pupils were being 
taught in this way.  By the end of the year there were at least seven hundred 
boys being taught at the Academy which equated to 85 per cent of the 
original school roll.543     
  
The re-opening of state schools in evacuation areas was hampered further by 
the fact that a number of schools had been taken over for military and first 
aid purposes.  For example, Colville mentioned in the November debate that 
77 schools had been occupied for military or civil defence purposes, and that 
222 were partially occupied and available only in part for teaching purposes.  
He did not name the schools in question.  He claimed that attempts were 
                                                 
541 Joan Lightwood, The Park School 1880-1980 (Glasgow, 1980), p.99. 
542 A.D. Dunlop, Hutchesons’ Grammar: The History of a Glasgow School (Glasgow, 
1992), p.116. 
543 Iain MacLeod, The Glasgow Academy: 150 Years (Glasgow, 1997), pp.134-135. 
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made to have some schools which had been requisitioned returned to the 
Education Authorities.  These schools were in vulnerable areas where fewer 
children took up the evacuation offer than anticipated.544 
 
Vulnerable or sending areas included Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Rosyth 
and Clydebank.  After 1941, Dumbarton, Greenock and Port Glasgow were 
added to this list.  Reception areas for children from Edinburgh were in the 
north such as Banff and Inverness or in the borders, including Peebles, 
Roxburgh and Selkirk.   Glasgow children were sent north to areas around 
Aberdeen and Perthshire, or further south-west to such places as 
Kirkcudbright and Dumfries.  Neutral areas which had the potential to 
become danger zones included areas around Ayr, Lanark, Renfrew and some 
of the burghs in Aberdeen, Inverness and Midlothian.545   
 
By November 1939, in 9 of the 12 neutral areas schools had been wholly or 
partially reopened and the needs of necessitous children were being met, but 
19 schools in the neutral areas of Dumbarton, Fife and West Lothian 
remained closed.  Some of these buildings were being used for defence 
purposes and Colville confirmed that as far as possible the government was 
doing all it could to counter the educational problem of school closure in the 
cities.  He said that: 
  
…in evacuation areas, many of the secondary schools [had] been open 
for several weeks, and work [was] going on, in the way of air-raid 
                                                 
544 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1099-1100. 
545 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.6. 
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protection, to enable other schools, including the primary schools, to 
reopen where at all practicable.546 
 
Although mass school closures had been temporary at the outbreak of war, 
evacuation forced children into a compromised educational situation.  In the 
reception areas schools were often overcrowded and many operated a 
double-shift system.  In cities when schools were closed, children were left 
without education for an indeterminate time and when they re-opened there 
were often classes of up to 40 or 50 children.  In Glasgow class sizes were 
particularly high.  The number of primary classes with over 50 children rose 
from 62 in 1939 to 83 in 1945. In the secondary sector the number of classes 
with over 40 children rose from 50 to 167.547  
 
 
When schools did re-open it was not possible to make attendance 
compulsory.  With too much free time and lack of structure and discipline 
provided by the educational system, there emerged a heightened awareness 
of delinquency problems among juveniles.  The Scottish Women’s Group on 
Public Welfare associated some of the problems connected with juvenile 
delinquency to evacuation.  It also attributed delinquency to a decline of 
discipline in the home, due in part to the absence of patriarchal control when 
husbands/fathers were called up.548   
 
                                                 
546 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1096-1097. 
547 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.406. 
548 Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns (1944), p.41. 
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Members of Parliament were sensitive to the issue of youth crime associated 
with school closure in the cities.  Thomas Cassells, Labour MP for 
Dunbartonshire, said he feared for the future of children where schools in 
evacuation areas were closed indefinitely.  He believed education and/or 
environment was to blame for juvenile delinquency.  His worry was that:  
 
If these children are to be left to run loose and wild in the streets, what 
will be the position in the years to come?  …I have been going about 
from court to court in Scotland dealing with questions relating to 
juvenile crime.  …juvenile delinquency [traced] back to its origin 
[found] either that the environment has been largely responsible or 
that the child has not received the educational opportunities to which 
it was legally and morally entitled.549    
 
Joseph Westwood, Labour MP for Stirling and Falkirk, also felt it was: 
 
…a tragedy that so many children who were evacuated to areas which 
were considered comparatively safe, should have returned and that 
large numbers of them should be running wild in our streets without 
guidance or discipline, without educational and physical 
instruction…something must be done and done speedily, to arrest the 
damage which is being caused in this way to the child life of the 
nation.550   
 
                                                 
549 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1137-1138. 
550 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1088-1089.  
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The subject of juvenile delinquency was dealt with in chapter III.  It is 
mentioned here as it concerned educationalists and government sufficiently 
to push to reopen secondary schools in evacuation areas as a priority.  A 
SED circular from February 1940 expressed government concern over the 
damage to social, medical and educational provision, caused in the five 
months of school closures.  It said that: 
 
…Authorities should set themselves the ultimate goal of providing 
full-time education for all children, including infants.  …where 
physical difficulties make it impossible to provide full-time schooling 
in present circumstances, less formal occupations, eg on the lines of 
the home service scheme and educational visits, should be organised 
for the remainder of the school day.551 
 
The home study groups in both Glasgow and Edinburgh helped to keep 
some children in touch with education, although the lack of discipline and 
loss of opportunity also applied to children aged 14 who had left school at 
the beginning of the war.  Continuation classes for school leavers had been 
suspended due to lack of teachers, and accommodation and their 
employment prospects were hampered by the suspension of Senior and 
Junior Leaving Certificates.  This meant that prospective employers had no 
measure of attainment reached on leaving school.  Some level of 
understanding of the situation can been gleaned from the situation in 
Edinburgh, where there were approximately 1,400 young teenagers 
unemployed in the first few months of the war.552   The situation was eased 
                                                 
551 NAS. ED44/1/12. Circular No. 155 Scottish Education Department, 7 February 1940. 
552 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1127-1128. 
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for some when the Senior Leaving Certificate was re-introduced.  However, 
the Education Department continued the suspension of the Junior Leaving 
Certificate.  This effectively meant that juveniles, which included 14 year 
olds who had left school at the start of the war, could still be discriminated 
against by employers.   
 
Staff shortages and lack of accommodation prevented young teenagers from 
taking advantage of the benefits afforded by youth services such as 
continuation classes or attending junior instruction centres.553  The fact that 
teenagers lacked suitable facilities for employing their spare time in a useful 
way was the subject of a circular issued November 1939.  The circular 
followed Colville’s request to the SED that there was an urgent need make 
provision for the welfare of young people over 14 years.  The circular 
stressed that:   
 
…the need for action [had] become more urgent as a result of the 
inevitable dislocations and strain of war.  Young people [were] 
affected by changes in employment, by the long dark evenings and by 
the absence of one or both parents.554   
 
Behaviour was a subject included in Boyd’s 1944 survey although he was 
sceptical about the results which he claimed presented possibly a more 
‘flattering’ picture of stay-at-homes than in reality.  He felt the questionnaire 
was too vague on the issue and claimed that no parent would have specified 
                                                 
553 H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1127-1128 
554 NAS. ED/44/1/12. Circular 142, Scottish Education Department, 27 November 1939. 
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the ‘badness of bad behaviour’.  Yet Boyd concluded that no school could 
escape the effects of total war and that:  
 
…the general impression left on the observer was that the conduct of 
those set free from schooling in the early months of the war was 
surprisingly good.555  
 
In contrast Titmuss believed that makeshift lessons, crowded classrooms and 
severed relationships with teachers were contributory factors in the rise in 
juvenile crime, in both stay-at-homes and evacuees.  However, when it came 
to passing judgement, he believed, people were quick to forget the 
circumstances children had forced upon them.  They were no longer 
regarded as children who had spent their formative years escaping bombs 
and living in improvised conditions, but as young criminals.  Writing in 
1950, Titmuss stated his belief that such children had been let down by 
home and school, and expressed disappointment that little account was taken 
of the fact that they had endured six years of war.556   
 
For stay-at-homes conditions continued to be problematic even after schools 
reopened.  Shortage of accommodation, materials and teachers, coupled with 
overcrowded classrooms allowed little opportunity for any meaningful 
individual teaching.  
 
Ultimately a measure of how educational standards were affected by the 
challenges of war, evacuation and non-evacuation, is shown in the outcome 
                                                 
555 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), pp.89-90. 
556 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.410. 
 237 
of a series of tests by the Scottish Council for Research in Education 
(SCRE).  The SCRE was established in 1928 by the Scottish teachers’ union 
(the Educational Institute for Scotland), and the Association of Directors of 
Education, to measure attainment levels in children of 11 years old.  
Attainment levels in children was recorded in 1932 and a similar test was 
carried out in 1947, to detect any discernible changes in intelligence levels 
during the 15 years.  Their cohort group in 1932 comprised of 80,000 
children of 11 years of age.  In 1947 the total number of 11 year old children 
tested was 70,806.  Allowances were made for changes in the Binet 
Intelligence Test, (a cognitive ability and intelligence test used to diagnose 
development or cognitive deficiencies in young children) which was carried 
out in 1932, to the Terman-Merrill test of 1947.557   The research found 
evidence of a slight rise in intelligence levels in Scottish schoolchildren in 
the period, with the average score for 1932 recorded at 34.5 rising to 36.7 in 
1947, in a test with a maximum of 76 points.  This was counter to the SCRE 
hypothesis that war could have had a disturbing effect on the results.558       
This survey may be used here as a very rough guide to educational 
attainment of Scottish children during the years of war.  The 1947 survey 
took account of the fact that children had been subjected to six years of war 
and that many of the children were suffering from emotional disturbance 
related to evacuation.  The 1947 survey adopted a more sociological 
approach with a random-sample group being sent a questionnaire which 
included a few questions on evacuation as it was thought that such a 
separation could cause ‘confusion and unhappiness’ and might ‘retard the 
                                                 
557 www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com . [Accessed 18 May 2014]. 
558 The Population Investigation Committee and The Scottish Council for Research in 
Education, The Trend of Scottish Intelligence (1949), p.viii.   
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educational progress of the child’.559  In both the original 1932 survey and 
the 1947 survey family size and position of the 11 year old in the family 
were taken into consideration.  The similarity of the sets of results between 
the two surveys was due, according to the surveyors, to the fact that while 
the education of the children tested in 1947 had been disturbed by war, this 
was, they considered, counterbalanced by the fact that the 1932 cohort may 
have been adversely affected from the years of depression following the 
Wall Street Crash in 1929.560  This experience was considered equal to the 
trauma of evacuation during the war.  The explanation put forward for this 
conclusion is somewhat surprising, as it is difficult to equate severe financial 
hardship impacted on families by the depression of the 1930s with the 
trauma of family separation involved in evacuation.  Taken in the context of 
the time, with school closure, double shift systems, overcrowded classrooms 
and home study programmes, it would have been unsurprising if the Scottish 
survey had shown a decline in educational attainment in 1947.  Comparative 
English school test result findings support the view that Scotland suffered 
less disruption in educational attainment levels than children in England and 
Wales during the war.  
 
The Scottish results can be compared favourably with the intelligence test 
carried out between 1924 and 1946, conducted by the Education Committee 
of London County Council, on children in England and Wales between 13 
and 14 years old.  Tests concluded that in general the attainment levels in 
that age group in 1946 were significantly lower than children of the same 
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p.4. 
 239 
age in 1924.  As with the Scottish test results, the two English surveys were 
not identical.  Differences include the fact that in 1946 London children 
involved in the survey would have been seven or eight years old when war 
began.  As teenagers they had just emerged from six years of war, the 
memory of which was evident in and around the bombed areas of London.  
This was coupled with significant disruption to the educational system 
especially in the early months of the war.   
 
There are a number of potential reasons for the discrepancies between the 
two sets of results for English school children.  Examples include the fact 
that the First and the Second World War were staged very differently; the 
First World War was not fought on the Home Front; children tested in 1924 
had lived through six years of peace and the majority of the cohort would 
have been eight years old at the end of the First World War.  Furthermore, 
unlike the argument used in the Scottish test where the first cohort had lived 
through the years of depression in the early 1930s, this would not have been 
a factor in the 1924 English test results.  The significant disruption to the 
educational system in England as a result of war was emphasised in 
Titmuss’s research.  He reported that of the 72,000 young army recruits in 
1946, who would have been in school during the early part of the war, there 
was an ‘all-round drop in the level of scholastic attainment, and a serious 
increase in the numbers graded educationally backward’.561    
 
For Scottish children in 1947, the positive attainment levels meant that 
education had suffered less than had been anticipated as a result of war and 
                                                 
561 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.409. 
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evacuation.  Nevertheless these results cannot be seen as conclusive proof 
that the education of schoolchildren generally did not suffer unduly from the 
disruptive effects of war.  As the cohort group consisted of 11 year old 
children only, there is a possibility that had younger or older children been 
tested the results may not have been as favourable, with the English survey 
of 13 and 14 year olds providing an indication of uneven development. 
 
In terms of the physical welfare of Scottish school children the gradual 
reopening of schools meant that medical inspections could resume.  From 
Harris’s study of the growth rate in children between 1939 and 1945 there 
appears to be no apparent decline in the physical wellbeing of children due 
to lack of school ancillary services in the period when schools were closed.  
He found that in Glasgow there was a slight increase in height in girls and 
boys, in all stages, i.e. entrants, intermediates and school leavers, during the 
six years of war.  In Dunbartonshire, he claimed, there was a slight drop in 
height ratio for school leavers, attributed, it was thought ‘to a change in the 
age at which the children were measured’.562  Harris argued for the 
importance of anthropometric ratios since height, he claimed, proved a 
‘powerful index of social and economic disadvantage.563  He stressed that 
nutritional standards for children in England and Wales had improved during 
the Second World War.564  In 1943 Tom Johnston, Secretary of State for 
Scotland indicated increased budget levels for education, which included 
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additional spending on food for schoolchildren and youth welfare.  Setting 
out items of enhanced expenditure to parliament he noted:  
 
 £9,021,790, an increase of £187,520 over the estimates for 1942.  
Spent on school meals and milk, the development of youth services, 
the supplement to teachers on war service.565 
 
The scale of increase in the provision of school meals can be observed from 
the City of Edinburgh School Medical Officer of Health report for 1940.  It 
was estimated that the number of school meals provided, either free or at a 
cost of 2s.6d, between January and May 1940 amounted to £848,308, and 
milk had been supplied to 14,800 school children, representing 103,124 
gallons.566  The number of dinners increased from 35,000 in July 1941, to 
78,000 in May 1942.  By June 1943 the number of children taking school 
meals had risen to 140,000.   
Efforts to expand access to school meals and milk resulted in an average 
weight gain among school children according to figures produced in 1942.  
In his speech to parliament in 1943 Johnstone reported that boys on average 
were 2.5lbs heavier and girls just over 2lbs heavier than those aged five 
years ending with the outbreak of war.  Scotland as a whole, he said, had 16 
per cent of children receiving school dinners and 19 per cent receiving 
dinners, lunches or soup meals, where in the previous year only 8 per cent of 
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children were receiving school dinners.567  The rise in height and weight of 
schoolchildren was confirmed for Glasgow where the 1940s average 
increase for thirteen year old boys amounted to a weight increase of 2.90 lbs, 
and height by 0.75 inch.  For girls of the same age weight increase was 2.94 
lbs and height increase was 0.72 inch, as compared with the pre-war five 
year period 1935-1939.568  (See Chapter III for figures for the overall 
improvement in the height and weight of schoolchildren during the war).  
 
The notion that warfare led to extended welfare is evident from the wartime 
observations of Sir Alexander MacGregor, Glasgow Medical Officer of 
Health.  He noted an almost 9 per cent improvement in the overall health of 
school entrants compared with the pre-war figures.569  Arguably enhanced 
nutrition was coupled with improvements in children’s dental health.  This 
can be observed from the Medical Officer of Health Reports for East 
Lothian towns which show a decline in the number of extractions of 
temporary and permanent teeth between 1939 and 1950.  In the 12 months 
from June 1939, 310 children were inspected in Haddington, West Barns, 
North Berwick, Prestonpans and Tranent Public Schools.  Of that number 
there were 184 extractions of permanent teeth, 341 extractions of temporary 
teeth and 134 fillings.  By March 1949 in these areas the number of children 
inspected was 1583 and the number of permanent teeth extracted was 92 for 
caries (or cavities) and 35 for regulation purposes, 245 extractions for 
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temporary teeth and 175 fillings.570  These figures show a marked 
improvement, especially in the number of permanent teeth extracted.  Areas 
around Perthshire produced similar figures.  Statistics from the Medical 
Officer of Health Report for Perth and Kinross showed a marked 
improvement in the number of permanent extractions; down from 1415 
between 1938/39 to 785 between 1944/45.571  More broadly this report 
noted: 
 
…judging from the figures for nutrition, height and weights, there is 
no evidence that wartime conditions have affected adversely the 
health of school children…In the case of evacuees from large cities, 
significant improvements in weight and general health were seen in 
those who remained in the area…572        
 
In the capital, Edinburgh Medical Officer of Health report submitted in 1941 
showed that dental checks were carried out on 13,427 children, of whom 
10,820 required treatment.  Patients treated at the school dental clinic 
amounted to 6,615.573  These figures show that while improved dental 
checks and treatment was being administered there was nevertheless much 
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work still required to make people, especially parents, aware of the great 
importance of oral hygiene.     
   
Evacuated children were not alone in benefitting from wartime health 
improvements.  In Edinburgh the results of clinical inspections for 
cleanliness and childhood contagious diseases showed a similar upward 
trend.  Inspections were carried out on 27,333 children in Edinburgh schools 
in March and June 1940.  Of the 13,581 with reported defects in the initial 
examination the figure was reduced to 12,894 on re-examination.574 
 
The results of the intelligence test, health surveys and dental inspection 
discussed so far in this chapter implies that generally there was minimal 
long-term damage to the education and/or health of children during the war.  
However, issues of equal importance relate to the emotional stress of war on 
both stay-at-homes and evacuees.  Foster et.al, noted that the percentage of 
stay-at-homes who received psychological therapy for distress in adulthood 
was 9.3 per cent as opposed to 29 per cent of evacuees.575  Positive results 
were countered by a different type of problem suffered by stay-at-homes.  In 
2007 Waugh et. al., investigated the levels of post-traumatic stress in both 
evacuees and stay-at-home children.  They found that stay-at-home children 
                                                 
574  NAS. HH62/60. City and Royal Burgh of Edinburgh Public Health Department, 
Annual Report on the Health of the City during 1940 by the Medical Officer of Health.  
Submitted August 1941, p.21. 
575 D. Foster, S. Davis & H. Steele, ‘The evacuation of British children during World War 
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who had been exposed to the impact of air-raids and the aftermath of 
bombing showed higher levels of PTS than evacuees.576   
 
There were no significant psychological studies carried out on Scottish 
adults who were children during the Second World War.  However, 
qualitative research conducted for this thesis indicated that the effect of 
bombing on those children who lived through the blitz on Clydebank were 
no less traumatic than being evacuated.  The memory of air raids and 
bombing is vividly recalled by the people of Clydebank who, as children, 
lived through the constant air raids and the blitz of March 1941.  Over 
seventy years on Charlie has never forgotten how he rescued his brother 
from their home when it was hit by an incendiary bomb.  He said: 
 
Alistair was screaming his head off and wouldn’t come out of the 
corner.  I jumped back in and we both jumped out together.  By this 
time the whole house was on fire and the bombs just kept falling all 
around us.577              
 
The clear recall related to the trauma of bombing is countered by the fact 
that he remembered very little of the time spent in Coatbridge when he, with 
his mother and brothers, were evacuated there after the raids.  His only 
memory of that time was the cramped conditions where the whole family 
lived in one room. 
                                                 
576 Melinda J. Waugh, Ian Robbins, Stephen Davis & Janet Feigenbaum, ‘The long-term 
impact of war experiences and evacuation on people who were children during World 
War Two’, Aging and Mental Health, 11:2 (2007), p.172.  
577 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014.  Transcript held with author.  
 246 
 
Dennis also lived through the two nights of bombing in Clydebank.  He 
recalled what he described as ‘the horrible recurring nightmare’ and of being 
‘stressed out’ with nights of broken sleep for months afterwards and never 
having ‘a doctor come up and give you a wee sedative’.578  Dennis and his 
family were taken to Coatbridge after the blitz and spent two nights sleeping 
in a primary school on the floor in one of the classrooms.   
 
The years have not diminished memories of the traumatic effect the bombing 
raids had on the people who lived through them.  Violet, was 18 years old 
when Clydebank was bombed.  Aged 91 when interviewed, she still 
remembered vividly how she and her mother attempted to stay in Clydebank 
after the first of the raids.  Forced to evacuate, they eventually got to 
Helensburgh and stayed there until their home was rebuilt in Clydebank.579  
Measured against the trauma of separation suffered by evacuated children, 
the experience of being bombed-out among these stay-at-home children had 
similar short and long-term emotional impact. 
 
This chapter set out to assess the effect of emergency wartime conditions on 
stay-at-home children.  The initial problems connected with the closure of 
city schools at the beginning of the war provided the impetus for urgent 
official intervention to ensure as many schools as possible be reopened.  Yet 
the results of Scottish intelligence tests have shown that there was no 
significant long-term damage to children’s education during the war.  This 
may have been due to the action of teachers and local authorities rather than 
                                                 
578 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 17 October 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
579 Interview with Violet, recorded on 17 October 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
 247 
any government initiative.  The fact that teachers in evacuation areas were 
pro-active in the delivery of group teaching sessions provided children with 
a continuous link with education.   
 
Any immediate physical deterioration in nutritional levels, due to the lack of 
ancillary services while schools were closed, was eventually made good 
when schools reopened and city children could take full advantage of 
extended provision of the school meals and milk-in-schools schemes.  The 
warfare to welfare theory is particularly apparent here.  School closures due 
to war and evacuation had helped to provide a tool for greater official input 
into improvements in education and the eventual passing of the Education 
Acts of 1944 and 1945 which provided for an expanded and inclusive school 
health and educational service.  Positive health implications of the 
legislation included early intervention by experts in the diagnosis and 
treatment of childhood diseases and improved dental care and dental 
hygiene. 
 
Arguably the passing of the Education Act in 1944 in England, and 1945 in 
Scotland was in part a response to the need for reform brought about by the 
war and evacuation.  Responsibility for the passing of the Act lay in the 
hands of Lord Butler.  R. A. Butler was appointed President of the Board of 
Education in 1941.  In his memoirs he claimed to have been given, ‘the 
opportunity to harness to the educational system the wartime urge for social 
reform and greater equality’.  Evacuation, he commented, had caused ‘a 
severe shock to the national conscience’, and that it had ‘brought to light the 
conditions of those unfortunate children of the ‘submerged tenth’ who would 
also rank among the citizens of the future’.  He described his particular 
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pleasure in the passing of the Education Bill at a time when ‘no other 
Minister on the home front had been able to bring his plans to fruition’.580  
While it may well have been that this remark simply referred to the pride he 
felt in his own personal achievement, there is no doubt that war and 
evacuation had indeed helped create a platform for change.  This was 
substantiated by the speed with which the Act was passed and its progressive 
nature helped validate the warfare to welfare theory.   
 
The 1944/45 education legislation effectively gave every child a right to free 
secondary education lasting four years (later extended to five years), 
although this did not take effect until 1947.  The legislation has had varied 
responses from historians who felt that the 1944/45 directives did not go far 
enough in ensuring equality of opportunity.  Macnicol noted that this 
legislation did not break down class barriers in education.  Instead, he 
argued, that at the end of the 1940s secondary education for all was still 
‘qualitatively differentiated, with selection by and large on the grounds of 
social class.’581   This referred to the tiered system of education which 
existed well into the second half of the century.  Counter to this Harris 
believed that the introduction of the Education Act of 1944/45 meant wide 
reaching improvements in the physical and mental well-being of children.  
He acknowledged that war brought social policy and welfare reforms to the 
political stage in a way which had been absent during the inter-war period, 
although much debate had already taken place concerning the school 
medical service over the previous thirty years.582  Prior to the passing of the 
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581 Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of schoolchildren’ (1986), p.3. 
582 Harris, The Health of the Schoolchild (1995), p.162. 
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Act medical treatment for school children had been limited to certain minor 
ailments, such as tonsils and adenoids, plus defects of eyes, ears and teeth.583  
The concept of continuity in welfare planning was also supported by 
Jenkinson, who used the proposals brought forward by such bodies as the 
DHS, the Political and Economic Planning and the British Medical 
Association in the 1930s to challenge Titmuss’s warfare to welfare 
approach.584        
  
Addison has argued that government motives for passing the Education Act 
were driven by economic and political strategy in order to ‘eclipse 
Beveridge by a Tory project’, rather than promoting a better education for 
children in the future.585  Looking beyond the period of the war, whatever 
the motives were for passing the Education legislation of 1944/45, there is 
no doubt that the improvements in education and health it elicited did 
enhance the argument that warfare led to welfare.     
 
The fact that the 1944 Education Act was a wartime measure, serves to 
reinforce the importance of the link between evacuation and progressive 
educational reform.  The turnaround is clear when it is remembered that at 
the start of the war the raising of the school leaving age was delayed.  The 
long-term psychological condition of post-traumatic stress in stay-at-home 
children, especially those who experienced bombing raids and lived with the 
threat of bombing, was as manifest as the stress of separation suffered by 
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evacuees in later life.  Stay-at-home children had the security of familiar 
surroundings and family life, albeit diminished by the threat of air raids and 
in many cases by the absence of fathers on National Service duties.  In the 
short-term, stay-at-home children lacked the benefits of a continued 
education and associated services at the beginning of the war.   However, as 
schools were reopened in evacuation areas within months of war being 
declared, the welfare services were quickly reinstated.  The enhanced school 
wartime welfare arrangements led to an overall improvement in the general 
health of most school children.  Moreover, the war had no noticeably 
detrimental effect on the overall educational performance of stay-at-home 
city children. 
 
This thesis is not making a judgement on the whole Act, but views the 
enhanced school medical examination part of it as a move forward.  There 
can be little doubt that the argument that through the process of war social 
welfare was brought to the fore and that evacuation gave a renewed focus to 
the educational system; the Education Act, passed in 1944 and 1945 in 
Scotland, was testimony to this.  The Education Act effectively extended 
school medical inspections to include secondary pupils.  The Act helped 
widen the scope of medical provision which encompassed new availability 
of hospital treatment for children as both in-patients and out-patients.  This 
was to treat those children who suffered from a broad range of diseases and 
conditions including speech therapy and rheumatism.  It also included 
provision for child guidance and early intervention for children with a 
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physical or mental disability.  Early surgical or medical intervention had the 
potential to improve the wellbeing of children.586   
 
In summary, this chapter has shown that the lives of stay-at-home children 
and those who returned early were different to that of evacuees but similarly 
traumatic during the war.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
586 MacNalty, (ed.), History of the Second World War (1953), pp.301-302. 
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Chapter VI 
Analysis of the Effect of Evacuation Through the use of Oral 
History 
 
...according to where the scales tip between life and times, oral 
history shifts between performance-oriented narrative and content-
oriented document, between subject-oriented life story and theme-
oriented testimony.  In practice, oral history stays mostly in between: 
its role is precisely to connect life to times, uniqueness to 
representativeness, as well as orality to writing.  The key word in life 
and times is the one in the middle.587 
 
The key focus of this chapter will centre on the oral testimony of evacuees 
concerning how war and evacuation affected them.  It will consider whether 
or not social welfare developments can be assessed through the use of oral 
history.  The structure of the chapter will be arranged along the broad 
themes of health and education.   Changes to the way in which the personal 
and emotional welfare of children was controlled had roots in the evacuation 
process and these issues, together with the warfare to welfare theory which 
has continually been argued for throughout this thesis, will be considered 
through the evidence given by Scottish evacuees.  The body of evidence 
which helps to reinforce the part played by evacuees and the evacuation 
process in promoting social welfare changes will be considered from 
documentary and historical records, in order to substantiate the oral 
                                                 
587 Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue 
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testimony.  Almost without exception, those former evacuees interviewed 
were, and remain, oblivious to the part they played in the history of the 
Second World War and of their contribution towards achieving improved 
and permanent social welfare changes.  The evacuation process formed a 
significant part of the social history of the Second World War and evacuees 
had an impact on the growth in child care and welfare developments, in 
child guidance and extended nutritional care for children, pregnant women 
and young mothers.  In the case of Clydebank evacuees, the rapid restoration 
of homes and the building programme after the bombing in 1941, helps 
demonstrate the priority given to reconstruction (in this instance in a very 
physical sense) as part of the broader commitment of warfare to welfare.  
 
Portelli, and others, including Lynn Abrams588 and John Tosh,589 have 
highlighted the benefits and pitfalls of oral history as a methodology.  This 
includes what Portelli refers to above as performance-oriented narrative and 
content-oriented document.  He acknowledges that there is more than likely 
to be a significant difference between the narrator’s story and the 
documentary evidence.  Oral history falls short of written history in the 
precision of dates and times and sometimes in muddled chronological 
recollection of events.  Paul Thomson believes that through oral history the 
scope of historical writing is enriched and history becomes more democratic, 
and the oral historian shares experiences of the past at a human level.590   In 
order to establish a ‘democratising approach’ to the interview it is important 
                                                 
588 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (Oxford, 2010). 
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to secure a bond of trust between the narrator and the interviewer, this 
Abrams has referred to as intersubjectivity.591  For the qualitative 
methodological approach adopted here it has been necessary to establish this 
intersubjectivity from the outset.  This began with a brief introduction by 
phone to each of the respondents in order to arrange an interview, and to 
ensure they were comfortable about having a stranger visit them in their 
home.  At all times they understood the nature of the visit and welcomed the 
opportunity to relate their experience. 
 
The problems referred to above have been addressed within the thesis by 
ensuring that oral testimony has been substantiated by the use of primary 
evidence.  One of the identified pitfalls of the interview process, 
chronological discrepancy, was apparent at the beginning of an interview 
with a former evacuee who was quite insistent that war was declared on 9 
September 1939.  He was quick to point out that there were some details 
surrounding his evacuation experience which were not so clear in his 
memory, he could not remember for instance: 
 
…getting off the train or anything like that, I don’t remember it…it 
may well be it was because the journey was quite so long because it 
took some time to get from Glasgow to Aberdeen in those days.592 
    
                                                 
591 Abrams, Oral History Theory (2010), p.55. 
592 Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 1 July 2011.  Transcript held with author. 
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For John the subjective memory was predominantly feelings of isolation 
which resulted from living on a farm in a remote district far away from the 
friends he had travelled with from home.   
 
Chronology and minute discrepancies tend to be fairly common in 
recounting the narrative of the past.  It is the discrepancy between the real 
and perceived events that is derived, as Abrams explained, from 
subjectivity.593  In John’s case, his subjectivity was shaped by his experience 
of life and work on the farm.  Often there is a danger of a merger of the 
importance of the personal experience of particular incidents with the 
written and reported narrative.  This can transmit to a somewhat distorted 
picture of the truth which, as Abrams pointed out, led to a mistrust of the 
reliability of oral history among historians in the past.594   Like Abrams, 
Ludmilla Jordanova warned of the need for critical reflection of oral history 
and its reliance on memory.  However, Jordanova believed oral history to be 
a ‘democratising approach’, where human relationships can be brought to 
life.595  Therefore, while acknowledging the limits of oral history as a source 
of concrete information, and its deficiencies with precision, oral history can 
also be the source of compelling, richer narratives about the past that have 
left no written trace. 
 
Collecting oral history testimonies for the purpose of this thesis has proved 
Jordanova’s point on almost every occasion.  Giving a voice to former 
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evacuees has provided a human element to the evacuation story and 
speaking freely about their experience can have a liberating effect.  
Respondents often display a shyness coupled with an underlying pride in 
recounting the experience of their part in the history of the Second World 
War.  Initially most respondents believe they have very little to say on the 
subject, however within a short time, inhibitions are forgotten and they bring 
forward narratives of the past they had thought and reflected on ever since 
the War.  When Pat and Joan began their story they believed they had 
nothing to say of any consequence.  In both cases, with over an hour of 
recording time, they realised they remembered clearly their whole 
experience.596      
 
This chapter strives to give former evacuees the opportunity to exercise the 
democratising approach to history, referred to above, in their account of 
what happened during the time of their evacuation.  The significance of 
personal traumatic events, such as the separation from parents, siblings and 
home life at a young age through evacuation was, in many cases, so 
profoundly memorable that, over seventy years on, the experience has left a 
deep and lasting impression.  Retelling the story of their war and evacuation 
captures the social and emotional side of the evacuation scheme on a 
personal level.  Most of the interviews were recorded and took place in the 
homes of the respondents in Glasgow, Edinburgh, and areas around 
Perthshire.  In the main these interviews were recorded, although there were 
a few who had hand written their story and once or twice the recordings 
                                                 
596 Interview with Pat, recorded on 20 July 2010.  Transcript held with author.  Interview 
with John and Joan, recorded on 1 July 2011.  Transcript held with author. 
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failed and the interview had to be transcribed on the spot as far as possible, 
and verified with the respondent.  In order to protect the identity of the 
respondents first names only have been used throughout the chapter.  Where 
the finite details may be lacking in accuracy, as in dates and times, and in 
some cases the series of events are slightly distorted, the picture of the main 
events is embedded clearly in the memory, and the details may be verified 
with documentary evidence and historiography.   
 
Minor details such as the worry over having to be picked from a line of 
children arriving in reception areas, in a dishevelled state after a long 
journey, as many evacuees did, may now seem almost incidental but was 
profoundly important to children at the time.  In the introduction to his work 
on ‘Churchill’s Children’ Welshman asked why it was that evacuees who 
have told the story of their evacuation invariably say that they were the last 
to be picked?597   This was especially true in the case of Les, an evacuee to 
Dunning.  Les had said he remembered arriving and being in the church hall 
and that he was the last child to be picked.598  Jim, who was interviewed 
earlier on the same day, and who has now known Les for many years, said 
that although Les thought he was the last to be picked he was not and that 
‘…they all thought they were the last to be picked’.599  Les’s subjective 
experience was largely shaped by the initial fear of being left alone when all 
the other children had been taken by foster carers.  The psychological effect 
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598 Interview with Les, recorded on 4 July 2010.  Transcript held with author. 
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of perhaps not being ‘picked’ was significant to the personal and emotional 
morale of evacuee children. 
 
Those evacuees who have kindly retold their stories here have displayed 
what can only be described as a quiet acceptance of, and resilience to, 
adversity which runs like an invisible thread through their personalities.  
There is no way of knowing whether this fundamental part of their character 
was formed as a result of their evacuation experience or if that aspect of 
their personality would have been such if they had not encountered war and 
separation.    
 
Comparatively there is a significant gap in the existing historiography 
dealing with oral testimony between Scottish and English evacuees.  To 
some extent this is understandable in so far as statistically there was a 
greater proportion of English rather than Scottish evacuees.  English 
evacuees in the initial wave including unaccompanied children, adults, 
mothers and children, teachers and helpers amounted to a total of 1,298,500 
and in Scotland the figure for evacuees of all categories was 175,000.600   
Furthermore in England mass evacuation took place on three separate 
occasions.  The existing academic work on oral history testimony relating to 
evacuee experiences include that of Summers, Welshman and Smith.  
Summers based her research on a collection of oral histories, used in 
conjunction with interviews compiled for the Museum of English Rural Life 
and from material held at the Imperial War Museum.  Her oral testimonies 
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did not include any Scottish evacuees directly and mentioned the country 
briefly in relation to a family whose connection with Scotland was simply 
that it was where they spent their summer holidays.601  Welshman used a 
core of thirteen former evacuees to tell the story of the evacuation 
experience.  Nine of the thirteen were child evacuees from working class 
backgrounds.  The thought behind this was undoubtedly that the majority of 
children involved in the official government evacuation scheme were from 
poorer areas in and around the cities.  The remainder of Welshman’s cohort 
were adults.  These testimonies were collated from written and 
autobiographical accounts and through newspaper requests for former 
evacuees to tell their stories.  This study of thirteen people included the 
experience of two Scottish brothers who were evacuated from Glasgow to 
Fife.602    
 
Smith’s research cohort was taken almost entirely from the collections held 
by the Imperial War Museum.  Her approach was simply to introduce the 
topic to be discussed at the beginning of each chapter and let the oral 
testimony speak for itself.  Of the 416 pages in Smith’s book on 
recollections from evacuees only one direct reference to Scotland is 
mentioned.  There is no other direct Scottish link in her work on evacuation 
although she did record a significant number of accounts from survivors 
from the sinking of the City of Benares whose nationalities were not 
established.603  
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Of the techniques used by these historians for collection and analysis of oral 
testimony, Summers’ method is most akin to the way in which qualitative 
data has been compiled for this thesis.  The most significant factor here is 
that Summers carried out all of the interviews personally and concentrated 
on individual experiences from a wide range of evacuees irrespective of 
class.  Social class was a significant issue at the time and has been of some 
importance to historians of evacuation since.  It is evident from some of 
these interviews that the children were very much aware of their social status 
and of class division.   When Colin was evacuated from Clydebank after the 
bombing raids, he and his family stayed in several different billets.  He was 
aware of the social differences among his peers at school and understood 
that there were children who were ‘better off’ than he was as, he said, they 
always had ‘a proper play piece’ (play time snack).   This type of social 
awareness was perceptible to Colin on more than one occasion.  In one 
particular billet while they were in Helensburgh, he described the house as 
being ‘as near as we would get to living like toffs!’  As compared to where 
they had lived in Clydebank, it was ‘like a palace’.604  For Colin and others 
there was no real evidence of a breakdown in the social class barriers either 
during or immediately after the war.      
 
The cross section of interviews in Summers work included a wide 
geographical area including the Far East, with stories of families interned in 
the Philippines, of civilians escaping from Malaya, of husbands and fathers 
being held as prisoners of war in Hong Kong, of returning fathers and those 
whose fathers did not return.605  From the stories recounted here of absent 
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fathers, Colin’s story is the most acute in terms of the way in which it is 
flecked with the emotional turmoil of separation and some of the joys of 
reunion.  He described his father’s homecoming on leave from the army 
during the war.  In his absence he said the younger members of the family 
had all but forgotten him.  He recalled that when his younger brother was 
sent to answer the door of their billet in Helensburgh, where they had been 
evacuated after the Clydebank blitz, he announced to their mother that there 
was a soldier at the door.  That soldier was in fact their father.  He said 
‘truthfully, some of us were not too sure either’.  He did not recall how long 
their father had been away but thought it must have been long enough for his 
family to have forgotten him.606  This type of reception would undoubtedly 
have been particularly upsetting for the fathers as well as for the children.  
However, Rusby’s study has suggested that there was no significant long-
term effect on the mental health of wartime children as a result of absent 
fathers.607  
  
In academic terms the Scottish experience was dealt with in an article by 
Stewart and Welshman.  They compared the process with that of England 
and Wales on the issue of evacuation as a constituent of Scottish welfare 
history, which they believed was under-investigated.  They concluded that 
more local and regional work was required to establish what happened to 
evacuated children and with what consequences.  They used written 
testimony from a Billeting Officer, but did not include any oral history from 
former evacuees in this journal article.  They based some of their findings on 
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607 Rusby, Childhood Temporary Separation (2005), p.135. 
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the work of Boyd and on that of the Scottish Women’s Group on Social 
Welfare.608    
 
The Scottish Women’s Group on Social Welfare had highlighted the defects 
present within Scottish society, which the evacuation process had 
accentuated.  Evacuation essentially raised an awareness of the condition of 
poverty some children were forced to endure.  Physical and mental health 
developments progressed from this in the form of government intervention 
in the provision of extra nutrition, clothing for necessitous children and an 
extension of child guidance clinics.  The physical and mental state of 
children’s health as a result of evacuation has provided psychologists and 
sociologists such as Rusby and Stewart with a unique opportunity of study 
from a very different perspective. For the first time children were being 
removed from their homes for protection, for reasons other than as a result 
of separation from abusive parents or carers.    
 
The long-term separation, which for some spanned six years of war, had, in 
a number of cases, a detrimental effect when returning to home life after 
such a lengthy absence.  The transition from evacuee to part of the family 
was not always a particularly easy process.  Among those evacuees 
interviewed here who had spent the duration of the war in reception areas, 
there was a great deal of affection and regard for the people who had cared 
for them during their evacuation.  The stress of separation at the end of the 
war was for them as significant as that felt on leaving home. 
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This was the case for Les who had spent the duration of the war in Perthshire 
in the village of Dunning.  He explained that he went back to Glasgow only 
briefly.  When war broke out he had been living with his grandparents in 
Glasgow.  He said: 
  
I went…to stay with my grandparents because my mother died when I 
was two and my father was killed in the war.  They (the grandparents) 
came up to Dunning occasionally…I came back to Dunning in 
September 1955.  I liked the country.  I liked the way of life here.609  
 
After joining the army and completing his National Service Les moved 
permanently to Dunning to be with the people who had been his foster 
parents during the war.  He settled there and still lives in the village. 
 
Edna had been evacuated in September 1939 and spent all six years of the 
war in Dunning.  Being awarded dux medal at the end of primary school 
while she was evacuated was a measure of how well she had done 
educationally, and she got on really well with her peers in the little school in 
Dunning.  When she returned to Glasgow she had difficulty settling down to 
school life.  Secondary School in Glasgow was very upsetting.  She said: 
 
When you have stayed in a village for five years you get to know 
people and then you come back to Glasgow…and you just didn’t 
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know anybody, it was awful.  This is the bit I remember.  I remember 
going to Whitehill School.  I got into the classroom and nobody would 
sit beside me.  I didn’t go to their primary school.  Everybody was 
sitting with people from their primary schools and I knew nobody, and 
at playtime I just thought I have had enough of this…I’m going home!   
I never really settled after that.  It was quite harrowing.610 
 
Edna’s lengthy evacuation meant the children in secondary school were 
strangers to her and she felt very much alone.   Honour too recalled that 
when the evacuees returned from Auchterarder House and Strathallan Castle 
it was very much a case of ‘them and us’ in the classroom.  One other former 
pupil from Laurel Bank School confirmed this.  She said that when she 
returned from Auchterarder to Glasgow for sixth year she felt very excluded 
and confirmed ‘it was definitely a ‘them’ and ‘me’ situation’.611 
 
While official histories of evacuation focused on physical health, interviews 
with evacuees indicated that it was their emotional wellbeing rather than 
their physical health that was important to them.  There were some whose 
affection shifted from family attachment before the war to a more lasting 
attachment to foster parents during their evacuation.  There were in fact 
some children who never settled back into their former life.   
 
                                                 
610 Interview with Edna, recorded on 10 July 2010.  Transcript held with author.  
611 Anna Magnusson (ed.), The Time of Our Lives: Memories of Laurel Bank Girls during 
World War II Evacuation (Glasgow, 2011), p.91. 
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Generally evacuees interviewed here have shown no sign of the type of 
neglect or hardship which was expressed in the 1940s surveys.  These 
surveys were carried out by groups and individuals including the Scottish 
Women’s Group on Public Welfare,612 Padley and Cole,613 and Susan 
Isaacs.614  Much of what was written made claims of child poverty and 
neglect which necessitated official intervention in order to protect the health 
and well-being of children.  These surveys slowed down after the initial 
enthusiasm in the psychological study of evacuation and there was a dearth 
of work in the field until the 1980s.615  Evidence of child neglect, which 
came to the fore in official circles with the arrival of evacuees was addressed 
in Chapter III.  
 
Work continued on separation and attachment theory through the work of 
John Bowlby, eminent Psychiatrist, Psychologist and Psychoanalyst, one of 
the co-authors of the Cambridge Survey.  He recognised the danger of 
separating young children from their mothers.  Bowlby also connected 
childhood mental health and social life.  Bowlby’s work in this field 
continued through to the early 1950s.616   
 
 
  
                                                 
612 Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns (1944). 
613 Padley and Cole (eds.), Evacuation Survey (1940). 
614 Isaacs, (ed.), The Cambridge Evacuation Survey (1941). 
615 Rusby, Childhood Temporary Separation (2005), p.30. 
616 Harry Hendrick, Child Welfare: Historical dimensions, contemporary debate (Bristol, 
2004), p.137. 
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On the specific question of the long-term effect of evacuation as it relates to 
separation and attachment, a number of stories have been told of the trauma 
of separation where siblings could not be accommodated together.  Brown 
described the terrifying effect on families when they had to be billeted 
separately.617  It was years later that interviewee Ina thought of how she and 
her sister had been separated from her brother who was sent to live on a farm 
with an elderly couple who had no children.  She spoke of their separation 
saying that:  
When we were evacuated to Dunblane our young brother John had 
just turned 7…He was sent to a farm 3 miles away…He must have 
attended the local school as I don’t remember seeing him again except 
for one visit when my mother came to Dunblane and we visited the 
farmhouse…Years later…he said that he had felt so lonely and 
abandoned and resentful of our parents.  I would say that he grew up 
with a chip on his shoulder and was argumentative and contrary at 
times. 
She went on to say: 
When I look back over our lives then I feel ashamed that neither my 
sister nor I gave him a second thought or even missed him at all…My 
only excuse is that we were only 9 and 11 and were happy with our 
lives… I’m truly sorry that no one ever talked about the war and 
evacuation and how it has affected families over the years 
                                                 
617 Brown, Evacuees (2005), p.77 
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since…When I watch the news on TV these nights about the wars in 
the Middle East and see the evacuees I despair for all of them. 618 
 
Abandonment was one of many issues surrounding the evacuation. The 
reality was that children were exposed to all kinds of danger during 
evacuation, mentally, physically and sexually, some of which were not 
formally recognised or recorded until the early 1980s.  Heather Nicholson’s 
oral based account published in 2000, is fraught with explicit accounts of 
abuse recounted by former evacuees who had been placed in foster care.619   
Reports of such abuse have been less well documented in Scotland.  One of 
the few Scottish examples in Welshman’s book pointed briefly to an area 
where child neglect was evident.  In St Andrews in Fife a number of children 
evacuated from Glasgow stayed in the Priory where it was suspected they 
had not been treated very well as they could be ‘picked out’ as Priory 
children due to the condition of their hygiene and clothing.620  The Priory in 
St Andrews was run as a home for orphaned children and during the war it 
was used to accommodate evacuees from local areas as well as from 
Glasgow.  In this particular instance the social class divide was evident as 
the locals in St Andrews could physically identify the Priory children.   
 
Echoing the 1941 Cambridge Evacuation Survey findings, Stewart and 
Welshman have argued that evacuation served to demonstrate the need for 
more child guidance clinics, where emotional and mental health issues could 
                                                 
618 Interview with Ina, recorded 4 July 2011. Transcript held with author. 
619 Nicholson, Prisoners of War (2000). 
620 Welshman, Churchill’s Children (2010), p.65. 
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be dealt with.  They also believed that it highlighted the psychological health 
of children in general.621  Rusby noted that the work of wartime researchers 
brought the inadequacies of child care to the attention of the post-war 
government, and it was the outcome of these studies which influenced the 
provision and content of the improved social welfare services after the 
war.622  
 
Some of the evacuees who returned home early to Clydebank were subjected 
to bombing raids and further evacuation and suffered long-term mental and 
physical trauma which went undetected and therefore untreated.  Dennis 
recognised that he had suffered a type of post-traumatic stress, but as he 
pointed out, nothing was done to help him with the recovery process.623  
Another blitz survivor pointed out that counselling was not part of the 
vocabulary of the 1940s.624  It was not until much later that the stress of 
living through years of war, separation, sirens, black-outs and major 
disruption to everyday life was recognised as a significant cause of 
emotional attachment problems in the adult life of former evacuees. 
 
In March 1941 after the devastating raids on Clydebank, 15,000 people were 
evacuated under the evacuation scheme and a further 25,000 left without any 
government assistance.  This meant that 40,000 people from a population of 
                                                 
621 Stewart and Welshman, ‘The Evacuation of Children in Wartime Scotland: Culture, 
Behaviour and Poverty’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, vol. 26, 1:2 (2006), pp. 
112-116. 
622 Rusby, Childhood Temporary Separation (2005), p.30.  
623 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. Transcript held with author.  
624 Clydebank Life Story Group, Untold Stories (1999), p.27.  
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50,000 left Clydebank after the raids.625   There had been approximately 
38,000 children and adults in reception areas in Scotland at the end of 
January 1940.626  The figures for those left in reception areas in September 
1945 amount to just 5,500 which would suggest that the Clydebank residents 
had returned in significant numbers in the four years since the bombing had 
taken place, hence while the war was ongoing.627  The damage to property in 
Clydebank as a result of the bombing was extremely severe.  From a total of 
12,000 homes in the area only eight were left undamaged and 4,300 had 
been damaged beyond repair.628   Yet, Dennis, Isa and Charlie stressed that 
they were able to return to new homes in Clydebank before the end of the 
war.  Dennis returned to Clydebank in 1943.  He said: ‘Well by that time the 
actual house had a huge team of joiners.  Houses that were fixable were 
fixed.’629  Isa described her mother’s joy when she returned from Alexandria 
to Dumbarton and then eventually to a new home in Clydebank:  
 
We were away from Clydebank for two years and then we came back 
and were in Old Kilpatrick till we got a prefab house and my mother 
thought she was in heaven.630    
 
                                                 
625 J.J.R. MacPhail, The Clydebank Blitz (West Dunbartonshire Libraries & Museums, 
1991), p.49. 
626 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.31. 
627 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.562. 
628 MacPhail, The Clydebank Blitz (1991), p.56. 
629 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
630 Interview with focus group, recorded on 30 March 2015.  Transcript held with author. 
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Charlie was also back in Clydebank by 1945.  During his stay in Whitecrook 
he remembered his father’s attempts to secure a council house in Clydebank.  
He said:   
 
…they were arguing about building a house, rebuilding it, building it.  
So they rebuilt our house and …I reckon we came back in 1945 into 
our house that they rebuilt.631 
   
Some accounts of how these raids and the evacuation affected the people of 
Clydebank have been recorded by the Clydebank Life Story Group.632   
Stories from the collection describe how difficult it was to come to terms 
with family separation.  Local studies of Clydebank concluded that there 
was no official date when residents began to come back to Clydebank.  
Some people came back right after the Blitz, others stayed out of the town 
but travelled in to work every day until they were able to find 
accommodation.  Others made lives outside the area in places where they 
were evacuated to, and never returned to Clydebank.  It is Colin’s opinion 
that ‘the rebuilding of the town took decades and to an extent has been a 
work in progress ever since’.633  
 
One woman interviewed for the Life Story Group had no recollection of how 
long it was before damaged homes were repaired and ready for occupancy, 
                                                 
631 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
632 Clydebank Life Story Group, Untold Stories (1999). 
633 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015.  Transcript held with author. 
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or how long it took for new homes to be built in Clydebank.  She did 
remember that her family all came back together and although they were: 
 
…scattered by evacuation…they all came back and we all settled 
within about a hundred yards of each other.  We were all in the one 
street or just round the corner.  We were really quite close.634 
 
Among the Clydebank evacuees there was evidence of a close community 
and family ties.  Pat, who had been evacuated at the beginning of September 
1939 with her brother, was brought home after just two weeks.  She had 
been very upset at being separated from her family.  She and her brother 
were brought home to Clydebank and were at home when the town was 
bombed.  Having to be evacuated for a second time was not so traumatic 
because the family were all together.635   
 
Pat’s early return from evacuation was caused by her unhappiness at being 
parted from her family.  This was the cause of many of the children being 
brought back early.  For parents the separation had an equally profound 
effect and, as Honour recalled, her parents brought her back from Strathallan 
Castle after possibly only six weeks.  Her brother had not been evacuated 
from Glasgow Academy and therefore her parents made the decision that the 
                                                 
634 Clydebank Library, Evacuation: a collection of Sources (Museum Education Service, 
undated), p.107.  
635 Interview with Pat, recorded on 20 July 2010.  Transcript held with author. 
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family should all be together no matter what happened.636  Close family ties 
was one of the many and varied reasons why children were brought back 
from reception areas and these have been discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
 
While mothers with young children also tended to return early, expectant 
mothers in reception areas helped draw attention to the need for extended 
maternity care.  The fact that more women were opting for hospital and 
hostel care rather than home births was discussed in chapter III.  Attendance 
figures for Lennox Castle, Airthrey Castle and Haddo House in Aberdeen, 
quoted on page 151, were a reflection on the popularity of hospital births.  
The extended maternity care facilities were also available to women in 
reception areas as well as evacuees and proved popular to both.  Jenkinson 
pointed out that these services helped improve the life chances of Scottish 
mothers and babies.637   
 
Analysis of the interviews from former evacuees revealed the fate of some 
of the children who were evacuated with their pregnant mothers and which 
has been somewhat overlooked in the past.  Two of the evacuees interviewed 
here had been accompanied by their mother and the rest of their siblings.   
James and his brothers and sisters had been evacuated with their pregnant 
mother to Kilmun in Dunoon.   When her baby was due, his mother was sent 
to Airthrey Castle and Jim and the rest of the family were taken to Cardross 
Park Children’s Home where they stayed for six weeks until their mother 
came out of hospital.  Cardross Park had been a convalescent home for 
                                                 
636 Interview with Honour, recorded on 13 November 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
637 Jenkinson, Scotland’s Health 1919-1948 (2002), p.212. 
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members of the Scottish Horse and Motorman’s Association, before it was 
leased by Dumbarton County Council in 1941 and used as a refuge for 
people from Clydebank after the blitz.  James and his brothers and sisters 
knew they had been sent to Cardross Park Children’s Home as their mother 
had to go to hospital to have her baby.638   
 
Not all children were kept as well informed as were James and his family.  
Colin, who was five years old when he and his family were evacuated, spoke 
of the time he and his siblings spent at Cardross Park Children’s Home.  He 
said his mother had taken them there and left without telling them why they 
were there. This has remained something of a mystery to him since.  He said 
that, ‘…for part of the time my mother simply disappeared …[and] not 
knowing where she had gone was the worst part’.639  
 
Unfortunately for Colin, and others who have spoken on the subject, there 
was no follow-up counselling available at the time.  Instead Colin has lived 
all these years with the assumption that his mother must have had some sort 
of breakdown and that was why she had left the children at Cardross Park.  
Children, he said, were not given any information about what was 
happening.  Now, because the family who were there have all passed away, 
he has no one to ask what really happened at the time.  Retelling his story of 
war and evacuation, Colin uncovered a range of social and emotional 
factors, of family attachment and class differentiations.        
 
                                                 
638 Interview with James, dated 4 February 2015.  Transcript held with author. 
639 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author. 
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Recognition of the long-term psychological trauma attached to evacuation is 
of particular importance in the argument that warfare led to welfare.  The 
trauma of separation led to a period of bed wetting and was in part the cause 
of his unhappiness at having to go to school as an evacuee.  On reflection he 
considered that his dislike for attending school had much to do with missing 
his mother.640   
 
For parents too, separation was difficult to come to terms with and, as 
Dennis recalled, when he returned to his home after the Clydebank blitz his 
mother worried constantly when he was out of the house.  He said that it was 
difficult for her to ‘let him out of her sight’ and of how he had to be home as 
soon as it began to get dark.641  There were also attachment issues evident 
among the people who cared for evacuees.  Living with a family for an 
extended period often meant that the child or children became part of the 
family.  There are accounts of lasting friendships continuing well into 
adulthood and of the effect of how separation at the end of the war led to 
profound sadness when the evacuees returned home.   
 
Jim, who has lived in Dunning all his life, fondly remembered the two 
Glasgow evacuees his mother took in to their home at the beginning of the 
war.  Undoubtedly the boys who came as evacuees shared the same fondness 
for the family and the countryside.  Jim described how they became part of 
the family and how sad it was when the time came for them to go back to 
Glasgow.  He said: 
                                                 
640 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015.  Transcript held with author. 
641 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. Transcript held with author.  
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John and Billy lived with us for two and a half years…as part of the 
family.  John…still associated himself with Dunning [and joined] the 
Blackwatch [regiment]…the Blackwatch barracks was in Perth and 
during his training [he spent] all his spare time…in Dunning.642 
 
Life in the countryside was a learning curve for some city children, and for 
country residents having evacuees could be something of a trial, as stories 
from rural areas attest.  These include complaints that some city children had 
to be taught to respect the environment and the wildlife it contained.  
Children like David who had grown up in the countryside remembered being 
shocked and surprised by the attitude of city children when they came to 
Dunning.  David’s story included an account of some Glasgow boys he 
encountered during their evacuation to his village.   He said: 
 
…I got four (boys) up the wood there and they stole a duck from the 
farmer and lit the fire up the den, and chopped its head off with a 
chopper and [were] roasting the duck on the fire.643 
 
Their behaviour upset and angered David and he recalled having many 
arguments with them about their treatment of the countryside.  In a wider 
context significant praise was bestowed on the benefits of country living 
open to evacuees.  In the House of Lords the Archbishop of Canterbury 
                                                 
642 Interview with Jim, recorded on 4 July 2010.  Transcript held with author. 
643 Interview with David, recorded on 4 July 2010.  Transcript held with author.  
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praised the impact of the Devonshire countryside for evacuees, although his 
comments applied to country living generally.  He said: 
 
…the children in these reception areas have had some benefits from 
their experience.  There has been a greater variety of teaching, there 
has been a widening of their horizons, and in some cases there has 
been given to them, I think…a real love of the country, which may 
have important consequences in the future.644 
 
This was true in Ina’s case.  Being sent to Aberdeen in September 1939 
opened up a new and exciting world which she had never known in 
Glasgow.  She loved life in the country and spoke with great affection of the 
time she spent away from home.  She recalled climbing trees for the first 
time, eating raw beetroot from the fields, and getting sick from eating 
Laburnum pods.  She said: 
 
…we loved the school and had a happy, happy time.  …it was the first 
time in my life I saw the stars properly.   …when the nights were a bit 
darker and the schoolteachers were telling us about the stars…I was 
fascinated.  You live in the city!  We lived right in the city, you never 
saw that.645 
                                                 
644 H of L Debates, 7 February 1940, vol. 115, cc. 469-470. 
645 Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011.  Transcript held with author. 
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Margaret, who was in her final year at Laurel Bank School, a private school 
for girls, was sent with her class to Auchterarder to board.   Her aspirational 
status was revealed when she noted her concern about the lack of science 
teaching in school as she wanted to study medicine.  However, Margaret 
appreciated the beauty and freedom of the countryside during her year as an 
evacuee:  She described how: 
 
It was very cold that autumn and winter and very beautiful, lovely 
clear skies, we had a lot of freedom…I had never been in the country 
for that long.  It was so easy to get around…at the weekend we would 
go off on bicycle rides for five to ten miles.  We were free, it wasn’t 
like a standard boarding school.  We were fed stories: Angela Brazil 
and the Chalet Girls, but it was much more fun than that because we 
knew everyone and we were trusted in a way, quite rightly I think 
because we weren’t too silly.646   
 
Margaret and Ina both enjoyed their individual experiences of living in the 
country.  They both felt it was therapeutic to have lived in such a carefree 
environment.  As a health measure, Margaret’s sister was sent to stay with 
them in Auchterarder ‘because she hadn’t been very well’, and stayed there 
for three years.  Margaret and her sister, with about six other girls, were 
billeted with a local lawyer in the town and went to Auchterarder House for 
classes.  For those children who enjoyed a happy evacuation, living in the 
                                                 
646 Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014.  Transcript held with 
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 278 
healthy conditions of the countryside meant there was very little exposure to 
what was going on in the war.  The evacuees in Auchterarder Margaret said 
‘...didn’t get much in the way of newspapers’ and, she said, ‘I don’t 
remember that we heard the radio so we were insulated in a way’.647   
 
She believed that as a result of her age she ‘didn’t feel any kind of 
homesickness at all’ and enjoyed the experience of evacuation.  As Margaret 
was in her last year of school, and therefore an older evacuee with a 
comfortable billet, her situation and attitude to being away from home was 
very positive.     
 
Margaret’s happy account of life in the country corresponds with that of the 
teachers who were sent with the girls from fee-paying Laurel Bank School to 
Strathallan Castle and Auchterarder House.  They too appreciated the natural 
beauty of the countryside, of the changing seasons, and the pleasure of being 
able to enjoy the laughter which ‘grew naturally out of the incongruities of 
[their] existence’.648   The Perthshire countryside was, by their account, a 
unique experience in happy living built into the fabric of world-wide war.  
Of the changing seasons it was said that ‘we were city dwellers walking 
between rows of houses and in noisy streets…none of us had seen anything 
like it…every imaginable variety of lily covered the green banks around the 
castle’.649  Being evacuated as a private school pupil and being ‘fairly 
                                                 
647 Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014.  Transcript held with 
author.  
648 E. M. Cuthbert, foreword to, Laurel Bank School 1903 to 1953 (Glasgow, 1953), p.45. 
649 Cuthbert, foreword to, Laurel Bank School 1903-1953 (1953), pp.44, 55 and 65. 
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cosseted’ in her living conditions in a large and beautiful country house, 
Margaret’s situation was somewhat different from the majority of 
evacuees.650   
 
The circumstances surrounding countryside living that Margaret described 
reflect the opinion of such surveyors as Padley and Cole who commented on 
the improvements in the physical and mental health of children as a result of 
a structured life.  Evacuees, they said, were subject to better sleep patterns 
and better food.  Children learned the pleasure of roaming the countryside 
freely and the boys especially provided helpful work for farmers.651  In spite 
of this, country and town people learning to live together under the 
exceptional circumstances of war and evacuation often proved difficult.  
Margaret said that if the girls from Laurel Bank School had been from the 
east end of Glasgow they would not have lasted long in Auchterarder and 
would have gone back pretty quickly.  She did not elaborate on this point but 
simply smiled.652  This was possibly an acknowledgement of the fact that the 
majority of the first wave of evacuees had returned home within the early 
months of the war.   
 
Private billeting, as Boyd pointed out, did not always work for evacuees, and 
idyllic recollections were, of course, not universal.  His wartime research 
showed that residential schools and hostels worked better for children with 
                                                 
650 Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014.  Transcript held with 
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problems.  This type of accommodation was most beneficial to children over 
12 years old, as the routine of attending school and smaller classes helped 
develop their character and personality.653  Rose suggested the evacuation 
process became the focal point of tension between two opposing ways of 
life.654  This was evident from the lack of response from residents in 
designated reception areas around Scotland when the prospect of taking in 
evacuees after the mass movement of September 1939 was mooted, as 
discussed in Chapter III.   
 
Rose believed evacuation had aroused a social awareness which she referred 
to as having been the central lens through which the British focused on the 
social question.655  According to Hendrick it was the moment when liberal 
democracy faced its greatest challenge.  The result, he believed, was that 
social welfare dominated politics throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and 
evacuation was a reminder to rulers of their primary duties: to feed, clothe, 
shelter and look after the health and welfare of Britain’s citizens.656   This 
was manifest in the extension of milk-in-schools and school meals 
programmes, improved medical inspections and of child guidance (and 
eventually an expanded education system) all mentioned in Chapter V. 
 
The extension of the school leaving age in 1945 was important in helping to 
fill the gap which the interviewees felt was lost by their evacuation.  Joan 
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expressed her concern over her own education, and of the void that she felt 
existed in her sister’s education which had been lost to her through 
evacuation.  Joan explained that, while she and her three sisters were 
evacuated, it was her thirteen year old sister who looked after them, rather 
than the women whom they were billeted with.  She said that:  
 
She (the householder) didn’t look after us at all, my sister looked after 
us, she took us to school and brought us back, so she lost her 
education then because she’d been out of it so long, she was a very 
clever girl too.  She did well but she did actually die very young but 
she didn’t get her education back. …My sister was capable of really 
good things.  She was a very intelligent girl but she probably thought 
she was doing her war effort.657 
 
The extension to the school leaving age came too late for her sister to benefit 
from it.  However, the other members of the family, although affected by the 
disruption in continuous education during the war, were able to make up the 
short-fall when they came back home.  She confirmed that: 
 
  …I wasn’t so bad because I made it all up eventually you know but 
certainly you lost your confidence when you came back.  So although 
it was just months and the summer went into it, you’d missed quite a 
lot of your friends, and your education, your exams, and you just felt 
different.  You just felt you had missed a lot…658 
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Charlie had experienced first-hand the trauma of the Clydebank blitz after 
which he and his family were evacuated.  First to a house in Coatbridge, in 
North Lanarkshire, then soon after they went to live with relatives in 
Renfrew where they stayed for two years.  The final two years of the war 
were spent in the Whitecrook area of Clydebank before they returned to their 
home, by which time Charlie had left school.  He explained: 
 
I remember all the schools being shut and the army was in the schools 
and you ended up either in a church hall getting slightly, I would say, 
educated part of the day and that fell away.  I felt I had lost a lot of 
schooling.659 
 
Colin had been able to stay in school until he was fifteen.  However, having 
a disability meant his secondary education was hampered as educational 
facilities did not extend to the provision of transport, and other means 
necessary to support children with minor physical problems.  As a result of 
his disability Colin found it difficult to negotiate the rigours of getting 
around a large High School. The nature of his disability resulted in him 
having to return to a Junior Secondary School after having spent the whole 
of his first senior year at Clydebank High.  It was a particular source of 
disappointment as he had been happy in High School. 
 
Although the change in legislation, as a result of the Education Act of 
1944/45, extended the school leaving age, historians such as Deborah 
                                                 
659 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
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Thom660 and John Macnicol661 have argued that the Act departed little from 
the old style.  They believed that it perpetuated a class based society by 
retaining the three tier system of education.  The entrenched values of 
private education can be seen to be upheld from observing the Laurel Bank 
School pupils and teachers who were evacuated to Auchterarder and 
Strathallan.  Their somewhat ‘cosseted’ and privileged surroundings 
highlight the inherent differences in the educational systems.  Thom 
commented that ‘different forms of education perpetuated the hierarchy of 
demand’.662  According to Lloyd the negotiations surrounding the proposals 
for the Education Bill left many unconsidered aspects of Scottish education.  
His assumption was that education reform was more important to England 
than Scotland, and that the 1945 Scottish measure contained an 
unremarkable set of improvements.663  Smout has also argued that Scottish 
education remained a class based structure until the 1950s.  He believed that 
once the needs of the middle classes had been attended to, only a limited 
number of working-class children would be privy to some upward social 
mobility.664   
 
The continued popularity of a system which perpetuated private education 
was evident from the number of parents who applied for places for their 
children in private schools during and after the war.  In 1942 Glasgow 
Academy had 763 boys on the school role, approximately 100 more than in 
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1941.   As a result of the continuing rise in applications throughout the rest 
of the war only one in three boys could be admitted, with a total of 840 boys 
on the school role in September 1944.  In other private schools around 
Glasgow after the end of the war the story was the same.  By 1948 Allan 
Glens and Hillhead could take only one in two applicants; the High School 
one in six; and Hutchesons’ School could accept one in three.665  Glasgow 
Academy had anticipated the possibility of changes in the educational 
system as a result of war and, in order to safeguard the independent schools, 
the Public Schools Governing Association was established.666  In spite of the 
fact that the three tier system was perpetuated, the warfare to welfare 
principle was evident through the educational reforms of the 1940s, when 
the changing attitude of government led to what Titmuss referred to as the 
‘universal character of…welfare policies’.  The difference between the pre-
war and wartime instigation of policy was the speed at which decisions were 
acted upon and the ‘unanimity underlying policy’.667     
 
In Chapter V the effect of total war on the educational system was discussed 
in connection with returning evacuees and stay-at-home children.  From an 
oral history perspective the daily routine of an inner city school can be 
observed from the original magazines produced by Whitehill School in 
Dennistoun, Glasgow during the war.  Written accounts by pupils and staff 
provide an original source of information of how school life in the city 
carried on during the war. They uncover some of the inherent problems 
                                                 
665 Dunlop, Hutchesons’ Grammar (1992), p.121. 
666 MacLeod, The Glasgow Academy: 150 Years (1997), p.142. 
667 Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, 1950, p.514. 
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which pupils and teachers were faced with on a daily basis and how they 
were overcome.    
 
The warfare to welfare theory present in the developments and progressive 
nature of education and child guidance can also be applied in religious 
terms.  There was some significant recognition and respect afforded to 
children in reception areas where they were billeted on families of different 
religions.  Religion had not been included in the initial discussions on the 
evacuation process but had quickly become a fairly major issue once the 
process had come to fruition.  Religion was the focus of Chapter IV and was 
mentioned in Chapter II to describe how evacuation had brought families of 
different faiths together during the Clydebank Blitz, and the element of 
surprise when people realised that both Catholics and Protestants were 
helpful, kind and welcoming to each other in a time of need.  Fitzpatrick 
alluded to the fact that, as a result of the Education Act of 1944/45, Church 
and State agreed to recognise the dignity of all people, the social dimension 
in education, the importance of moral values and cultural inheritance.668      
 
Religion was not a significant aspect of evacuation for the majority of 
evacuees interviewed.  The most important facet was the billeting situation, 
closely followed by school life.  For Catholic evacuees Pat, Joan and Ina, 
religion did played a significant part in their lives and during their 
evacuation they had the opportunity to continue their religious education.  
Whether children were conscious of their religious affiliation or not, schools 
of all denominations were involved in the religious welfare of pupils and 
                                                 
668 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p151.  
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were obliged to ensure that religious education continued through the war.  
At Whitehill, children’s bible period was replaced by religious instruction in 
the form of a short service every Tuesday morning at Rutherford Church.669  
The senior girls of Laurel Bank School who were evacuated to Auchterarder 
were free to choose which service they attended on Sundays.  Margaret and 
her friends chose the Episcopal Church service simply because it was 
quicker than the others, although she thought there was much more of a 
ritual than they were used to.670   Joan had a choice whether to go to mass or 
not, and chose to go.  Ina was made to kneel down and say her prayers every 
night by her foster parents, in order to maintain her religious observations.  
 
Colin’s religion was important to him and he enjoyed hymns and prayers, 
possibly as his mother was what he referred to as a ‘Salvation Army 
songster’.  He remembered being happy to take part in the morning hymn 
and prayers every day in school, when the partition between two classrooms 
was opened so that both sets of children could join in the service.671   For 
Dennis too, being evacuated with his family to Helensburgh meant that he 
could continue his religious education.  The problem was that when he 
returned to Clydebank he had to travel to East Dunbartonshire as there was 
no Catholic Senior Secondary in Clydebank.  It was not until 1961 that St. 
Columba’s Secondary school was built in Clydebank.672  Fitzpatrick argued 
that when the austerity of the post-war years passed, the Catholic secondary 
sector was expanded and transformed in accordance with the overall 
                                                 
669 Whitehill School Magazine, Number 49, November 1943.  
670 Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. Transcript held with author.                                                                                 
671 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
672 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.128. 
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restructuring of Scottish secondary education, following on from the 
Education Act of 1945.673   He further alluded to the fact that the acceptance 
of an expansion in Catholic educational provision was helped by the Labour 
Party coming to power in 1945, and claimed it was ‘the political if not the 
spiritual home of the majority of the Catholic community’.674   From this 
discussion it may be considered justifiable that religion was chosen as one of 
the three major themes of the evacuation process under discussion in this 
thesis.   
 
The concluding analysis of the themes under discussion here, in conjunction 
with the oral testimony, highlight the fact that it was predominantly the 
emotional and educational aspects of evacuation that were uppermost in the 
minds of former evacuees.   The trauma of separation was a particular factor 
that had to be overcome by evacuees such as Colin.   His experiences fitted 
with the parameters of psychological studies of long-term attachment theory.  
Alternatively, Les was so attached to his foster parents and life in the 
country that he never settled into life in Glasgow after the war.  Ina lived the 
rest of her life with the knowledge that her brother had felt abandoned 
during his evacuation and no one had ever attempted to address the problem 
of resentment he felt towards his family for many years after the war.     
 
This chapter looked at the way children coped with readjustment when they 
returned from reception areas, their attempt to adapt to school life, to fitting 
in to home life and family in the unfamiliar surroundings of their own home 
                                                 
673 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.103. 
674 Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.99. 
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and, for the Clydebank evacuees especially, in new homes or homes that had 
been repaired after war damage. There was no significant media coverage of 
returning evacuees at the end of the war as the majority had returned early, 
and those who remained in reception areas for the duration came back 
quietly.  Readjusting was not always easy, as Edna recalled.  She had felt so 
bad about going to High School when she returned to Glasgow that she ran 
away due to an overwhelming sense of loneliness.  Honour also found 
readjusting to school in Glasgow after just six weeks in Auchterarder very 
awkward.  She was very aware that pupils who returned to Laurel Bank 
School after being evacuated were treated as outsiders by the pupils who had 
stayed at home.  She said it was very much a situation of them-and-us.  Life 
as an evacuee and as a stay-at-home had equal problems in dealing with the 
disruption caused by war. The effects of dealing with school life in the city 
was recorded in the various magazines from Whitehill School, where 
teachers and pupils responded to the conditions of war.     
 
In the main there was little to substantiate the warfare to welfare theory 
among the respondents.  Only Isa and Charlie had appreciated that repairing 
and rebuilding of homes in Clydebank had begun before the end of the war, 
and that families were able to return to the area reasonably quickly in spite 
of the devastation the town had suffered.  None of the respondents were 
particularly conscious of the extended welfare benefits introduced during the 
war, such as school meals and milk, although Charlie did concede that he 
felt children were healthier as a result of rationing.675  None of the 
respondents were aware of or required the support of child guidance which 
                                                 
675 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014.  Transcript held with author. 
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was established before the war.  Child guidance facilities developed and 
extended throughout the war and in the post-war period.  However, children 
who were affected by the emotional trauma of separation often kept their 
feelings hidden till many years later.  Ina commented that children did not 
tend to discuss their feelings as openly as they should have at the time, and 
in the case of wartime, children including her own brother and interviewee 
Colin, they kept their own counsel till later in life.    
 
The human element of evacuation is demonstrated in the honest way each of 
the respondents told their story.  Unintentionally, and almost without 
exception, they displayed a strong sense of independence, developed 
possibly as a result of the resilience that it was necessary to adopt to help 
them face the reality of a traumatic and life changing situation, often 
undertaken alone and at a relatively young age.  In spite of this there is no 
bitterness evident in any one of these people concerning what happened to 
them.  None of the respondents had any real interest in the political side of 
the evacuation scheme or how the government dealt with arrangements and 
cost involved.  None were aware how much was paid to billeting families or 
assisted schemes.  They, as a group, are particularly unaware of the 
important role they played in the history of the Second World War, or the 
welfare improvements they helped to establish through their wartime 
experience.  They did not recognise that their evacuation helped create a new 
and permanent awareness of the importance of the child within society.  The 
growth and development of child guidance, more inclusive health care for 
pre-school and school children, improved school medical inspections, the 
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expansion of education for all and the growth and development of child and 
maternity care, all followed as a result of war and the evacuation experience.   
 
As a group, the general consensus was that they considered the experience to 
be looked upon as a process in their life which they could do nothing about 
and have appreciated the life experience it gave them.  The value of oral 
testimony lies with the fact that these stories provide the human side of 
evacuation.  While none of the interviewees who took part in this research 
suffered from the type of conditions which were presented by the Scottish 
Women’s Group on Public Welfare, it could be argued that, as the 
evacuation process highlighted the conditions in which some people were 
forced to live, it created a climate for political intervention and change, 
which made welfare a primary element of post-war liberal democracy.676 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
676 Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns (1944). 
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Conclusion     
  
It was all happy memories…and in the winter they got a lot of snow 
there compared to the city and there was a big field just across from 
this house and we used to go sledging.  I loved it! I just loved it!677 
         
In this concluding chapter attention will focus on the theoretical framework 
of the thesis and the way in which it was carried out, with a brief outline of 
the aims, objectives and methodology.  The chapter will include suggestions 
for further research which are beyond the remit of this study.  It will 
summarise the principal argument and discuss how this was developed and 
addressed in the body of the thesis.   
  
Overview of aims, objectives and methodology  
 
The aim of the thesis was to assess how far the warfare to welfare theory 
most often associated with the work of Richard Titmuss applied to the 
administration of evacuation in Scotland.678  The thesis objective was to 
show that oral history was the most appropriate approach to explore the 
picture of Scottish evacuation in relation to issues of health, education and 
religion.  A further objective was to deepen the knowledge of what happened 
to Scottish evacuees with the help of oral testimony, in turn providing 
enhanced evidence for the hitherto under recorded Scottish evacuee 
experience within the wider history of evacuation.  The method of analysis 
for the arguments both for and against this theory have been provided from 
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documentary evidence of welfare developments and through accounts of the 
governing process. 
 
The Theoretical Framework       
 
The foundation for the thesis was based on the fact that Scottish evacuees 
had been substantially overlooked in the history of evacuation after Boyd’s 
official record of Scottish evacuation was completed in 1944.679  The 
Scottish evacuation process had been treated in non-specific terms in much 
of the academic literature since the revival of interest in the subject in the 
1980s.  The major focus of academic attention had been predominantly on 
issues of health and education from an English perspective.  Religion 
features infrequently in this literature and again predominantly from an 
English viewpoint.  Hence this study has introduced a fresh perspective on 
the wartime evacuation experience.      
 
The warfare to welfare theory is most clearly defined by the Second World 
War, in particular through the evacuation process following which a much 
broader and substantial welfare system was introduced with the extension to 
education, child welfare and child guidance.  As Titmuss explained, 
evacuation gave rise to a much greater understanding of the need for social 
justice.  He wrote of evacuation that: 
 
…for five years of war the pressures for a higher standard of welfare 
and a deeper comprehension of social justice steadily gained in 
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strength.  …and despite all the handicaps of limited resources in men 
and materials, a big expansion took place in the responsibility 
accepted by the State for those in need.680     
 
This theory has been much debated among historians.   Thane and Rose, for 
example, while in agreement that war helped accelerate changes in welfare, 
believed post war improvements were along the lines advocated before the 
war.681   Rose wrote that the Second World War helped amplify the concern 
about social and economic inequality.682   Holman’s opinion accorded with 
the Titmuss theory that it was war and evacuation that prompted local and 
central government to extend the scope and nature of its welfare services.  
He believed evacuation heightened awareness of the importance of child 
care.683  Policy enactments of the post-war Labour administration directly 
link the warfare to welfare theory.  Addison pointed out, it presented Labour 
with the opportunity to complete and consolidate the work of the wartime 
coalition government.684  During the Labour government’s term in office, 
policy initiatives which were planned in 1930s, such as National Insurance, 
were brought to fruition; the nationalisation and housing programmes were 
achieved, and in 1948 the National Health Service was established.        
 
The political history of the period has been dealt with briefly in the body of 
the thesis but it was the social history which was the principal motivation.  
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Once the gap in the knowledge regarding Scottish evacuation was identified 
the questions were threefold; to find out why Scotland had been overlooked 
to a great extent in the history of evacuation, where it fitted into the existing 
academic work on evacuation, and how the improvements in social welfare 
affected Scottish evacuees.  From the outset it was intended to see how and 
why the Scottish evacuee arrangements and the experience of evacuees 
supported or contradicted a revision of broad based British evacuation 
history.  
 
Metropolitan research methods used by previous historians overlooked the 
‘celtic fringe’ and focused on south east England.  Reasons for this may be 
identified as a result of two specific factors.  Firstly, Scotland’s population 
was much smaller than England.  Secondly, the only other major evacuation 
in Scotland took place in March 1941 after Clydebank was bombed, whereas 
in England there were two further major evacuation schemes undertaken.   
However, on reflection comparative figures of evacuees in the first instance 
equate to similar numbers for Scotland and England and therefore deserve 
equal discourse in the historical narrative.  Scotland had a population of 
approximately five million people as opposed to England’s population which 
at the time was over forty-two million.  The number of Scottish evacuees 
amounted to approximately 175,000 and English evacuees amounted to 1.2 
million in the first instance.  In percentage terms these figures equated to 3.3 
per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively.  The difference in the numbers 
remaining in reception areas in Scotland and England was more pronounced 
by January 1940.  In Scotland approximately 23 per cent, representing 
30,972 schoolchildren, 4,182 pre-school children and 3,043 mothers, 
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remained in reception areas.685  By comparison, in England over half a 
million, or approximately 42 per cent remained in reception areas during the 
same period.686    
 
Once the decision was made to explore Scottish evacuation through personal 
accounts, finding people who were involved in the evacuation process meant 
advertising locally in newspapers, public libraries, and speaking to local 
historians.  Interviews were qualitative in nature as a lengthy questionnaire 
would have been less favourable to the by now, elderly respondents.  Telling 
their story in their own words helped create a more relaxed atmosphere and 
in turn produced a more rounded account of their experience.  In the case of 
the collection and analysis of evidence there is very little which could have 
been done differently, as a quantitative study would have yielded less 
definitive answers on the research themes.  The personally conducted 
interviews amounted to thirty, which included two focus groups of three and 
four people respectively.  Additional existing oral accounts have also been 
included from among the respondents for the ‘Glasgow 2000 Lives’ project.  
There were over sixty respondents to the project who mentioned their 
evacuation experience.  Of that number twenty-three of those interviews 
were pertinent to the themes of this thesis and their testimony has been used 
in the overall analysis.    
 
From these interviews it was possible to assimilate an extensive range of 
issues relating to the theoretical concepts under scrutiny.  Oral history as a 
research tool was fully explained to respondents who each gave consent to 
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their story being used in further research and for their stories to be stored 
with the University of Stirling library.  The respondents were from a range 
of backgrounds and the majority were included in the official evacuation 
scheme.  Two interviewees were from private schools and one person had 
been evacuated under private arrangements.  Three others were resident in 
reception areas and their families had taken in evacuees.  Among the group 
only two evacuees had remained in the reception areas for the duration of the 
war.  All the others had spent only weeks or months in reception areas 
during the early period of the war.   Seven of the interviewees from 
Clydebank had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and again after 
the bombing in March 1941.      
 
The conceptual framework designed around the oral testimony made it 
possible to observe the way in which the Scottish evacuation process 
evolved and the lasting effect the experience had on those involved.  It also 
helped to draw a justifiable conclusion to the hypothesis that oral history 
was necessary in order to determine the wider picture of the Scottish 
evacuation process.       
 
Parsons wrote that it was very difficult to find any semblance of a ‘norm’, 
and impossible to find a typical evacuee because their personal experiences 
were so different.687  However, from the testimonies collected for this thesis 
there are a number of distinct similarities especially among the Clydebank 
evacuees.  Through the use of collective, cultural and trauma memory, it was 
clear that all faced similar emotions such as fear, happiness, sadness, and 
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upset, while, at the same time, discovering that a different type of life 
existed than the one to which they had been accustomed.    
 
An awareness of their individual status, level of poverty and class was first 
realised among evacuees when they were settled in the countryside, although 
none of the respondents here fitted with the stereotypical dirty, verminous, 
ill-trained and ill-mannered evacuees from the slums identified in 1944 by 
the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare.688   The myth of poor ill-
kempt evacuee children from the inner cities, as Parsons has complained, is 
perpetuated by modern day textbooks which tend to rely on previously 
published generalised material.689   A definite social division in some 
reception areas caused complaints and objections to be raised by residents 
who had no wish to have anything more to do with evacuees after the first 
wave.  Colin and Violet mentioned their awareness of class within their 
billets, although this did not mean they felt they were deprived or 
impoverished by their situation.   
 
Chapters I 
 
Chapter I of this thesis centred on the construction and implementation of 
evacuation planning in the 1930s.  It dealt with the central administration for 
evacuation from the appointment of the Anderson Committee charged with 
the task of organising and planning, the role of the Scottish Health and 
Education Departments and the input of the voluntary sector.  The Anderson 
Committee was required to identify those districts likely to be most 
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 298 
vulnerable, those groups of people who should be included in the official 
scheme and to locate the potentially safe areas.  The Committee was also 
responsible for accommodation arrangements and the logistics involved in 
the movement of large numbers of people to areas of safety.   Deficiencies 
inherent in the original plans became evident in many of the basic 
requirements of the daily life once the evacuees arrived in reception areas 
and these problems and outcomes were discussed in Chapter II. 
 
 
Chapter II 
 
This chapter continued the theme of central administration and the way in 
which government agencies dealt with the outcome of the first evacuation 
scheme.  It explored evacuation in terms of educational provision, nursery 
and maternity care, and the possible enforcement of compulsory billeting.  
This chapter identified that planners had failed to take account of problems 
related to religious and cultural difference between host and evacuee.  Other 
issues discussed in this chapter were the use of propaganda as a tool for 
encouraging parents to leave their children in reception areas, the incentives 
involved in the assisted evacuation schemes and the overseas evacuation 
process.  This chapter concluded that the implementation of the first 
evacuation was perceived as a failure due to the substantial numbers who 
returned to danger areas before bombing began.  However, the public 
attention aroused by this initial evacuation of mothers and children 
accelerated welfare provision for vulnerable sections of society.    
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Chapter III 
 
This chapter substantiated the argument for warfare leading to welfare 
developments providing empirical evidence that the evacuation of pregnant 
women and young children was followed by effective and rapid wartime 
developments in child and maternity care.    
 
The Department of Health for Scotland’s Cathcart Report of 1936 had 
recommended a wide ranging provision of public health care by the state, 
but only the delivery of maternity care had been expanded by the outbreak of 
war.  However, the relatively vulnerable situation in which pregnant 
evacuees were placed directly led to rapid and progressive changes in care 
arrangements.  Writing a decade after the end of the war Ferguson and 
Fitzgerald wrote that war and evacuation impressed upon the nation the 
active need to take measures to maintain the health of babies and young 
children, and had shown up serious gaps that had existed in the pre-war 
services.690  They further stated that the emergency maternity scheme was 
one of the government’s most successful ventures during the war and 
became a catalyst for progress in areas of the country which had previously 
ignored the needs of expectant mothers.691  In Scotland this was exemplified 
by the opening of seven new maternity homes between 1939 and 1941, 
which raised the number of available beds in Scottish institutions from a 
total of 1,460 in 1938 to 2,178 by June 1944.692  After the war hospital 
confinement continued to grow in popularity in Scotland as the preferred 
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option for pregnant women, a trend only made possible due to the expanded 
wartime provision just noted.     
 
In support of the Titmuss theory the chapter noted there was a marked 
increase in the provision of wartime health and welfare delivered via health 
centres, medical officers, health visitors and social workers.  The chapter 
also focused on wartime child neglect which became more apparent through 
evacuation and, as a result, the number of child guidance clinics increased 
substantially after the war.  One such clinic was established in East Kilbride, 
near Glasgow.   By 1948 Nerston Child Guidance Clinic had treated 
upwards of 550 children suffering from emotional disorders.693   This 
chapter therefore substantiates the argument that the acceleration of 
healthcare changes afforded to mothers and young children was a direct 
result of war and evacuation. 
 
Chapter IV 
 
Religious adherence and attitudes of religious hierarchies to the evacuation 
process was the focus of chapter IV. The religious aspect of evacuation has 
been somewhat overlooked by evacuation historians.  This thesis has shown 
that catering for the needs of children during wartime extended beyond their 
physical health and wellbeing.  The maintenance of their religious welfare 
also played a pivotal role in the success or failure of the evacuation.  The 
chapter compared and contrasted the opinions of evacuees to their religious 
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observance at home before and during the time they were evacuated.  It also 
compared attitudes of Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish hierarchy to 
religious adherence during the evacuation process.  
 
Research for this chapter revealed that while majority faith groups were 
active in making special provisions for evacuees, local Church of Scotland 
parishes were less vociferous about the maintenance of their religious 
welfare.  The report from the Commission of Churches in 1941 observed 
that evacuation had depleted the numbers involved in youth societies and 
Sunday Schools, and caused a significant fall in the congregation which left 
a shortfall in the budget of the Church.694  Church records from Battlefield 
Church, in Glasgow, plus records from Linlithgow, Fife and St Andrews, 
including the Priory in St Andrews, in tandem with the papers from the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, showed no evidence of 
particular concern for the continued religious welfare of evacuees among 
their congregation.       
 
The warfare to welfare argument was prevalent here as it brought religion 
and welfare administration into closer collaboration.  In the post-war world 
of the 1950s, as Fitzpatrick pointed out, Church and state were brought 
closer together by legislation contained in the Education Act of 1945.  This 
made possible the expansion of Catholic education after the war as adequate 
and efficient provision was to be made for free primary, secondary and 
further education.695    
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Chapter V 
 
This chapter concerned children who stayed at home and those evacuees 
who had returned within the first weeks or months of their evacuation.  Here 
too the warfare to welfare theory is evident in the way schools dealt with the 
problem of ensuring the continuation of children’s education.   
 
War and evacuation had a detrimental effect on education when schools in 
evacuation areas were closed in the early months of the war.  Teaching staff 
evacuated with their class had been replaced with retired teachers and the 
call-up to national service affected the supply of male teachers.  In reception 
areas where a double-shift system operated, children received only half a 
day of teaching every day.  When city schools were in a position to reopen, 
accommodation was hampered by the fact that some schools had been 
occupied by military personnel.  Junior and senior leaving certificates were 
suspended at the beginning of the war.  The raising of the school leaving age 
to 15, which was due to be implemented the day war was declared, was also 
temporarily set aside.  Teachers attempted to combat some of these negative 
aspects with the establishment of home study groups in evacuation areas.  
These sessions helped bring teachers and pupils closer together, with both 
groups experiencing a renewed understanding of the other.   
 
This chapter also discussed the psychological aspect of evacuation and 
included extracts from interviews with the people who lived through the 
bombing raids on Clydebank.  The conclusion of the research showed that 
there was no long-term effect of school closure on educational attainment 
levels.  Furthermore, the modifications in education resulting from war and 
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evacuation had gradually and permanently changed the lives of children, 
which meant people like Edna were able to enjoy the effects of the new 
educational policy legislation when the school leaving age was raised.696                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Chapter VI 
 
This chapter was based on the oral testimonies of former evacuees in 
conjunction with documentary evidence and secondary sources.  It sought to 
demonstrate how their involvement helped shape the ensuing welfare 
developments which resulted from war and evacuation.     
  
The cumulative evidence from the oral interviews led to the conclusion that 
whatever way evacuation is remembered, and no matter how brief a period 
that was spent away from home, the experience is forever imprinted in the 
memory of those who took part.  There were no bravery medals given out to 
evacuees, or any particular recognition given to their courageous efforts to 
withstand the disruption and losses of war.  For people like Dennis, Charlie 
and Isa, who witnessed their homes being bombed and had to flee from 
Clydebank with nothing more than the clothes they wore, their stories have 
until now been left untold.697  For them, as for many of the Clydebank 
residents, the warfare to welfare theory is evident in the way in which they 
were able to rebuild their lives within a relatively short time after the blitz.  
Each of these evacuees had either returned with their family to their 
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refurbished or rebuilt homes, or been placed in new homes, often before the 
end of the war.  They shared the benefits of a renewed welfare system of 
medical care and, while they were unable to take advantage of an extended 
educational system, in time their children were able to enjoy what their 
parents had helped to achieve.  From the interviews it was evident that there 
was a quiet acceptance of what happened to these evacuees.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum this thesis has argued that evacuation was instrumental in alerting 
government and the public to the profound necessity for action in health, 
education and living conditions of the children from the cities.  It touched 
upon the policy implications of evacuation and its impact on the political 
climate in the aftermath of the war and of the Labour Party’s rise to power.  
The thesis did not cover the actions of the Labour government in the post-
war years, the coming of the National Health Service, Insurance Services or 
the extent of the implementation of Beveridge’s Report of 1942 on the fight 
against the five giants of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness, 
since these were beyond the focus of this research topic.  What this thesis 
has done is to help illuminate Scotland’s social history of wartime 
evacuation and place it within that of the rest of Britain.  It has helped to 
qualify and exemplify the theory that war ultimately led to improved 
provision in the areas of health, welfare and education of the Scottish 
people.  It did not make a judgement on the overall success or failure of the 
evacuation scheme as a wartime expedient, instead it judged the extent to 
which it was a substantial contributory factor in the resultant social welfare 
developments.   
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The significance of interviews conducted and the theoretical framework 
were provided to support a wide ranging consideration of the three main 
issues of health, education and religion.  It is evident further local and 
regional studies on the subject of the fate of evacuees from within Britain 
and abroad would be beneficial.  Moreover research into residential hostels 
and nurseries, the sick and the elderly, and the developments in adult, 
technical and university education, for those who lived through the 
evacuation experience, would also further enhance the knowledge of the 
evacuation process. 
 
The evidence contained in this collection of oral histories has proved that 
even seventy-five years on, the memory of events remains clear in the minds 
of those who took part in it.  Their willingness to help establish the 
framework for this thesis by agreeing to be interviewed and having their 
stories recorded and used as a reference for future researchers, is testimony 
to the value they place on their wartime experience.  A key component of 
this thesis therefore lies in the collection and collation of oral testimony 
from Scottish evacuees.   
 
When the narratives are viewed alongside the comprehensive written 
research material, it is clear that the recorded experiences within the 
evacuation process display a recognition of the need for social reforms in a 
number of areas.  This principle was touched upon by the Commission of 
Churches which reported in 1941.  Their study, Evacuation and the 
Churches, inferred that within the evacuation process the seeds of social 
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good might be cultivated.698  It was also hoped they would be wisely 
cultivated as valuable compensation could be reaped by a future generation.  
In agreement with the findings of the Commission of Churches this thesis 
concludes with the view that the amalgam of activities affecting evacuees, 
exemplified by this study of the Scottish experience, led to an improvement 
in the quality and quantity of social welfare provided to post-war 
generations.    
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
698 Commission of the Churches, Evacuation and The Churches (1941), p29. 
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Appendix 1 
  
Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011. 
 
Evacuated:  Coull, Aberdeen, 1 September 1939. 
Duration 2 months. 
Dunblane, Perthshire, March 1941. 
Duration 2 years. 
 
This interview was part of a small focus group of three people, Ina and two 
relatives: Chrissy and David.  All three had been evacuated at the beginning 
of the war.  Ina and Chrissy were evacuated again after the bombing raids on 
Clydebank. 
 
Ina’s recollection of events was most vivid.  She had been evacuated to 
Coull in Aberdeen at the beginning of the war with her two sisters and her 
brother.  In Aberdeen she recalled how much she had enjoyed being there.  
She said there was ‘never any strife there and we got on well, we loved the 
school and had a happy, happy time’.  She spoke of having experienced the 
stars for the first time saying: 
 
…it was the first time in my life I saw the stars properly.  …when the 
nights were a bit darker and the schoolteachers were telling us about 
the stars and I was fascinated.  You live in the city, we lived right in 
the city, you never saw that! 
 
Ina and one sister and brother were evacuated again in March 1941.  This 
time they were sent to Dunblane in Stirlingshire.  There she also enjoyed her 
life as an evacuee.  It was her opinion that they had a better life in Dunblane 
than they had had in Glasgow.  She explained the family situation in 
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Glasgow where they lived in a room and kitchen in Gallowgate.  Their 
family situation was such that all four children shared a bed, and mother and 
father slept in a bed recess in their kitchen.  They had a shared toilet with the 
neighbours which was located on the tenement landing.  She said of 
Dunblane, ‘…it was all happy memories and in the winter they got lots of 
snow there compared to the city’.  She remembered sledging there, ‘I loved 
it. I just loved it!’  She said they were so happy in Dunblane and they never 
felt homesick.  So much so that they did not want to go back to Glasgow. 
   
Religion played a part in Ina’s evacuation.  The two years they spent in 
Dunblane Ina and her sister had lived in two different billets, both of which 
they had settled into well and enjoyed.  Ina, a Roman Catholic, pointed out 
that in both places the family were Protestants although they made sure Ina 
and her sister Jessie went to mass every Sunday.  While they were there they 
were made to kneel down and say their prayers at night.  The family, she 
thought, had been very kind to them.   
   
She realised that they never spoke about the evacuation when they went 
home, nor did she ever think to ask her parents what had happened to them 
while the children were away.  She never found out where her parents had 
lived when their home was uninhabitable after the bombing raids.   
 
Issues of separation and abandonment discussed in the thesis was a focus of 
Ina’s testimony.  They did not see their brother at all in the two years they 
spent in Dunblane.  He had been sent to live with a family on a farm in 
Sheriffmuir.  Years later she said John told her, ‘I quite liked living on the 
farm Ina but I was so lonely.  I just felt I’d been abandoned’.   
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Ina said, ‘…he had always kind of resented my parents for a long time and I 
never knew this was what it was’.  She said that when she looked back over 
their lives then she felt ashamed that neither she nor her sister had given 
John a second thought or missed him at all.  Her only excuse, she admitted, 
was that they were just nine and elven years old at the time and they were 
happy with the life they were living.  It was, she said, ‘a case of out of sight 
out of mind’.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 1 July 2011. 
 
Evacuated:  John - Drumoak, Aberdeenshire, September 1939  
   Duration 4 weeks.  
  Joan - Cumnock, East Ayrshire, Easter 1940 
   Duration – Two or three months. 
 
Husband and wife John and Joan were interviewed together.  John had been 
evacuated at the beginning of the war under the official evacuation scheme.  
John’s stay away from home lasted four weeks while Joan thought she was 
away for a number of months at least.  Joan had a very different evacuation 
experience from her husband.  She had been sent privately with her siblings 
around Easter 1940, after her aunt and cousins had gone to Cumnock, and 
reported back that the neighbour of the family they were staying with was 
taking in evacuees.   
 
John was slightly confused about the date of the war starting and the date of 
his evacuation.  He remembered going from Glasgow to Aberdeen by train 
and that he and his sister had been billeted on a farm in a fairly isolated part 
of the countryside.  He recalled that there had been two other evacuees, a 
mother and daughter, who shared the room with them. 
 
John’s evacuation was relatively short and he had continued to go to school 
while he was in Aberdeen. Coming home was also quite easy as he said, 
‘…most of the people in the school that we were at were people who were 
from the original school that we were evacuated from’. 
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John and his sister never really settled in Aberdeen, partly due to the 
isolation and the two mile walk to school and back each day.  Every week a 
letter came from their parents and in the letter there was a sixpenny piece.  
His sister saved these until they had enough to send a telegram home asking 
that their parents collect them.  When John and his sister returned to 
Glasgow their school was still closed and they had no education for a while.   
 
Joan had been evacuated with her sisters and brother to Cumnock and she 
felt her education had suffered while she was there.  None of the others in 
the class were evacuees.  She was in a class of children of varying ages who 
were all taught together, and she was annoyed by the fact that she had 
already been taught fractions and decimals and had to go through the process 
again.  She felt the teacher never spoke to her and that she had learned 
nothing while she was evacuated.     
 
Joan spoke of her sister having missed out on an education much more than 
she or her brother.  Joan’s sister had looked after the family rather than the 
people they were billeted with. Joan said: 
 
…my sister looked after us, she took us to school and brought us 
back, so she lost her education then because she’d been out of school 
for so long, she was a very clever girl too.  She did well but she did 
actually die very young but she didn’t get her education back.   
 
Joan continued: 
 
 312 
I wasn’t so bad because I made it all up eventually…but certainly you 
lost your confidence when you came back. So although it was just 
months and the summer went into it, you’d missed quite a lot of your 
friends, and your education, your exams and you just felt different.  You 
just felt you had missed a lot.    
 
 
On the issue of religion Joan, who was Roman Catholic was told that they 
could go to Church one afternoon a week for their religious education.  She 
said, ‘…but we didn’t have to go, I was one of four and I went because I 
liked it.  But I remember my two big sisters and my brother didn’t want to 
go’. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Interview with Edna, recorded on 1 July 2010. 
 
Evacuated:   Dunning, Perthshire, September 1939. 
Duration: Five/six years. 
 
Edna was six years old when she was evacuated at the beginning of the war 
and spent between five and six years in the small village of Dunning on the 
outskirts of Perth.  She had three different billets during that time and felt 
happy and settled there.  When she went home she had some difficulty 
fitting back into school life in Glasgow. 
 
At the beginning of the interview Edna insisted she did not remember very 
much about her life as an evacuee.  However, as the interview progressed it 
was clear she remembered a great deal. 
 
Edna spoke about her family circumstances and of the fact that her father 
had died the year before war broke out.  Her mother stayed in Glasgow to 
look after her own father, and they had made plans for air raids in an attempt 
to secure the life of at least one or other of them in order that there would be 
someone to look after the children if the war ended.  She said: 
 
…there were shelters built in the back court and a shelter in Alexandra 
Park so my Grandad would go to one and she (mother) would go to 
the other.  That was always the case…that they split up so that one 
would be left. 
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Edna and her two brothers were evacuated with their school in Dennistoun, 
Glasgow to the small village of Dunning in Perthshire, and she has very 
happy memories of the time she spent there.  Her memory is of having to be 
chosen from a line of children and of her mother’s insistence that the family 
stay together.  In her opinion this had been very difficult especially as the 
Dunning farmers had wanted boys.  When they had to move from their 
second billet to make way for Canadian soldiers her older brother was sent 
to a dairy farm and she and her younger brother were sent to live at the local 
manse.   
 
She remembered that many of the Glasgow children left Dunning and 
supposed this was when the bombing raids had died down.  When her 
second brother returned to Glasgow she stayed on in Dunning.  She recalled 
that when she finally went home it had been difficult to settle.  She said: 
 
It was just a tiny wee school.  It was very strict…which I suppose we 
were quite used to.  But coming back I think that would be more, you 
know when you have stayed in a village for five years and you get to 
know people and then you come back to Glasgow and you just don’t 
know anybody. 
 
She continued: 
 
It was awful…I remember going to Whitehill School and going into 
the classroom and nobody wanted to sit beside me because I didn’t go 
to their primary school, everybody was sitting with people from their 
primary school.  I felt as if I knew nobody and at playtime I just 
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thought, I have had enough of this I am going home…I only knew you 
took the number seven tram not realising it went to Riddrie and 
Bellahouston and I took it the wrong way.  Looking back…I don’t 
think I really ever settled at secondary school because of that.  We 
made friends eventually.  It was just never the same, it was a bit sad. 
 
She remembered with some sadness that: 
 
There was nobody around that had been evacuated, my brothers of 
course had left school by that time.  I just didn’t know anybody at all.  
Whereas if I had been in Dunning, I was the Dux of the Dunning 
School…if you had gone on to secondary school you would have 
taken all this with you.  Whereas you were just nobody when you 
went to this school and nobody wanted to know.  I felt that was quite 
harrowing. 
 
Edna has fond memories of Dunning and has returned many times.    
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Appendix 4 
 
Interview with Barbara, 30 June 2014. 
 
Evacuated:   Banff, Aberdeenshire, 1 September 1939. 
  Duration: Four months. 
 
There was a technical failure during this interview and it did not record.  
Barbara’s story was transcribed verbatim in order that she could read and 
verify it at the time. 
 
At the beginning of the war Barbara was evacuated with her mother to Banff 
in Aberdeenshire, she was five years old.  She remembered there were 
children from her school and children from other Edinburgh schools who 
were all evacuated together.  Barbara and her mother were billeted in a 
house with a family of five children and settled reasonably well, although 
her mother was quite homesick.   
 
Most of Barbara’s recollections were of coming back to Edinburgh in 
January 1940 and of how her education developed.  This information was 
pertinent to the educational issues involved in the thesis.  Barbara recalled 
that:   
 
When we came back home the schools in Edinburgh were all closed 
and the teacher came and taught us in a room in someone’s house.  
There were quite a few of us being taught together but I don’t 
remember whose house it was.  From what I remember I think we 
were taught there every morning. 
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She continued: 
 
I think it was about a year until the schools re-opened and the home 
study programme kept going all the time the schools were closed so 
we never missed any of our education. 
 
When schools reopened teachers had seemed quite old, although she 
believed: 
 
After the schools re-opened life carried on as normal.  Classes were 
just the same…the only difference was that while the war continued 
the German planes flying back to Germany, after bombing in 
Glasgow, would drop bombs indiscriminately, just to lighten their 
load for flying back home.  
 
Barbara did not remember much about what happened at the end of the war 
although she remembered rationing and thought people were healthier as a 
result of it and said, ‘…on the whole people were fitter and healthier than 
they are now’. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Interview with Jack, 10 July 2012. 
 
Evacuated:   Rothesay 1940. 
  Duration: Four months. 
 
Jack has been deaf from birth and his interview was not recorded.  He had 
given a series of talks to various school groups on his wartime experiences.  
He passed on these printed notes which included a section on his evacuation 
to Rothesay in the summer of 1940. 
 
Jack and his mother were evacuated to Rothesay with his cousins (he refers 
to them as hearing cousins).  Jack could not go to school in Rothesay as 
there was no deaf school there.  As a result he felt he missed out 
considerably on his education.  He stayed in Rothesay until September 1940 
and while he was there he missed his friends who started leaving him out 
when he returned to Glasgow. 
 
The family had to move to Ilford in 1943 and Jack went to a hearing school 
there.  It was Jack’s opinion that war had temporarily affected his education, 
although he felt that once the teachers understood his handicap he began to 
get on well at school with the other pupils and staff.    By the end of the war 
he felt he had managed to attain a high level of education, and on leaving 
school he was given a good report and recommendations from the Head 
Teacher.  This helped him gain employment as a printing apprentice. 
 
It was in Ilford that Jack really suffered the effects of war as he witnessed 
the death of friends and neighbours when their homes suffered direct hits by 
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German bombers.  These traumatic events have stayed with Jack throughout 
his life and in his personal testimony he freely admits that it affected every 
part of his life as a result of witnessing bombing and death at first hand. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Interview with Les, recorded on 6 July 2010. 
 
Evacuated:  Dunning, Perthshire, 1 September 1939. 
Duration:   Five years. 
 
Les was evacuated to Dunning, Perthshire, with his school in Dennistoun, 
Glasgow, at the beginning of the war.  He moved back to Dunning and the 
people he had been billeted with after completing his National Service.  He 
has lived there ever since.  He said:  
 
I went…to stay with my grandparents because my mother died when I 
was two and my father was killed in the war.  They (the grandparents) 
came up to Dunning occasionally…I came back to Dunning in 
September 1955.  I liked the country.  I liked the way of life here.699  
  
Arriving as an evacuee his lasting memory was the fear of being left behind 
when all the other children had been picked.  His testimony reflected the 
worry expressed by evacuees generally concerning being the last child left 
when all the others had been billeted. 
 
When Les was chosen however it was to be completely life changing.  The 
couple who had chosen him were to become his family not just for the 
duration of the war but forever.  This was in spite of the fact that in the 
beginning he felt the locals and the evacuees did not really mix much.  He 
said:   
                                                 
699 Interview with Les, recorded on 4 July 2010.  See full transcript in Appendix 6. 
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We had our own school and teachers and a bit of banter kind of thing.  
We called them Country yokels they called us Glasgow Keelies. 
  
Les settled into country life and it suited him so much more than living in 
Glasgow.  He felt much more at home in Dunning and discussed the class 
structure surrounding his Glasgow home.  He explained:  
 
Actually the part that I lived in Glasgow you can say it wasn’t a rough 
area it was a snobby area.  It is a rough area now.  More or less it is, 
apart from they have made the old school into luxury flats.  So that’s 
the kind of area but I like the country.  The man that I was evacuated 
with, he was a haulage contractor.  The Army took the lorries off him 
when Dunkirk happened.  They gave him a couple of long lorries.  He 
got fed up with them and started travelling for a living and that’s 
where I come in.  That’s what I liked about here.  That was one of the 
main reasons I came back here.  I liked the way of life. 
 
When asked if that was why he went back to Dunning after the Army and 
after school he replied: 
 
I got sent to a public school Chingford in Essex and I hated it.  My 
auntie put me there. …I hated it. I didn’t fit in there at all coming 
from here.  I talked my Granny into signing my papers and joined the 
Army to get out.  …I joined Boy Service in the Army.  I went into the 
Army on 15 January 1947.  The Army was different in those days.  I 
was in Tripoli and Libya.  …when I was only 15.  
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From the Army Les came straight back to Dunning in 1955 and settled there.  
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Appendix 7 
 
Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014. 
 
Evacuated:  Coatbridge, Lanarkshire, 1 September 1939. 
  Duration: One year. 
  Helensburgh, March 1941. 
  Duration: Three years. 
 
Charlie had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and again when 
Clydebank was bombed.  He gave a personal interview and was also part of 
a small focus group of four who were all involved in a writing group in 
Clydebank.  His story is included in the Clydebank Lifestory Group, Untold 
Stories: Remembering Clydebank in War Time (Clydebank: Clydeside Press, 
1999).     
 
Charlie and his family were evacuated after the bombing in Clydebank near 
Glasgow.  He believed that until the day he dies the memory of that time 
will stay with him.  He said: 
 
You sort of grew up with the thought of the whole of Clydebank, out 
of the 47,000 houses there was only 7 not touched.  To see the bodies 
at that age! 
 
His family home suffered a direct hit from an incendiary bomb and Charlie 
described saving his brother.  He said: 
 
This one came right in and hurt my mother on the foot and it fell over 
and burst into flames.  It would have set anything on fire but because 
it was concrete it didn’t…  It was like putting a fluorescent light on 
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and you couldn’t see it.  My dad just pulled my mother out, lifted the 
baby out…I jumped over the bomb and then my brother wouldn’t 
come out, he was in the corner screaming his head off.  I had to jump 
back in and take him and we both jumped over the bomb and that was 
it…it was an incendiary bomb but if it had been a bomb we wouldn’t 
be here today to tell the story. 
 
The children had to leave their bombed out house bare footed and wearing 
only their pyjamas.  When the family got to an air raid shelter another 
incendiary bomb blew up three feet away from them.  Charlie’s fear at this 
time was that they would be buried with the earth from the explosion.       
 
Directly after the bombing Charlie and his family were evacuated to 
Coatbridge for a short time.  They had a room in someone’s house which all 
six of them shared for at least a year.  Two further years were spent in 
Renfrew with relatives before the family moved to Whitecrook, eventually 
returning to their Clydebank home which was rebuilt in 1945. 
 
During his evacuation Charlie felt his education suffered.  He felt cheated 
when, having turned fourteen before the war ended, he had had to leave 
school.  This meant he was unable to make up the time that had been lost 
when schools were closed at the beginning of the war. He said: 
 
I remember the schools being shut and the army was in the schools.  
You ended up either in a Church Hall getting slightly educated part of 
the day and then that fell away and I felt I had lost a lot of schooling, 
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you know with shifting from Coatbridge to Renfrew, from Renfrew to 
Whitecrook and finally getting back to our own house.    
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Appendix 8 
  
Interview with Violet, recorded on 17 October 2014. 
 
Evacuated:   Helensburgh, Dunbartonshire, March 1941.   
Duration: Six months. 
 
When the advertisement was placed in the Clydebank Post for volunteers to 
give an account of their evacuation experience during the Second World 
War, the assistant at the newspaper office had a contact at the Clydebank 
Life Story Group.  She gave them the details and the organiser of the group 
helped locate a number of people willing to re-count their wartime 
experience.  Violet was eighteen when she was evacuated and was keen to 
tell her story.  Her experience of the Clydebank Blitz appears in Untold 
Stories: Remembering Clydebank in War Time (Clydebank: Clydeside Press, 
1999).  
 
When the war arrived in Glasgow, Violet’s family home in Clydebank was 
destroyed by a bomb, a home her widowed mother had saved for and they 
had lived in for only six weeks.  After their home was bombed Violet’s 
brother went with some of her relatives to Helensburgh.  She and her mother 
stayed on until further air raids forced them to make their way there too.  
They had to walk part of the way and tried to hitch a ride from passing cars.  
It was at that time Violet was very aware of her social status as she described 
what happened.  She said: 
 
…this big posh car stopped, chauffeur driven car, and the man who 
was the passenger, he opened the door and says ‘are you from 
Clydebank?’ and we said ‘yes’.  He asked where we were going and 
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we told him we were trying to get to Helensburgh…so they took us in 
a chauffeur driven car from Dumbarton to Helensburgh. 
 
Violet, with her mother and brother, remained in Helensburgh for six months 
and Violet travelled daily to the Singer Sewing Machine Company, in 
Clydebank, where she worked as a shorthand typist.  The family were 
billeted in upper Helensburgh with a lady whom she described as ‘very 
posh’ in a ‘great big house’ but, she added, she had ‘no feelings 
whatsoever’.       
 
The awareness of the social division between host and evacuee was evident 
in much of Violet’s testimony.  During the interview she mentioned that on 
her return to Helensburgh, after a particularly long day, she thought she 
would walk the quick way along the drive to their room in the servant’s 
quarters, when she was stopped by one of the servants.  She described what 
happened saying: 
 
…it was a long day cause you were away about seven in the morning 
and not maybe back to about seven at night.  Anyway, I decided 
instead of going straight up I would go in the big drive…so I cut off 
this big corner you see.  …she came to the front door and said ‘don’t 
you ever use this drive again’.  So I had to go back down and come 
away back round again and go in the servant’s entrance. 
 
Violet stressed how annoyed she was about the servant’s attitude as she 
shared a room with her mother.  She said: 
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My mother and my brother, who was fifteen, he was three years 
younger than me, were allocated, must have been one of the servant’s 
rooms, and there were only two beds in it, two single beds, like 
hospital beds.  Well we didn’t mind that if they had been free but my 
mother and I had to share a bed and she was getting paid for three 
people.  …you know she really wasn’t a nice person. 
      
In spite of the billeting arrangements and having to travel back and forward 
to work daily Violet enjoyed much of life in Helensburgh.  She said that: 
 
It was a lovely summer and you had the bathing pool and my chum, 
they lived up in Mill Road.  She was quite well off, her father was a 
manager in Yarrows so they paid for their accommodation at 
Craigendoran.  Erin and I were in the swimming pool and out on the 
rowing boats and all the rest of it.  We were having a great time but 
my brother was absolutely fed up. 
 
As a result, when her mother returned to Clydebank Violet stayed on in 
Helensburgh and continued to enjoy the sporting activities.   
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Appendix 9 
 
Interview with Honour, recorded on 13 November 2014. 
 
Evacuated: Auchterarder, Perthshire, 7 September 1939. 
  Duration: Six weeks. 
 
Honour was a pupil at Laurel Bank School in Glasgow and one of two 
privately educated pupils who were interviewed.  She was evacuated with 
her school at the beginning of the war.  The week after war was declared 
Honour’s parents had taken her to Strathallan Castle where the juniors were 
staying.  The senior pupils from the school were billeted in Auchterarder.  
She was there for just six weeks as she said: 
 
My parents brought me home because they didn’t see the sense in me 
being evacuated and Alistair (her brother) being in town.  They 
thought we might as well all be together and so I spent the rest of the 
war at home. 
 
Her parents were of the opinion that if anything happened to one of the 
family, it might as well happen to all of them.  Honour had not really 
enjoyed being at Strathallan.  The girls all slept in camp beds and there was 
no privacy whatsoever.  When she returned to school in Glasgow she 
thought there was a definite divide between those who had stayed behind 
and those who had been evacuated.  She said: 
 
I can remember them (the evacuees) coming back to school when they 
were about, must have been 14 or 15 I think.  It was the evacuees and 
the rest of us.  They were obviously friendly with each other but it 
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was very much Auchterarder and Lily Bank.  I think some of them, 
depending probably on their age, in fact I know some of them were 
still Strathallenites or Auchterarderites until we left school.  They 
made their friends and I think they just carried on with them and we 
had ours but we were very, initially, we were pretty much divided.  
Auchterarder sat there and Lily Bank sat there sort of thing. 
 
The fact that Laurel Bank School re-opened so soon after war being declared 
meant Honour felt she had not missed out on her education.  She said: 
 
…our education really didn’t suffer in any way at all.  It was a 
relatively short space of time although we were three classes in one 
initially and just in house four which was the end of the terrace, but by 
the end of the war we were using all our houses and we had all gone 
back to individual classes. 
 
Honour’s school and home life were fairly back to normal before the war 
ended and she did not remember anything about the end of the war.  Most of 
Honour’s interview surrounded her return to Glasgow and to Laurel Bank 
School which had been re-opened by an ex-headmistress within the first 
month of the war.  The site of the junior school was Lily Bank Terrace 
where the school had three houses.  As war progressed the school got more 
or less back to normal.  They carried on playing sport all through the war, 
travelling from Botanic Gardens to Scotstoun Hill to the playing fields once 
or twice a week for games.  They travelled by tramcar or bus and latterly it 
was her opinion that they would not have known there was a war on apart 
from the air raid warnings.  She recalled they had, ‘…an air raid warning 
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every day initially and we all had to foregather, I think in our classrooms 
initially, but I then think laterally in the cloakroom’.  
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Appendix 10  
 
Interview with Jim, recorded on 4 July 2010. 
 
Jim is a resident of Dunning, Perthshire.  Jim began his testimony with the 
memory of the day the evacuees arrived in the village.  His narrative is 
representative of the way in which evacuation was responsible for the 
development of lasting friendship: 
 
I would be 9 when they arrived in September.  All I can mind is the 
bus bringing them up from the railway station. I think they were a 
rough lot. A lot of them were really wee… 
There was as many of them gone away home just within a month 
because nothing had happened then.  I think they did a re-evacuation 
after Clydebank.  …It was amazing how quickly we all managed to fit 
into the school again.  They actually used what was the cookery, as 
what we talk about which is now the Community use hall up the top 
of Dregan, at the top of the Brae.  By that time they still had two of 
their own teachers here I think…  We didn’t have a lot to do with 
them in that respect. Now their teachers were in in the morning our 
teachers were in in the afternoon. That was it you just never the twain 
shall meet kind of thing.  There was no cross purposes. 
They were half days.  I cannot tell you how long as the memory 
doesn’t… they had half days. Because that was you free in the 
afternoon if there wasn’t any tatties. 
 
Jim spoke of the two Glasgow evacuees who were billeted with his family: 
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Well John, Billy and us became very friendly all the way through. 
Because John as I say went to Middle Third you didn’t go to the first. 
Him and Billy and they were brought back from Middle Third and 
went into St. Paul’s Church Manse.  Their sister was with them as 
well but it was after that that they came to us. They were with us for 
about two years.  They were among I would say among the last of 
them to be back. 
…They lived as part of the family. The mother used to come up and 
visit and after they left us they went to Balgowan House near 
Methven.  I don’t think they were that long there because by that time 
things had died down a bit as far as evacuees were concerned and they 
were just away back home.  
 
When the war was over the family stayed in touch with their Glasgow 
evacuees and they remained lifelong friends. 
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Appendix 11 
 
Interview with David, recorded on 4 July 2010. 
 
David has lived in Dunning in Perthshire all his life.  He was a schoolboy of 
eight when approximately 300 evacuee children from Glasgow arrived in the 
village at the beginning of the war. 
 
When the evacuees arrived with some of their teachers the little school with 
about 100 pupils was suddenly crowded.  They had to work a double-shift 
system where the Dunning children were taught in the afternoon and the 
evacuees in the morning session.  David complained that he would rather 
have been taught in the forenoon.  He said: 
 
…we had to stay clean until the afternoon where I’d rather have been 
in the forenoon and get away playing …but apart from that we got on 
fine. 
 
It was his opinion that some of the Glasgow children had no idea how to 
treat the wildlife they found in the village and that: 
 
…one or two of them were wildish, I got four up the wood there and 
they stole a duck from the farmer and lit the fire up the den and 
chopped it’s head off with a chopper and was roasting the duck on the 
fire… 
 
He remembered that a lot of the children went back to Glasgow quite 
quickly only to return when the bombing raids began in Clydebank.   
 335 
Private evacuees from the South of England were also in Dunning and there 
were some borstal boys from Glasgow who were billeted in Auchterarder.  
David met some of these people again when he did his national service.  
Overall David had no problem with the evacuees who came to live in the 
village and understood how they were kept sheltered from the events of the 
war. 
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Appendix 12 
 
Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. 
 
Evacuated:  Helensburgh: 1 September 1939. 
  Duration:  Four months. 
  Helensburgh: March 1941. 
  Duration:  Two years and two months. 
 
The above dates are loosely estimated.  Dennis had been evacuated at the 
beginning of the war and, like the other Clydebank evacuees interviewed for 
this thesis, he returned to his home before the town was bombed. 
 
Dennis did not remember much about his first evacuation at the beginning of 
the war.  What he remembered most was what happened after the bombing 
in Clydebank when he and his family were taken to a primary school in 
Coatdyke, a little village which lies between Coatbridge and Airdrie, in what 
is now north Lanarkshire.  The family, he recalled had to sleep on blankets 
on the floor in one of the classrooms. After a few weeks the family were 
moved to a friend’s home in Helensburgh.  
 
Dennis had no problems having to be evacuated and thought the experience 
was generally good.  He remembered his teacher as ‘a wonderful person.  
…she had a soft touch with the evacuees but she treated everybody the 
same’.  Going back to Glasgow in 1943 he said: 
  
…life went on, it was terrific, the orange juice and cod liver oil, you 
don’t take anything for granted.  No, it was great.  
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On the subject of his continued education he explained that he was Roman 
Catholic and there was only one Catholic school in West Dunbartonshire 
that offered a higher education.  He said that: 
 
…you had to score on a four hour exam, two hours in the morning and 
two in the afternoon.  You had to score over 75% to get the higher 
education.  I can remember that there was 7 of us, out of close on 70 
in the class.  All the classes were muddled but that was it, I thought it 
was disgraceful myself.  Very clever kids getting deprived for one or 
two marks.  …you could leave when you were not quite fourteen.      
 
He remembered his mother was very nervous when the family returned to 
Clydebank and, in his words, ‘wouldn’t let me out of her sight’.  He said: 
 
That was the same for all the other brothers.  They didn’t let you off 
the leash too far.  You had to be in at night as soon as it was starting 
to get dark…  Eventually the war was going well for us.  …parents 
were able to relax then.  We knew that after D-Day that it was just a 
matter of time. 
  
Some of what Dennis said in his interview pointed to the fact that the 
emotional trauma children suffered during the war went undetected.  
Dennis’s happy memory of being evacuated was overshadowed by the 
dramatic and fearful events he experience during the Clydebank blitz.  He 
had recurring nightmares and remembered being stressed out with broken 
sleep for months afterwards.  He said: 
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…that affected you and you don’t get any doctor to come up to you 
and give you a wee sedative or anything like that, you had to just grin 
and bear it you know. 
 
Dennis recognised that what he suffered at the time was a type of post-
traumatic stress.  This was never discussed with his family and therefore the 
problem had never been addressed.  
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Appendix 13 
 
Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. 
 
Evacuated:  Auchterarder, Perthshire. 1 September 1939. 
Duration: One year. 
 
Margaret was the second pupil from Laurel Bank School in Glasgow who 
agreed to be interviewed.  She was a senior in her last year of school when 
war broke out.  The senior school girls were evacuated to Auchterarder and 
the junior school girls were sent to Strathallan Castle.  At seventeen 
Margaret recalled not being at all homesick when she was sent to 
Auchterarder and rather enjoyed the time she spent in the countryside.  She 
described where they stayed and the surrounding area: 
 
Half a dozen of us were billeted up in the village with the local lawyer 
who was a very respectable bloke and had a large house with a garden 
sloping down to the river…  It is very full of Churches which I have 
never really worked out, but it has a big history connected to the 
Disruption, so you have a choice of Churches.   
 
As far as Churches go, two of my fellow students, I suppose you 
would call them fellow pupils, were still doing Greek so they had to 
go to one of the Ministers of one of the Churches who had enough 
Greek to do a little teaching.  So they used to go down to him, but for 
Sunday we were always expected to go to Church.  We found out that 
the service in the Episcopal Church was shorter.  Our English teacher 
was an Episcopalian so half a dozen of us unreligious lot said we 
would go… 
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On health care during evacuation Margaret said:   
 
The girls who were up with me were supposed to be in need of special 
care.  My sister came because she hadn’t been well and she stayed on 
for three years and I was there for one year. 
 
She thought the girls had: 
 
…a very cushy billet I must say although it wasn’t terrifically 
comfortable.  We had camp beds and it was rather cold.  …the 
unfortunate people were landed with us you see.  If we had been from 
the east end of Glasgow we would have gone back as quickly as we 
could.  But we stayed on.  
 
Margaret enjoyed the fresh air and the outdoor activities.  She said: 
 
It was very cold that autumn and winter and very beautiful, lovely 
clear skies and I had never been a whole year long in the country, and 
I thought it was really rather good because it is lovely country round 
there.  It was so easy to get around on a bike.  There was little traffic 
and we had a lot of freedom.  At weekends we would go off on 
bicycle rides for five or ten miles, something like that, which was 
really very nice, we were very free.   
It wasn’t like the standard boarding school on which we were fed 
stories of course, all of us had read school stories like Angela Brazil, 
the Chalet Girls, that kind of thing, but it was much more fun than 
that.  We knew everybody.  We were trusted in a way and quite 
 341 
rightly I think because we weren’t too silly, and so we went roaming 
round that area… 
…we had a regular run on school work.  We more or less followed the 
same curriculum that we would have done.  In some ways I should say 
it was rather like a kind of school that… in the mid nineteenth century 
a young lady would have gone to in terms of academic rigour but it 
wasn’t bad actually, we got a lot of individual attention but it was 
limited by the fact that there weren’t an awful lot of subjects 
available.   
 
The Laurel Bank girls were sheltered from the effects of war while they 
were in Perthshire.  Margaret said:   
 
We didn’t get much in the way of newspapers and I don’t remember 
we heard a radio so we were kind of insulated from the news of the 
day which at that time was the phoney war anyway.  But as far as 
school work went we could carry on quite well with languages but we 
never had very good science teaching. 
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Appendix 14 
 
Interview with Pat, recorded on 20 July 2010. 
 
Evacuated:  Tighnabruaich, 1 September 1939. 
  Duration: Two weeks. 
  Dumbarton, March 1941. 
  Duration: 10 months. 
 
Pat was evacuated with her twin brother at the beginning of the war.  She 
was extremely unhappy and very homesick although the people they were 
billeted with were very good to them and treated them well.  Pat described 
how she first realised that being evacuated was more than just a temporary 
arrangement.  She said: 
 
…it was a brother and two sisters…they were very friendly.  …they 
were lovely people.  They had hens and all that in the back yard, and 
they had fruit trees.  Of course then you didn’t know how long you 
were going to be there for.  To us, we thought it was part of a holiday, 
you were so young…and then it dawned on you really, here I am, 
staying here. 
 
Pat’s surprise and excitement about being able to return to her home in 
Clydebank was described in emotional terms.  Her description of what 
happened possibly reflected the feelings of many of the children who were 
sent away in the first wave of the evacuation scheme.  She said: 
 
I was walking along the sea front…feeling sorry for myself …and I 
could see two women each carrying a child in their arms and another 
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woman, but I wasn’t paying attention to them.  …the next minute I 
heard a voice shouting ‘Trisha’ and when I looked over it was my 
mother.  …my heart just lifted. 
So that must have been that, two weeks it must have been but to me it 
felt like eternity.  
 
Pat was settled back in Clydebank when the town was bombed.  She and her 
sister remembered with sadness the loss of friends and neighbours when a 
shelter near their home was bombed and all the women who were sitting on 
one side of the shelter were killed.  The men sitting on the opposite side all 
survived.  After the raids the family moved to Dumbarton for ten months 
until they could return to Clydebank. 
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Appendix 15 
 
Interview with Colin, 4 February 2015. 
 
Evacuated:  Cardross, Argyll, March 1941. 
  Duration: unknown. 
  Helensburgh, date unknown. 
  Duration: unknown. 
  
Colin’s interview was brief and not recorded as he had spent some 
considerable time writing out the story of his life during the war.  He was 
happy to pass on his story to be used in this thesis.   
 
The family evacuation to Cardross after the bombing in Clydebank was a 
lasting memory of the time.  Colin and his siblings were separated from their 
mother for six weeks during their stay in Cardross and his story helps 
reinforce the personal trauma of separation which has, to some extent, been 
missed from existing accounts of the history of evacuation.  Colin’s account 
of life as an evacuee also drew attention to how aware children could be of 
their social status.  Colin freely admitted he remembered very little about 
war until after the family were settled in Cardross.  He said: 
 
I am not sure exactly where we were taken to after leaving Cardross.  
We were to stay in various places following our evacuation from 
Clydebank.  My instinct tells me we were taken to Helensburgh, to a 
place up in Queen Street.  As near as we could get to living like toffs! 
 
He goes on to give a description of where they were billeted in Helensburgh 
and compared it with his home in Clydebank: 
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Our living accommodation was in a large room above which could 
have been stables or perhaps a garage.  The room was huge and we 
were only using half of it.  Compared to Gordon Street it was like a 
palace. 
… You can imagine that we thought that we were in heaven. 
 
Colin’s awareness of the social divide was evident in his school life too.  
When the family were finally settled back in Clydebank and he was enrolled 
into Junior Secondary School he wrote that: 
 
In our class you could easily tell the ones who were better off.  They 
always had a proper play piece.  If we had a buttered scone we 
thought we’d won the pools. 
   
Colin’s narrative was also concerned with the problem of separation and 
abandonment he felt at the time.  The family lived in various places during 
their evacuation although Colin has no recollection of how long they spent 
in each place.  All this he had been able to deal with until he and his siblings 
were separated from their mother suddenly and without explanation.  This 
was something he would never forget.  He said: 
 
…the family were split up for some time, and for part of that time my 
mother simply disappeared.  This was a constant worry to me and I 
think the not knowing where she’d gone was the worst part.   
 
During the interview Colin looked at a photograph of himself with his 
family when they were all evacuated.  With regret he said that there was no 
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one left to ask what had happened to their mother during the time she had 
disappeared.  He thought she may have been admitted to Airthrey Castle 
Maternity Home but he has no way of verifying this. 
 
Colin’s testimony also drew attention to absent fathers and gave some 
indication of how difficult it would have been for parents to reintegrate with 
their family.  His father had enlisted in the army and he wrote about his 
homecoming when some of the family believed he was a stranger.  He said 
while they were in Helensburgh there was a knock on the door: 
 
My brother Bobby was sent to answer it.  Back he comes to tell 
mother that there was a soldier at the door.  Mother hurries to the door 
only to return with the said soldier.  ‘You silly beggar’ she said ‘that’s 
your father’.  …I had no idea how long he was away, but it was long 
enough for his family to have forgotten him. 
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Appendix 16 
 
Interview with James, 4 February 2015. 
 
Evacuated:  Kilmun, Argyll, 1 September 1939. 
Duration: Approximately one year. 
  Helensburgh, March 1941. 
Duration:  unknown. 
  Cardrosspark Children’s Home, possibly April 1941.  
  Six weeks. 
 
James’s narrative failed to record and therefore had to be written out and 
verified on the day of the interview.  A significant part of James’s story 
focused on events in his life after the war.  There were however issues raised 
concerning education and separation which were particularly relevant to the 
themes discussed in this thesis.     
 
At the beginning of the war James was evacuated to Kilmun and stayed there 
until the autumn of 1940.  Throughout the time he was evacuated he did not 
feel that his education had suffered.  He recalled: 
 
The school was still closed and the local teacher decided she was 
going to start a class for us.  There were probably about a dozen boys 
in the morning and the girls in the afternoon.  She was a wonderful 
teacher. 
 
The problem was that when James returned to Clydebank he was in his final 
year of school.  He said: 
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I went to High School for my final year but I couldn’t get a leaving 
certificate.  I left school at thirteen and began work as a window 
cleaner then eventually I worked with my father as a chimney sweep. 
 
James accepted the fact that he was unable to continue his education beyond 
the age of thirteen, and that he missed out on job opportunities due to the 
curtailment of the junior leaving certificate during the war.  This 
demonstration of acceptance continued in James’s narrative as he explained 
what happened when the family were once again evacuated after Clydebank 
was bombed.  At that time the family were evacuated to Helensburgh and his 
mother was pregnant and spent time in Airthrey Castle where she had the 
baby.   He said, ‘…the rest of the children were taken to Cardrosspark 
Children’s Home and we stayed there for six weeks’.  As a result of being 
told what was happening James did not suffer from any separation or 
abandonment issues when he and his siblings were sent to the Children’s 
Home.        
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Appendix 17   
 
Interview with Christine, recorded on 21 July 2010. 
Evacuated:  Draffin Farm, Forfar. 1 September 1939. 
Duration: unknown (possibly two years). 
   
 
Christine’s narrative began from the time she arrived in Forfar with her 
mother and aunt and four children.  Christine admitted that there was not 
terribly much she remembered about her evacuation as she was just six or 
seven years old at the time.  She did remember that the place where she and 
her family were billeted was fairly remote and was relatively primitive 
compared with her home in Glasgow.  She said the place was ‘very derelict’.  
There was no running water and bathing was done in a zinc bath once a 
week, a process which took place in the scullery.  Bathing was followed by a 
process of hair combing with a nit comb.   
 
There were no buses to take the children to school and the children had a 
long walk through country lanes to get there every day.  Nevertheless she 
was not unhappy as an evacuee.   
 
Life in the country was very different for Christine than the one she had 
known in Glasgow.  However, when the family returned from Forfar life in 
Glasgow had changed in the aftermath of the Clydebank bombing and she 
had to get used to this.  She recalled the dangers involved in the process that 
was adopted in case of an emergency.  She said that: 
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…in front of the close there was an air raid shelter.  There was a 
barricade thing so that if any bombs fell they wouldn’t go in …the 
debris wouldn’t go into the close …we were always told to go to the 
low down houses.  When you think about it we would have been 
trapped but nobody knew.       
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Appendix 18 
 
Interview with Isa, Charlie, Colin and Liz, recorded on 30 March 2015. 
 
This was a focus group interview where three of the respondents had been 
evacuated after the Clydebank Blitz.  All respondents are involved with the 
Clydebank Life Story Group who hold a writing workshop once a month.  
They kindly offered to tell their story collectively although Charlie and 
Colin had given separate interviews.  From among this group Isa’s testimony 
is the one which had not been heard on a previous occasion and Liz had not 
been involved in the evacuation process at all.  She had come to the group in 
the hope of being able to add something of value to the story of Clydebank 
in wartime. 
 
The interview began with a discussion concerning the Clydebank blitz.  All 
the members of the group questioned the validity of the statistics in relation 
to the number of Clydebank residents who were killed during the blitz and of 
the number of homes that were damaged or destroyed.  They believed 
collectively that more had died than was reported.  They were also in 
agreement with Colin that it was what he called, ‘…these urban myths that 
grow up’.  Colin questioned the statistics relating to the blitz and asked, 
‘…who found out that there were only five houses undamaged?’ 
 
Isa’s memory of the blitz is still clear.  After seventy-five years she said: 
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…at night when I am lying in bed and I wake up and hear a plane 
going over it brings it all back.  It is just as though it happened 
yesterday.  Oh! Yes, you don’t forget. 
 
Isa and her family had to be evacuated after their home was bombed in 
March 1941.  She explained that her family lost everything her parents had 
built up from twenty-seven years of marriage: 
 
…we were left with not a teaspoon.  …we joined the queue and we 
got on the bus and they were not allowed to tell us where we were 
being taken.  We travelled through all the fires and passed the Singer 
wood yard which had burnt for weeks and the Esso tanks.  …we got 
to Alexandria and we were taken into a church hall and we were there 
for a fortnight sleeping on the floor.  …the people of Alexandria 
couldn’t have been better.  They helped us such a lot.  …there was a 
Mission Hall in Alexandria and they owned a row of old people’s 
cottages…they cleared out two attics and gave us these.  …people of 
Alexandria came with bedding and china and cutlery because there 
was absolutely nothing… 
 
After two years the family returned to a new home in Clydebank and 
afterwards Isa’s parents never talked about what happened.  She said: 
 
…We just took it, it had happened and we had to get over it and I  
think sometimes they must have wanted to forget about it.  
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Charlie and Colin agreed.  Colin said: ‘…I think a lot of our parents…just 
shut it out completely’. 
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Appendix 19 
Respondent List 
Name 
 
 
Date of 
Interview 
Date of 
evacuation 
and age 
when 
evacuated 
Destination Duration 
David 6 July 2010 Not evacuated 
but lived in 
Dunning 
when the 
evacuees 
came – age 8 
  
Sheila 6 July 2010 September 
1939 – 
Privately 
evacuated 
Dunning, 
Perthshire 
Two weeks 
Jim 6 July 2010 Not evacuated 
but lived in 
Dunning 
when the 
evacuees 
came and his 
family 
provided 
accommodati
on to two 
evacuees 
  
Les 6 July 2010 September 
1939 – age 7 
Dunning, 
Perthshire 
Five/six 
years 
Edna 20 July 
2010 
September 
1939 – age 6 
Dunning, 
Perthshire 
Five years 
Mary 24 July 
2010 
Not evacuated 
but had 
evacuees stay 
at the family 
home for two 
years 
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Irene 25 July 
2010 
September 
1919 
Alloa,  
Clackmannan 
 
Stirling 
Unknown 
 
 
Two years 
John  1 July 2011 September 
1939 – age 8 
Drumoak, 
Aberdeen 
Four 
weeks 
Joan 1 July 2011 September 
1939 – age 9 - 
Privately 
evacuated 
Cumnock, 
Ayrshire 
Nine 
months 
Ina 4 July 2011 September 
1939 – age 8 
March 1941 –  
age 9 
 
Coull, Aberdeen 
 
Dunblane, 
Perthshire 
Two 
months 
 
Two years 
 
Chrissie 4 July 2011 September 
1939 – age 8 
March 1941 – 
age 9 
Inverurie, 
Aberdeenshire 
Girvan, Ayrshire 
Unknown 
duration 
Unknown 
duration – 
mother 
missed her 
and 
brought 
her home 
David 4 July 2011 September 
1939 – age 11 
Privately 
evacuated 
Lanark One year 
Pat 20 July 
2010 
September 
1939 – age 5 
Tighnabruaich, 
Kyles of Bute 
Two weeks 
Christine 21 July 
2010 
September 
1939 – age 6/7 
Draffin Farm, 
Forfar 
Unknown 
(possibly 
seven 
weeks) 
Jack 10 July 
2012 
September 
1939 – age 9 
Privately 
evacuated 
Rothesay, Isle of 
Bute 
Three 
months 
Barbara 20 June 
2014 
September 
1939 – age 5 
Banff, 
Aberdeenshire 
Four/five 
months 
Charlie 17 October 
2014 
March 1941 - 
age 11 
March 1942 - 
age 12 
March 1944 - 
age 14   
Coatbridge, 
Lanarkshire 
Renfrew, 
Renfrewshire 
Whitecrook, 
Clydebank 
 
One year 
 
Two years 
One year 
Violet 17 October 
2014 
March 1941 – 
age 18 
Helensburgh Six 
months 
Honour 13 
November 
2014 
September 
1939 – age 
(unknown) 
Strathallan Castle, 
Perthshire  
(Juniors of Laurel 
Bank School, 
Glasgow)   
Six weeks 
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Dennis 21 
November 
2014 
March 1941 – 
age 6 
Helensburgh Two years 
and eight 
months 
Margaret 29 
December 
2014 
September 
1939 – age 17 
Auchterarder, 
Perthshire 
(Seniors of Laurel 
Bank School, 
Glasgow) 
One year 
Colin 4 February 
2015 
March 1941 – 
age unknown 
Cardross, 
Helensburgh, Rhu, 
Cardross Park 
Children’s Home,  
Unknown 
James 4 February 
2015 
September 
1939 – age 
unknown 
 
March 1941 – 
age unknown 
Kilmun, Argyll 
and Bute 
 
Helensburgh and 
Cardross Park 
Children’s Home 
One year 
 
 
Unknown  
Focus Group of Isa, Charlie, Colin and 
Liz  
(Liz was not evacuated and Charlie and 
Colin were interviewed separately at 
different times so only Isa is mentioned 
here) 
30 March 
2015 
March 1941 Alexandria, 
Dunbartonshire 
Two years 
 
Rosa 13 July 
2016 
Evacuated to 
Britain on the 
first 
Kindertransp
ort – 
December 
1938 – age 13 
London – then 
Scotland 
Rosa 
never went 
back to 
Germany 
– she is 
now 90 + 
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